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INTRODUCTION
Much scholarly attention has focused on possible impediments to both science and innovation arising from extensions of
patent protection to research tools and to other upstream
knowledge assets in ways that threaten to undermine the coop1
erative norms of basic scientific research. Until recently, however, far less attention has been paid to the growing capacity of
global copyright law and related rights to impede access to, and
use of, the cumulative scientific literature and data that digi-

1. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Noncompliance, Nonenforcement,
Nonproblem? Rethinking the Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45 HOUS.
L. REV. 1059, 1093–97 (2008); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can
Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI.
698, 698–701 (1998), available at http://www.sciencemag.org/content/280/5364/
.698full.pdf; Kenneth G. Huang & Fiona E. Murray, Does Patent Strategy
Shape the Long-Run Supply of Public Knowledge? Evidence from Human Genetics, 52 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1193, 1193 (2009) (finding that gene patents decrease public genetic knowledge); Fiona Murray & Scott Stern, When Ideas Are
Not Free: The Impact of Patents on Scientific Research, 7 INNOVATION POL’Y &
ECON. 33, 54 –60 (2006) (finding some evidence that patents reduce the use of
knowledge); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 94 –100, 115–29
(1999). See generally DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL
INNOVATION: UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT 184 –92 (2004) (discussing potential risks of patenting scientific research); Fiona Murray & Siobhán O’Mahony, Exploring the
Foundations of Cumulative Innovation: Implications for Organization Science,
18 ORG. SCI. 1006, 1009–17 (2007) (discussing the importance of access to
knowledge for innovation); Anthony D. So et al., Is Bayh-Dole Good for Developing Countries? Lessons from the US Experience, 6 PLOS BIOLOGY 2078 passim (2008), available at http://www.plosbiology.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10
.1371%2Fjournal.pbio.0060262 (commenting that attributing U.S. economic
growth to the Bayh-Dole Act is misleading).
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tally integrated scientific research methods massively ingest.
In this Article, we contend that this latter phenomenon poses a
more immediate and pervasive threat to basic scientific research methods today than the still controversial claims about
thickets of rights and anticommons effects attributed to excess3
es of the patent system in recent years.
A. POTENTIALLY BOUNDLESS SCIENTIFIC OPPORTUNITIES IN
THE DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT
Information technology is transforming fields as diverse as
4
molecular biology, especially genomics and proteomics, and
5
conservation ecology, while spawning new fields, such as

2. For pioneer works, see, for example, Reto Hilty, Copyright Law and
Scientific Research, in COPYRIGHT LAW, A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 315, 318–21 (Paul Torremans ed., 2007) [hereinafter Hilty, Copyright
Law and Scientific Research]; Reto Hilty, Five Lessons About Copyright in the
Information Society: Reaction of the Scientific Community to Over-Protection
and What Policy Makers Should Learn, 53 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 103,
109–18 (2006) [hereinafter Hilty, Five Lessons About Copyright]; Jerome H.
Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons
for Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment,
66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 315, 319–22, 396–413 (2003); Matthew Sag, Copyright and Copy-Reliant Technology, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1607, 1607–16 (2009)
(finding the fair use doctrine crucial to information dissemination); Pamela
Samuelson, Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science, 293 SCI. 2028 passim
(2001), available at http://www.sciencemag.org/content/293/5537/2028.full.pdf;
see also infra Part I.
3. See generally JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL MEURER, PATENT FAILURE:
HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 1–6
(2008) (finding that the costs associated with patents have often exceeded
their benefits); JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 49–53 (2008) (stressing
that the types of patentable subject matter have grown); DAN BURK & MARK
A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 154 –61
(2009); MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES 16–20, 49–69
(2008) (discussing how anticommons can create innovation gridlock). But see
Christopher M. Holman, The Impact of Human Gene Patents on Innovation
and Access: A Survey of Human Gene Patent Litigation, 76 UMKC L. REV. 295,
297–301 (2007) (minimizing the effects of utilitarian patent thicket objections).
4. See, e.g., COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS IN GENOMIC AND
PROTEIN RESEARCH & NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMICS AND PROTEOMIC RESEARCH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION, AND PUBLIC HEALTH 1 (2006); COMM. ON A NEW BIOLOGY FOR THE
21ST CENTURY & NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, A NEW BIOLOGY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 49–52 (2009) [hereinafter A NEW BIOLOGY].
5. See, e.g., JAMES B. CAMPBELL, INTRODUCTION TO REMOTE SENSING xv
(4th ed. 2007); Karin S. Fassnacht et al., Key Issues in Making and Using Satellite-based Maps in Ecology: A Primer, 222 FOREST ECOLOGY & MGMT. 167,
167 (2006).
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7

metagenomics and metabolomics. The combination of massive
storage capacity, powerful data manipulation techniques, and
graphical capabilities has revolutionized both how basic research is conducted and how the resulting knowledge is pre8
served and disseminated in nearly all fields of science. These
methodologies have also helped to generate networked communities of users and collaborators, often working in dynamic
6. Metagenomics has been defined as “the application of modern genomics techniques to the study of communities of microbial organisms directly
in their natural environments, bypassing the need for isolation and lab cultivation of individual species.” Kevin Chen & Lior Pachter, Bioinformatics for
Whole-Genome Shotgun Sequencing of Microbial Communities, 1 PLOS COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY 0106, 0106 (2005), available at http://www.ploscompbiol.org/
article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pcbi.0010024. Advances in bioinformatics, refinements of DNA amplification, and the expansion of computational
power have greatly facilitated analysis of DNA sequences recovered from environmental samples. These advances have enabled the adaptation of shotgun
sequencing to metagenomics samples, for example, in global ocean sampling expeditions. See generally Mya Breitbart et al., Genomic Analysis of Uncultured
Marine Viral Communities, 99 PROCEEDINGS NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S.A. 14250
passim (2002); J. Craig Venter et al., Environmental Genome Shotgun Sequencing of the Sargasso Sea, 304 SCI. 66, 66–67 (2004), available at
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/304/5667/66.full.pdf.
7. “Metabolomics is the systematic study of the unique chemical fingerprints that specific cellular processes leave behind,” i.e., the study of their
small-molecule metabolite profiles. Bennett Daviss, Growing Pains for Metabolomics, SCIENTIST, Apr. 25, 2005, at 25–28. A closely related field is
“metabonomics,” which extends metabolic profiling at the cellular or any level
to include information about perturbations of metabolism caused by environmental factors and other extragenomic influences, such as gut microflora. See
generally D.G. Robertson, Metabonomics in Toxicology: A Review, 85 TOXICOLOGICAL SCIS. 809, 809–10, 815–18 (2005) (comparing metabonomics with
metabolomics and discussing the latter’s impact on toxicology). These disciplines rely heavily on mass spectrometry and nuclear magnetic resonance
spectroscopy, among other detection methods, and on complex statistical software programs that analyze the data resulting from the use of these tools. See,
e.g., METABOLOMICS: METHODS AND PROTOCOLS vii–viii, 142, 229–46 (Wolfram Weckwerth ed., 2007); METAGENOMICS: THE FRONTIER OF SYSTEMS BIOLOGY 2–5, 8, 26–32 (M. Tomita & T. Nishioka eds., 2005). For the aspirations of
systems biology and functional genomics to integrate proteomic,
transcriptomic, and metabolomic information into a more complete picture of
living organisms, see A NEW BIOLOGY, supra note 4, at 21–38.
8. Scholars are attempting to discuss and understand the impact of this
newer ability to share large amounts of scientific research. See generally papers presented at The Future of Scientific Knowledge Discovery in Open Networked Environments: A National Symposium and Workshop, Bd. on Res. Data and Info. in Collaboration with Computer Sci. and Telecomm. Bd., Nat’l
Acad. of Scis., Washington D.C., March 10–11, 2011, available at http://sites
.nationalacademies.org/PGA/brdi/PGA_060424. For another example, see The
Digital Side of Biology, AGENCY FOR SCI., TECH. & RES. (Mar. 2, 2011),
http://www.research.a-star.edu.sg/feature-and-innovation/6291
(describing
huge changes to biological research stemming from digital technology).
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knowledge hubs, whose interactive communications steer com10
putational applications in potentially more fruitful directions
11
and fill open repositories with new data and information.
In this promising new research environment, scientists increasingly rely on automated knowledge discovery tools to mine
and recombine vast amounts of data and literature that are
flowing at rates that exceed the capacity of a single investigator
12
to comprehend and manage. Exploitation of these new opportunities, in turn, requires integration of information and data
scattered over a broad range of articles and databases that may
or may not be available online for extensive computational re13
search. For example, the use of networked computational
techniques for linking global collections of articles and data to
generate relevant research results, makes it possible to build
9. See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 68–90 (2006); SCOTT
STERN, BIOLOGICAL RESOURCE CENTERS: KNOWLEDGE HUBS FOR THE LIFE
SCIENCES 36–55 (2004); Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 1017–20 (2005).
10. See, e.g., James Boyle, Mertonianism Unbound? Imagining Free, Decentralized Access to Most Cultural and Scientific Material, in UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE AS A COMMONS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 123, 123–40
(Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom eds., 2007) [hereinafter KNOWLEDGE AS A
COMMONS]; Paul W. Jeffreys, The Developing Concept of e-Research, in WORLD
WIDE RESEARCH: RESHAPING THE SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES 51, 51–52 (William H. Dutton & Paul W. Jeffreys eds., 2010) (noting that cooperation between research groups is necessary to perform complex research and analysis,
and describing the pooling of “computational resources and research skills”);
THE METAGENOMICS RAST SERVER (MG-RAST ), http://metagenomics.anl.gov
( last visited Apr. 16, 2012) (community resource for metagenome data set
analysis).
11. See Jeffreys, supra note 10, at 51 (noting the possibility of a “data
deluge”).
12. See, e.g., Mark Segal, Accessing Microbiological Data: A User’s Perspective, in DESIGNING THE MICROBIAL RESEARCH COMMONS: PROCEEDINGS
OF AN INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP 161, 161–63 (Paul F. Uhlir ed., 2011) [hereinafter DESIGNING THE MICROBIAL RESEARCH COMMONS]; Thinh Nguyen, The
Web-Enabled Research Commons: Applications, Goals, and Trends, in DESIGNING THE MICROBIAL RESEARCH COMMONS, supra, at 91, 94.
13. See, e.g., Minna Allarakhia, Microbial Commons: Governing Complex
Knowledge Assets, in DESIGNING THE MICROBIAL RESEARCH COMMONS, supra
note 12, at 145, 148; NANCY L. MARON & K. KIRBY SMITH, CURRENT MODELS
OF DIGITAL SCHOLARLY COMMUNICATION, ASS’N OF RES. LIBRARIES 27 (Nov.
2008), http://www.arl.org/bm~doc/current-models-report.pdf; Victoria Stodden,
Open Science: Policy Implications for the Evolving Phenomenon of User-Led
Scientific Innovation, J. SCI. COMM. 2–6 (Mar. 22, 2010), http://jcom.sissa.it/
archive/09/01/Jcom0901%282010%29A05/Jcom0901%282010%29A05.pdf. For
similar applications to digital research in the humanities, see, for example, Sag,
supra note 2, at 1607–08, 1611–12.
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field-specific knowledge repositories that capture reams of relevant scientific data and technical information and to apply gen14
eral data-mining tools in the chosen environment. Users receive value when such tools can also be readily applied to the
scientific literature.
The digitization of research inputs and outputs has thus
engendered opportunities for the enhanced speed of dissemination of publicly funded scientific data, for the development of
high performing search engines that diminish the search time
for publications, and for automated cross-linking and textmining based on standardized metadata. The goal of this digital infrastructure should be to maximize these opportunities for
public research institutes and universities in both developed
and developing countries, while maintaining the classical functions of certification and diffusion of research results of the
predigital print markets.
B. COPYRIGHT AND RELATED LAWS AS DIGITAL GRIDLOCK
To make full use of search engines, data-mining techniques, and other automated knowledge discovery tools, scientists need unrestricted access to a broad range of journals and
databases, and unrestricted rights to extract, use, and reuse
the published research results they contain for purposes of fu15
ture research. The convergence of computerized technologies
and telecommunications networks has now made this goal theoretically feasible, and the sharing norms of science pull in the
16
same direction. Researchers anywhere should, in principle, be
able to locate, analyze, and disaggregate collections of scientific
information and data once they have been digitally transmitted
and made available to the public, subject only to the prevailing
17
community norms of attributions.
14. See, e.g., Peter Dawyndt et al., Knowledge Accumulation and Resolution of Data Inconsistencies During the Integration of Microbial Information
Sources, 17 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON KNOWLEDGE AND DATA ENGINEERING
1111, 1111–12, 1124 (2005).
15. See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text.
16. See generally OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-ITC-622, WIRELESS
TECHNOLOGIES AND THE NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE 27–28 (2005) (explaining
the benefits and challenges of wireless information sharing).
17. The scientists’ incentives flow primarily from reputational benefits,
not pecuniary interests, with regard to actual publication of upstream research results, and the costs of the research itself are normally borne by public
funders, foundations, and universities. However, scientists do have an interest
in not sharing either results or data until they can obtain these reputational
benefits via publication. See Karen A. Jordan, Financial Conflicts of Interest in
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In reality, intellectual property laws, as currently configured, stand in the way of attaining these goals. Since the
1990s, in particular, there has been an unprecedented extension of copyright law and related rights protecting both literature and collections of data into the realm of basic science, with
18
no adequate exceptions for research as such. These developments tend to subject the growing profusion of scientific data
and information to the same unbridled proprietary impulses
that have lately dominated the regulation of creative endeavors
19
in the traditional arts.
For example, global copyright laws automatically confer
20
exclusive proprietary rights on authors of scientific literature,
21
who routinely transfer those rights to commercial publishers.
Database protection laws, now enacted in more than fifty-five
countries, simultaneously endow compilers and publishers (as
assignees) with exclusive rights to the very data that copyright
22
laws traditionally left unprotected. Publishers, in turn, surround both scientific data and literature with a variety of technological protection measures (TPMs)—so-called electronic
fences and digital locks—that cannot be penetrated or pried
open even for purposes of scientific research without violating
global norms rooted in an array of multilateral, regional, and
bilateral treaties, as well as in a host of national legislative and
23
regulatory instruments.
Human Subjects Research: Proposals for a More Effective Regulatory Scheme,
60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 15, 92–94 (2003) (noting importance of publication
and priority for scientists); Philip M. Davis & Matthew J. L. Connolly, Institutional Repositories: Evaluating the Reasons for Non-Use of Cornell University’s
Installation of DSpace, D-LIB MAG. (Mar./Apr. 2007), http://www.dlib.org/dlib/
march07/davis/03davis.html (noting researchers’ reluctance to release results
before publication).
18. See infra Part I.
19. See BOYLE, supra note 3, at 122–59 (discussing the harmful consequences of over extending music copyrights).
20. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
art. 9.1, Apr. 15, 1994, 108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS
Agreement]; Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works arts. 2, 5; Sept. 9, 1886, 1161 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Berne Convention (1971)] (as last revised at Paris on July 24, 1971). The TRIPS Agreement
incorporated the Berne Convention (1971) into the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154
[hereinafter Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization].
21. See infra Part III.
22. See Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 11 March 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20, 21
[hereinafter Database Directive].
23. See infra Part I.C.2.
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The end result is a growing conflict between private rights
and public goods at the core of today’s most promising research
24
techniques. Enlightened policymakers view these upstream
data and information resources as public goods that need to be
widely shared in order to produce more downstream commer25
cial applications that advance public welfare. In contrast, intellectual property laws now impede access to scientific data
and literature, just at the time when developments in scientific
research methods require the use of automated knowledge discovery tools that depend on unfettered access and re-use condi26
tions for their successful applications.
C. NATURE AND SCOPE OF THIS ARTICLE
This Article examines the complex challenges posed by
copyright and related laws for digitally integrated scientific research, which have emerged, piece by piece, from several decades of disjointed legislative initiatives undertaken at the global, regional, and national levels. We explain how this state of
affairs came about and why fairly radical legislative reforms
would be needed to undo the harm that this tangled regulatory
net inflicts on global scientific research. More realistically, we
then explore a number of self-help measures that the scientific
24. See Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of
Private Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 3, 3–45 (K.E. Maskus & Jerome H.
Reichman eds., 2005) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP]
(discussing IP roadblocks to the diffusion of public knowledge). See generally
Peter Drahos, The Regulation of Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
GOODS AND IP, supra, at 48, 61–64 (commenting on the impact of IP treaties
on developing nations’ access to public goods); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Knowledge as
a Global Public Good, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 308, 308–20 (Inge Kaul et al. eds., 1999) (explaining how knowledge is a global public good).
25. See, e.g., Paul David, The Economic Logic of “Open Science” and the
Balance Between Private Property Rights and the Public Domain in Scientific
Data and Information: A Primer, in THE ROLE OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL
DATA AND INFORMATION IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 19, 19–34 (Julie M. Esanu &
Paul F. Uhlir eds., 2003); Paul Uhlir, Discussion Framework, in THE ROLE OF
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DATA AND INFORMATION IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN,
supra, at 3, 3–4 (discussing public welfare advantages of sharing scientific
knowledge and data widely).
26. See IAN HARGREAVES, DIGITAL OPPORTUNITY: A REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GROWTH 46–47 (2011); David, supra note 25, at 27–28.
Except, of course, for the growing number of scientific journals whose publishers have adopted full or partial open access policies. See, e.g., infra notes 496–
507 and accompanying text.
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community could itself adopt to alleviate some of the pressures
emanating from a bevy of poorly conceived intellectual property
laws. The overall goal is to persuade policymakers to avoid
measures that might further fragment and balkanize the research environment and to affirmatively empower the public
good functions of these laws once again, with a view to stimulating more and better scientific outputs and more downstream
commercial applications.
In Part I, we map the historical context and evolution of
the current deep divide between copyright law and science.
Given that digital scientific research is necessarily global in its
sweep, we focus considerable attention on comparative laws
that tend to fragment essential research inputs into diversely
accessible territorial compartments and to marginalize the
need for unified fields of enquiry. We demonstrate that, under
current conditions, scientists using automated knowledge discovery tools will likely become collective infringers of both domestic and international copyright laws and of national data27
base protection laws where applicable.
In Part II, we assess the limits of incremental legislative or
judicial action traditionally associated with copyright reform
processes and make the case for a strong and broad exception
for scientific research. Such an exception, we argue, must be
buttressed by imposing limits on the use of digital locks and related contractual restraints on users, lest publicly funded science become a hostage to the privatization impulses engendered by para-copyright regimes. We further propose
complementary reforms to both national database protection
laws and international intellectual property standards consistent with the need to empower e-science to flourish in a digitally integrated research space.
Finally, in Part III we argue that the best outcome for the
future of scientific research may well be for the scientific community itself to take responsibility for managing the conditions
under which its own knowledge assets will be created and deployed. We reconsider the wisdom of continuing to rely on proprietary publishing intermediaries in an environment increas27. Cf. JOHN TEHRANIAN, INFRINGEMENT NATION: COPYRIGHT 2.0 AND
YOU xix–xxi (2011) (noting how easily individuals can violate modern day copyright laws); Sag, supra note 2, at 1608 (stating that “[c]opy-reliant technologies tend to interact with copyrighted works by copying them routinely, automatically, and indiscriminately. These technologies are vital to the operation
of the Internet, but they are vulnerable to claims of copyright infringement at
key stages of their operation”).
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ingly characterized by an array of promising open access options. This Article concludes with some final observations on
the need to overcome the disconnect between private rights and
public scientific research goals as a step towards the elaboration of a more rational, long-term innovation policy.
I. THE GROWING DIVIDE BETWEEN COPYRIGHT LAW
AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE
Traditionally, copyright law and science operated in two
relatively distinct spheres, with patents seen as the primary
source of incentives for applications of research results to industry. Although most national copyright laws protected scien28
tific literature, this protection narrowly covered the author’s
mode of expressing research results, and not facts, data, or ide29
as as such. In a major decision in 1991, the U.S. Supreme
30
Court further truncated compilers’ rights by allowing third
parties to make use of the disparate facts and data revealed
even in an otherwise eligible compilation, notwithstanding the
31
copyright owner’s exclusive right to prepare derivative works.
Since 1994, international copyright law has also cautiously limited protection of so-called factual works—that is, compilations
of facts and data—to their original selection and arrangement,
32
but not to the underlying facts and data themselves.
Questions about unauthorized reproductions of published
research results in scientific journals were typically resolved by
33
limitations and exceptions in the domestic copyright laws, es28. Cf. Berne Convention (1971), supra note 20, art. 2(1) (“The expression
‘literary and artistic works’ shall include every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its expression . . . .” (emphasis added)).
29. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)–( b) (2006). See generally Paul Edward
Geller, International Copyright: The Introduction, in 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE § 2, at para. 2(c) (Paul Edward Geller ed., 2011).
30. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “compilations”); id. § 103 (compilations
as subject matter); id. § 106 (exclusive rights).
31. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363–64
(1991).
32. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, arts. 9.2, 10.2; see also 1 SAM
RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS 484 (2d ed. 2006) (noting that compilations have “long received
protection under most national laws” and that protection for compilations is
required under Art. 2(5) of the Berne Convention).
33. Technically, “exclusions” refer to content excluded from protection,
while “exceptions” are “limitations” on the exclusive right in question. See
WIPO STANDING COMM. ON THE LAW OF PATENTS, EXCLUSIONS FROM PATENT-
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pecially a fair use exception in the United States and a private
34
use exception in European copyright laws, although these issues became much more complex with the advent of photocopy35
ing machines. Moreover, U.S. copyright law has long dedicated government-generated data and literature to the public
36
domain, a practice that, until recently, had been rejected by
many other members of the Organization for Economic Cooper37
ation and Development (OECD). What emerged, at least in
EXCEPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS TO PATENTEES’ RIGHTS 7 (2011),
available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_15/scp_15_3-annex1.pdf.
For historical and philosophical efforts, ultimately fruitless, to distinguish “exceptions” from “limitations” in copyright law, see Christophe Geiger, Promoting Creativity through Copyright Limitations: Reflections on the Concept of Exclusivity in Copyright Law, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 515, 518–24 (2010)
(finding that, in fact, “the terms . . . are always used together systematically in
international copyright treaties and European legislation”). Both terms now
often refer to “users’ rights” in the literature.
34. See infra Parts II.A.1 & II.A.2.
35. See generally PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY 63–116 (2003)
(describing conflicts between photocopying and copyright law); Barton Beebe,
An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 549, 559–60 (2008) (noting problems posed for fair use by photocopying technology).
36. Much of today’s most valuable scientific data and information is generated by government agencies or, increasingly, by intergovernmental consortiums of scientific undertakings. In the United States, copyright law denies
protection for all works that government employees produce within the scope
of their employment. See 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2006). Moreover, as a policy matter,
government-generated data is distributed to would-be users at the marginal
cost of dissemination, and does not reflect the actual cost of production. See
Office of Mgmt. & Budget Exec. Office of the President, Circular No. A-130
(Revised) (Nov. 28, 2000), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
files/omb/assets/omb/circulars/a130/a130trans4.pdf; COMM. ON ISSUES IN THE
TRANSBORDER FLOW OF SCIENTIFIC DATA ET AL., BITS OF POWER 111–13
(1997) [hereinafter BITS OF POWER].
37. See, e.g., Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, § 12 (Can.); Heather J.
Ritch, European Research Infrastructure Consortiums: Privately Ordered and
Publicly Funded Research Commons for Data 45–57 (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, Duke University) (on file with Goodson Library, Duke University).
See also Council Directive 2003/98, 2003 O.J. (L 345) 90 (EU). Efforts to move
these countries towards the U.S. position have produced mixed results. For
example, Australia, which still retains crown copyright, has reached results
similar to that in the United States by attaching Creative Commons licenses
to government-generated works. See Intellectual Property Principles for Australian Government Agencies, ATTORNEY-GENERAL’S DEPT. (Oct. 1, 2010),
http://www.ag.gov.au/Documents/Statement%20of%20IP%20Principles%20for
%20Australian%20Government%20Agencies2.pdf. The United Kingdom currently licenses government generated information and databases covered by
crown copyright under an Open Government Licence (OGL). OGL grants a
royalty-free, perpetual, non-exclusive licence to use the information, subject to
certain exemptions, including a requirement for attribution. See Open GovABILITY AND
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the United States, was a relatively benign regulatory tradition
that was further complemented by the sharing ethos of science,
which favors open access to published research results for purposes of verification and the progressive generation of further
38
research.
This traditional approach, however, has been subverted by
much discussed high-protectionist trends evolving in multiple
39
directions. For example, in an effort to restrain perceived acts
of misappropriation, some federal appellate courts in the
United States devised subtle doctrinal arguments to justify
greater protection of disparate facts and data than the Supreme Court’s “thin copyright” approach to compilations would
40
otherwise seem to have warranted. Outside the United States,
efforts to strengthen the protection of factual compilations led
some fifty-five countries, mostly, but not exclusively, affiliated
with the European Union, to enact sui generis database protection laws that deviate from copyright tradition by directly pro41
tecting facts and data as such.
Meanwhile, both the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights of 1994 (TRIPS Agreement) and
the World Intellectual Property Organization’s (WIPO) Copyernment Licence for Public Sector Information, THE NAT’L ARCHIVES,
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/ ( last visited
Apr. 16, 2012). Meanwhile, in the United States, some government agencies
have begun to license data suppliers from the private sector without waiving
ownership and intellectual property interests, while a bill to impose some form
of crown copyright on government-generated works has been presented to
Congress. See H.R. 5704, 111th Cong. (2010) ( proposing to allow faculty members at Department of Defense service academies and schools of professional
military education to obtain copyright in scholarly articles).
38. See Séverine Dusollier, Sharing Access to Intellectual Property
Through Private Ordering, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1391, 1401–02 (2007) (“Scientists and researchers have become increasingly opposed to the trend of the
biotech industry to patent more and more biotechnological inventions. They
have developed a strong ethos of sharing and a desire to keep the scientific
commons available to all.”); David E. Winickoff et al., Opening Stem Cell Research and Development: A Policy Proposal for the Management of Data, Intellectual Property, and Ethics, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 52, 54 (2009)
(noting the “tradition of openness and sharing in the biomedical sciences”).
39. See Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 2, at 420–25.
40. Compare CDN Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256, 1262 (9th Cir. 1999) (allowing estimates of prices to fall under copyright law), and CCC Info. Servs.
Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 67 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that logically organized price estimates can be original work of authorship), with Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991)
(concluding that facts are never protected under a “thin copyright” analysis of
compilations).
41. See Database Directive, supra note 22, art. 7; infra Part I.C.2.
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42

right Treaty of 1996 (WCT) have imposed outer boundaries on
limitations and exceptions to the exclusive rights recognized in
national copyright laws. These laws cast some doubt on the
continued ability of prior doctrinal tools to alleviate impedi43
ments to the conduct of scientific research. Finally, the advent
of digital technologies, and the global response to their impact
on the transmission of copyrighted works online, has led both
the United States and the European Union to adopt regulatory
44
regimes, ostensibly pursuant to the WCT, that can prevent
the use of most existing limitations and exceptions, and even
prevent third parties from accessing unprotectible facts and
45
ideas. As these privatizing trends increasingly encroach on
46
the realm of scientific research, access to basic knowledge inputs becomes ever more complicated and potentially difficult or
costly to obtain.
A. TWO CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES IN THE APPLICATION OF
COPYRIGHT LAW TO SCIENCE
The well-known philosophical differences between Continental “authors’ rights” laws, rooted in natural law tradition,
including protection of the author’s personality interest, and
the copyright laws of common law countries, rooted in utilitari47
an notions of social welfare, led logically to contrasting views
of limitations and exceptions to the basic bundle of authors’
42. See WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 10, Dec. 20, 1996, 112 Stat. 2860,
2186 U.N.T.S. 152 [hereinafter WCT]; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 13.
43. See infra Part II.B.
44. WCT, supra note 42, arts. 11–12.
45. See infra Part I.B. Bilateral trade agreements have extended these
approaches to many other countries, both developed and developing. See Robert Burrell & Kimberlee Weatherall, Exporting Controversy? Reactions to the
Copyright Provisions of the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement: Lessons for
U.S. Trade Policy, 2008 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 259 (analyzing U.S.Australia Free Trade Agreement); Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Prisoners’ Dilemma Posed by Free Trade Agreements: Can Open Access Provisions Provide
an Escape?, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 631, 641 (2011).
46. See Winickoff, supra note 38, at 54 –55 (describing increasing privatization of scientific research).
47. See F. Willem Grosheide, Paradigms in Copyright Law, in OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS: ESSAYS ON COPYRIGHT LAW 203, 203–28 (Brad Sherman
& Alain Strowel eds., 1994); Edward C. Walterscheid, The Nature of the Intellectual Property Clause: A Study in Historical Perspective (Part 1), 83 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 763, 770 (2001) (“Madison’s view that copyrights and
patents were monopolies that should be tolerated because of the public good
they could produce was in essence the common law justification for these limited-term monopolies.”).
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48

rights. Under the Continental tradition, largely embodied in
the Berne Convention of 1886, most uses of an author’s creative
49
work presumptively require compensation. Any exceptions to
or limitations on that principle should be narrowly drawn, lest
authors be saddled with obligations to finance public goods that
50
were not imposed on other forms of property. Under the copyright approach, instead, as elaborated most fully in the United
States, authors should receive only those entitlements needed
to overcome the risk of market failure posed by free-riding copiers, and these entitlements remain subject to carve outs that
51
support the public interest ab initio.
These different philosophical foundations produced two different approaches to limitations and exceptions bearing on the
exclusive rights that copyright law confers on authors of literary and artistic works. In Europe, the standard approach was
to establish a list of enumerated exceptions, with the understanding that activities not covered by any of the listed exceptions were usually proscribed, even if they sometimes appeared
52
to be natural extensions of an existing exception. These codi48. See, e.g., Martin Senftleben, Bridging the Differences Between Copyright’s Legal Traditions—The Emerging EC Fair Use Doctrine, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 521, 524 –27 (2010).
49. See Geiger, supra note 33, at 520, 527 (“The fact that an exempted use
is not necessarily a free use is important to keep in mind . . . . Copyright limitations do not mean that works can always be used free of charge, and legislatures may provide a right to appropriate remuneration for all uses that copyright limitations legitimate.”).
50. See, e.g., Senftleben, supra note 48, at 524 –25. But see Paul Edward
Geller, A German Approach to Fair Use: Test Cases for TRIPS Criteria for
Copyright Limitations, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 553, 555–601 (2010)
(noting new trend in German case law favoring liberal construction of limitations based on constitutional considerations). See also Senftleben, supra, at
525–26 (“From an economic perspective, it can be added that copyright monopolies, while spurring investment in new information products, also impede
follow-on innovation requiring the use of preexisting, protected material.
Hence, there is a delicate balance between freedom and protection inherent in
copyright law. The cultural innovation cycle supported by copyright law requires both rights broad enough to spur investment and creativity, and limitations broad enough to provide sufficient breathing space for freedom of expression and freedom of competition.”).
51. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (IP Clause); LYMAN RAY PATTERSON &
STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS’ RIGHTS
163–76 (1991); Ruth Okediji, Givers, Takers and Other Kinds of Users: A Fair
Use Doctrine for Cyberspace, 53 FLA. L. REV. 107, 155–61 (2001).
52. See Annette Kur, Of Oceans, Islands, and Inland Water—How Much
Room for Exceptions and Limitations under the Three-Step Test?, 8 RICH. J.
GLOBAL L. & BUS. 287, 295–96 (2009) (contrasting civil and common law approaches to copyright exceptions). Hence some states carved out more expan-
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fied exceptions thus need updating at regular intervals, and
they are interpreted narrowly by courts, who tend to view them
as undermining the dominant theme of authors’ property
53
rights.
In contrast, U.S. legislation combines a list of fairly specific
express exceptions to the exclusive rights of authors with a
broad fair use provision that carves out additional space for
noninfringing activity, usually transpiring within specified
54
normative guidelines. This open-ended carve-out then applies
not only to new situations not directly reached by the codified
list of exceptions, but it may sometimes retroactively expand
even the scope of those exceptions that are codified.
The differences between these two approaches have clearly
diminished over time, as policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic rely on both incentives to create and natural-propertyrights thinking to justify ever higher levels of copyright protec55
tion. Conversely, scholars in Europe increasingly focus attention on the need for an appropriate balance between protection
56
and free uses. As will be seen below, a degree of harmonization has also been superimposed upon all the domestic copyright laws of WTO Members by international law. Nonetheless,
these historical foundations help to explain the differences that
sive exceptions for science. See Sam Ricketson, International Conventions and
Treaties, in THE BOUNDARIES OF COPYRIGHT—ITS PROPER LIMITATIONS AND
EXCEPTIONS 3, 5–10 (Libby Baulch et al. eds., 1997) (noting recurring exceptions in national copyright laws for, inter alia, “general enhancement of scientific and intellectual discourse”).
53. See infra notes 164–198 and accompanying text; see also Christophe
Geiger, supra note 33, at 519–20 (noting narrow interpretation of copyright
limitations and exceptions in civil law countries).
54. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106–22 (2006); see also William W. Fisher, III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1704 (1988); Ruth L.
Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 75, 117–23 (2000); Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2537, 2618 (2009).
55. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT 10 (2001) (stating
that the traditions differ “more in emphasis than in outcome”); see also Jane C.
Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary
France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991, 1014 (1990) (noting that a mix of
both utilitarian and natural rights reasoning underlie French and United
States copyright laws). For an important attempt to reduce these differences
by a fuller interpretation of the Lockean justification for property rights, see
Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1544 –
45 (1993).
56. See, e.g., Geiger, supra note 33, at 517–18 (citing authorities);
Senftleben, supra note 48, at 525–26.
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still characterize the distinctive approaches to limitations and
exceptions in the European Union and the United States.
1. Harmonizing the Designated Limitations and Exceptions
that Defend Scientific Research in the European Union
In Continental Europe, limitations and exceptions to copyright law emerged from state practice and over time were large57
ly incorporated into revisions of the Berne Convention of 1886.
The Berne Convention thus supplied the primary harmonizing
platform for limitations and exceptions throughout the twentieth century, even though there still remained some undefined,
58
if contested, space for supplementary state action. In this context, early exceptions for science were squeezed into Article
10(2) of the Berne Convention, which as late as the Brussels
Revision of 1948 allowed States to provide exceptions for “excerpts from literary or artistic works in educational or scientific
publications,” but only “in so far as this inclusion is justified by
59
its purpose.”
Even this simple, if rigid, approach (still extant in the cop60
61
yright law of the United Kingdom), was not mandatory.
57. For an account of the development of limitations and exceptions in the
Berne Convention, see SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE
PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886–1986, at 477–548 (1987)
[hereinafter RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION]. For an overview of limitations and exceptions in the international copyright system, see Ruth L.
Okediji, The International Copyright System: Limitations, Exceptions and Public Interest Considerations for Developing Countries, Issue Paper No. 15,
UNCTAD - ICTSD PROJECT ON IPRS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (May
2006), available at http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/docs/Okediji%20-%20
Copyright%20and%20DC%20-%20Blue%2015.pdf; see also SAM RICKETSON,
WIPO STUDY ON LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED
RIGHTS IN THE DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT (2003) [hereinafter RICKETSON, WIPO
STUDY], available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_9/
sccr_9_7.pdf.
58. See Mihaly Ficsor, Copyright for the Digital Era: The WIPO “Internet”
Treaties, 21 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 197, 204 –05 (1997) (noting belief that
Berne allows some flexibility in creating and expanding limitations and
exceptions).
59. Berne Convention, art 10(2), 331 U.N.T.S. 217 (as revised at Brussels
on June 26, 1948).
60. See Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, §§ 29–30 (Eng.)
(amended to implement the 2001 European Union Copyright Directive), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/48/contents; Lionel Bently,
R. v. The Author: From Death Penalty to Community Service, 32 COLUM. J.L.
& ARTS 1, 99 (2008) (noting lack of flexibility in U.K. copyright law); Robert G.
Howell, Recent Copyright Developments: Harmonization Opportunities for
Canada, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 149, 170 (2003–04) (noting the “narrow”
nature of U.K. copyright infringement test).
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States attempting to facilitate science under its aegis need not
have followed any particular model or any agreed view of the
needs of science as distinct from or constrained by the economic
interests of authors and publishers.
Things changed, however, when at the Stockholm Revision
Conference in 1967, the Berne Convention formally incorporated an exclusive reproduction right into Article 9(1), along
with a three-step test for enabling exceptions to that same re62
production right in Article 9(2). That test confined national
legislation on exceptions to the reproduction right to “certain
special cases,” that did “not conflict with a normal exploitation
of the work” and that did “not unreasonably prejudice the legit63
imate interests of the author.”
Although nothing in this provision dealt expressly with
science, the legislative history confirms that it was intended to
64
govern the use of scientific literature for research purposes.
For this very reason, the express reference to science in regard
to permissible excerpts under Article 10(2) was deleted at the
65
same time. A truncated version of Article 10(2), which now only regards excerpts for teaching, was ultimately incorporated
66
into the 1971 Revision of the Berne Convention. The decision
61. RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION, supra note 57, at 499.
62. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
art. 9(1)–(2), Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter RBC 1967] (as revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967).
63. Id. art. 9(2). Both the legislative history and commentary suggest
that, as originally conceived, all three factors must be answered affirmatively
for any given national exception to satisfy this international minimum standard of legitimacy. See MARTIN SENFTLEBEN, COPYRIGHT, LIMITATIONS AND
THE THREE-STEP TEST 43–53 (2004); Ficsor, supra note 58, at 214 –15. But see
infra text accompanying notes 447–65.
64. RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 32, at 782, § 13.34.
65. Id.; see also RICKETSON, supra note 57, at 499. (“Article 10(2) no longer contains an exception for works ‘having a scientific character’ . . . . [It] was
deleted on the recommendation of the Working Group which took the view
that it was unnecessary ‘in view of the expansion of the field of science and the
number of exceptions to the right of reproduction which were already included
in the Convention’. This must be correct: the legitimate interests of scientific
research are now adequately served by the broader right of quotation allowed
under article 10(1) and by the general exception to reproduction rights allowed
under article 9(2).”).
66. See Berne Convention (1971), supra note 20, art. 10(2) ( permitting
“utilization, to the extent justified by the purpose of literary or artistic works
by way of illustration in publications . . . for teaching, provided such utilization is compatible with fair practice”). The 1971 text was largely incorporated
into the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 9.1, and is therefore binding on
some 153 WTO members.
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to deal with the principal exception for science under the newly
enacted three-step test of Article 9(2), rather than by means of
67
a separate provision, introduced new levels of uncertainty
about the scope of permissible scientific activities without
mandating any specific action favoring scientific research as
such.
Meanwhile, because the exceptions covered in the Berne
Convention still were not exhaustive, a number of states adopted supplementary measures. For example, language ambiguously allowing reproductions and other uses “for the sole purpose of illustration for teaching or scientific research” was
68
adopted in some national copyright laws. State practice in
mostly European countries also recognized a “private use” ex69
ception that enabled scientists to make verbatim copies by
70
hand of literary works for research purposes. It was this latter
provision that effectively promoted scientific research over-andabove other designated exceptions in the Berne Convention or
state copyright laws, at least until the advent of photocopying
machines, and then digital reproduction technologies, which led
to regulation of the use of these devices in the interest of pub71
lishers.
67. RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 32, § 13.37 (“The decision of the
Stockholm Conference to delete any list of permissible purposes leaves a considerable area of discretion to national legislation. . . . [T]his means that there
will be divergences between national laws on these matters.”).
68. See, e.g., Congo Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights (No. 24/82
of 7 July 1982), art. 98; Copyright Act adopted on 11 November 1992, as last
amended on February 15, 2000, § 19(3) (Est.), in 2 WORLD INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, CUMULATIVE INDEX OF COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS LAW AND TREATIES (2001) [hereinafter CUMULATIVE INDEX OF
COPYRIGHT LAW]; Romania Consolidated Law No. 8 of 14 March 1996 on Copyright and Neighboring Rights, art. 33(1)(d), in 4 CUMULATIVE INDEX OF COPYRIGHT LAW, supra.
69. See, e.g., Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights art. 22bis (as
amended by the Law of April 3, 1995) (Belg.), in 1 CUMULATIVE INDEX OF
COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 68; Copyright Law, art. 53, (Text of Sept. 9, 1965,
as last amended by the Law of July 16, 1998) (Ger.), in 3 CUMULATIVE INDEX
OF COPYRIGHT LAW, supra. See generally BERNT HUGENHOLTZ ET AL., INST. OF
INFO. LAW, UNIV. OF AMSTERDAM, THE FUTURE OF LEVIES IN A DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT, FINAL REPORT 10–31 (2003) (discussing the European Union private copying provisions).
70. See J.A.L. STERLING, WORLD COPYRIGHT LAW 435,¶ 10.03 (2d ed.
2003) (noting acceptance of copying by hand for private use until the advent of
photocopying and other replicating technologies); see also Copyright, Designs
and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 29(1) (U.K.); STERLING, supra, at 437–38
¶ 10.09 (noting that there is a distinction in some national laws between private use and use for purposes of research).
71. STERLING, supra note 70, at 437–38.
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A major effort to harmonize limitations and exceptions at
the regional level then occurred in 2001, with the adoption of
the Directive of the European Parliament and the Council of
Europe on the Harmonization of Certain Aspects of Copyright
and Related Rights in the Information Society (InfoSoc Di72
73
rective). Ostensibly devised to implement the WCT of 1996
74
and the TRIPS Agreement of 1994, this Directive sets out a
deliberately exhaustive list of permissible exceptions and limitations to the exclusive rights of authors that European Union
75
member states may enact at their discretion. Besides allowing
reproductions for photocopying, subject to payment of fair compensation, and for noncommercial reproductions by public li76
braries under Article 5(2), the Directive expressly mentions
scientific research in Article 5(3)(a). Echoing some prior state
practice, this provision allows “use for the sole purpose of illustration for teaching or scientific research,” so long as the
source, including the author’s name, is indicated . . . and “to the
77
extent justified by the noncommercial purpose to be achieved.”
The meaning of this ambiguous provision is hard to pin
down with any degree of certainty. Narrowly, it seems to limit
excused uses to cases of “illustration” for both teaching and scientific research, unless the term “scientific research” can legitimately be detached from “the sole purpose of illustration” language. Although some state practice may lean towards such a
broader construction favoring reuse of information for further
78
research, language concerning related rights in the Rome
72. Council Directive 2001/29, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 16 (EC) [hereinafter
InfoSoc Directive].
73. WCT, supra note 42.
74. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20.
75. InfoSoc Directive, supra note 72, art. 5(2).
76. Id.
77. Id. art. 5(3)(a). Technically, the Commission has thus taken the “by
way of illustration” language out of Berne Convention 1971, art. 10(2), which
applies to teaching, and ostensibly applied it to excerpts of scientific research, in
addition to the three-step test discussed infra text accompanying notes 120–36.
78. For example, the German legislature resolved this ambiguity by enacting one provision allowing use of certain published works for the purpose of
illustration for teaching in schools, universities and the like and a second provision allowing use of such works for individual research purposes. Guido
Westkamp, The “Three-Step Test” and Copyright Limitations in Europe: European Copyright Law Between Approximation and National Decision Making,
56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1, 34 –36 (2008) (citing sections 52(a)(1)–52(a)(4)
of the German Copyright Act and observing that these provisions may exceed
what the InfoSoc Directive expressly permits). The provision aims, “as a matter of national legislation . . . to allow researchers such as in universities, etc.,
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Convention of 1961 avoided any such ambiguity. It excused
“use solely for the purposes of teaching or scientific research”
without mention of illustrations or a non-commercial purpose
79
as qualifying conditions. Current applications of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties may make it difficult to ignore this difference in language when courts take the InfoSoc
Directive as a standard for construing national laws that implement its provisions, which renders a broad interpretation
80
favoring science less likely to pass muster.
Even if a broader interpretation were to prevail (by limiting the term “illustration” to exceptions for teaching), it must
still overcome the Directive’s noncommercial purpose qualifi81
er. Because universities now routinely engage in commercial
exploitation of their scientific research results in both the European Union and the United States, rights holders (typically
publishers) can argue that the bulk of such research is commercial in the strict sense of the word. Such an interpretation
was recently upheld in a decision concerning university patents
82
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
although it is not clear that European courts would take a similarly strict line in regard to either patents or copyrights.
In this unfavorable setting, Article 5(3) of the InfoSoc Directive has done little to strengthen or encourage digital scientific research or the rights of scientific investigators. To the
contrary, the Directive may have fatally weakened them by definitively subjecting the old private use exception to a “pay equitable compensation” principle. This conclusion follows because, empirically, there is reason to believe that scientific
research in the European Union actually relied on the private
to take advantage of digital technology.” Id. at 35. Separate exceptions for private noncommercial use and noncommercial research purposes were also enacted in Austria. COPYRIGHT IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY: A GUIDE TO NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN DIRECTIVE 70–71 (Brigitte
Lindner & Ted Shapiro eds., 2011).
79. International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers
of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations art. 15(1)(d), Oct. 26, 1961,
496 U.N.T.S. 43.
80. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. See generally Bryan Mercurio
& Mitali Tyagi, Treaty Interpretation in WTO Dispute Settlement: The Outstanding Question of the Legality of Local Working Requirements, 19 MINN. J.
INT’L L. 275 (2009) (analyzing recent WTO Appellate Body decisions applying
the Vienna Convention).
81. See InfoSoc Directive, supra note 72, art. 5(3)(a); see also id. art.
5(2)( b) (restricting private use to non-commercial ends).
82. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1361–64 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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use tradition found in most domestic copyright laws, but never
83
directly mentioned in either Berne or TRIPS.
In any event, the ability of scientific researchers to fall
back upon the traditional private use exception had already
been compromised by the advent of modern means of technical
reproduction, which risked allowing the exception to swallow
the exclusive reproduction right and invited countervailing
regulatory action in national laws. In this vein, the InfoSoc Directive responds with a double-edged regulatory sword in Article 5(2)(b) by subjecting both photocopying and private copying
84
to an express obligation to pay fair compensation. Arguably,
these provisions cut back upon the preexisting ability of scientists to broadly copy literature for research purposes under the
85
private use exception. Moreover, apart from certain noncommercial library reproductions, these provisions in effect largely
confine scientific research to the vague and somewhat ambiguous language of Article 5(3)(a) as implemented in actual state
86
practice.
Finally, the exhaustive list of permissible exceptions in the
EC’s Directive contains no fair use provision that might afford
87
a greater degree of flexibility. On the contrary, Article 5(5) of
the EC’s InfoSoc Directive imposes three additional requirements that negatively circumscribe all the limitations and ex88
ceptions it otherwise allows. This three-step provision—
83. With specific regard to scientific research, the InfoSoc Directive’s ostensibly permissive language did nothing to clarify preexisting ambiguities or
the lack of standard approaches among member states. For example, U.K. law,
which has continued to tinker with preexisting exceptions inherited from the
predigital age, further limited provisions allowing research and use for private
study, already subject to a “fair dealing” proviso, by “inserting the requirements of non-commercial use and sufficient acknowledgement.” COPYRIGHT IN
THE INFORMATION SOCIETY, supra note 78, at 572 (citing CDPA, §§ 29(1)(a),
32, 36, 38, 39, 43 and § 61(4)(a)). Protests by user organizations were disregarded. Id. Because the Directive’s merely permissive language concerning science requires no affirmative action whatsoever, there was arguably no need for
these measures.
84. InfoSoc Directive, supra note 72, art. 5(2)( b).
85. Of course, paying equitable compensation in appropriate cases is better than imposing a duty to negotiate private uses under the burden of exclusivity. See, e.g., Geiger, supra note 33, at 524. However, it is a bad idea to
compel researchers to pay other researchers for research uses of their published works, especially when most of the research in question was probably
government-funded to begin with. See also infra Part II.A.
86. InfoSoc Directive, supra note 72, art. 5(3).
87. Id. art. 5(2).
88. Id. art. 5(5) (“The exceptions and limitations provided for in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 shall only be applied in certain special cases which do not
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derived from Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement—embodies a
retroactive and excessively narrow reading of the applicable international minimum standards, and thus appears to ignore
more flexible language later embodied in the WCT of 1996 and
more clearly amplified in the accompanying Agreed State89
ments. As we demonstrate in Part I.A.3, the end result is that
the InfoSoc Directive, regardless of how it is implemented,
could significantly cut back on the already narrow sphere of exceptions favoring scientific research in the past, whether or not
90
this was its intended purpose.
2. The Fair Use Approach in the United States
In contrast, the United States, which did not join the Berne
91
Convention until 1989, adopted a different approach to limitations and exceptions in general and to those bearing on research in particular. The designated limitations and exceptions
in the U.S. Copyright Law of 1976 that are most relevant to
scientific research include limitations on the reproduction
92
rights for libraries in § 108 and, above all, the fair use excep93
tion codified for the first time in § 107. By setting out the conditions under which library reproductions and interlibrary
loans might be made for purposes of private study, scholarship,
or research, § 108 operates in effect as a codified specification of
fair use as it applies to libraries in general.
There are no other designated exemptions bearing on quotations, excerpts, or scientific research as such in the 1976 Act,
94
like those under the Berne Convention and the European
95
Commission’s InfoSoc Directive. Hence, it is the codified fair
use doctrine, as judicially interpreted, that effectively governs
the rights of researchers in the United States to avoid or mitigate the exclusive rights of authors and publishers. Any soconflict with a normal exploitation of the work or other subject-matter and do
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder.”).
89. WCT, supra note 42.
90. Hilty, Copyright Law and Scientific Research, supra note 2; Hilty, Five
Lessons About Copyright, supra note 2, at 113–18; see also Westkamp, supra
note 78, at 26 (stressing that art. 5(5) will likely diminish public interest uses
in the digital environment).
91. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568,
102 Stat. 2853 (1988) (effective date of entry March 1, 1989).
92. 17 U.S.C. § 108 (2006).
93. Id. § 107.
94. Berne Convention, supra note 20, art. 10.
95. InfoSoc Directive, supra note 72, art. 5(3)(a).
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called private use exceptions, comparable to those traditionally
96
found in European copyright laws, must stand or fall as fair
uses in U.S. law.
Section 107 of the 1976 Act expressly recognizes a set of
preambular uses or “purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom
use), scholarship, or research” for which an open-ended fair use
97
exception is deemed particularly suitable. These uses promote
public goods in ways that courts must reconcile with the private rights of authors in an appropriately balanced copyright
system. Much depends, however, on how judges determine
whether the harm incurred by the copyright owner is justified
98
by the benefit to the public from allowing the use in question.
To answer that question, the statute requires courts to
evaluate four separate criteria that may pull in different directions and evince different weights, viz: (1) the purpose and
character of the use (such as a noncommercial use or a so-called
transformative use); (2) the nature of the copyrighted work (for
example, is it of a factual or scientific character to begin with);
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used (in both
quantitative and qualitative terms); and (4) the effect of any
given use upon the potential market or value of the copyrighted
99
work.
In the past, and for a fairly long period of time, it was the
fourth factor—the so-called market harm test—that predomi100
101
nated in the case law. Following Campbell v. Acuff-Rose,
however, all four factors must now be weighed by the courts,
and the predominant factor has become the first, in practice, as
courts focus increasingly on the presence or absence of a socalled transformative use, i.e., a new use not necessarily envisioned by the original author that enriches culture or the pur-

96. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. See generally Glynn S.
Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813 (2001).
97. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
98. See, e.g., 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 10.1.2 to 10.1.4 (2d ed.
1996).
99. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1)–(4); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
U.S. 569, 576–94 (1994) (explaining each of the four factors in § 107).
100. Jane C. Ginsburg, Conflicts of Copyright Ownership between Authors
and Owners of Original Artworks: An Essay in Comparative and International
Private Law, 17 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 395, 401 n.22 (1993) (noting that
“the inquiry into potential market harm remains dominant”).
101. 510 U.S. at 569.
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102

suit of knowledge. This transformative use factor has prevailed in the digital arena, as seen in cases involving search
engines that access and index massive amounts of data and in103
formation on the Internet. Courts in the United States have
now routinely held that the use of thumbnail images as markers for search engines, for example, is transformative and that
the fair use defense can avail notwithstanding some use for
104
commercial gain.
Empirically, it can be demonstrated that judges also invoke
other factors, especially a hidden fifth factor—namely, “the extent to which the claimed fair use serves the public interest”—
without which few, if any, major federal appellate decisions af105
firming fair use are likely to be found. In other words, the
federal appellate courts look for transformative uses that advance the public interest, especially as identified with those
106
public goods set out in the preamble, without unduly com102. See id. at 579 (emphasizing uses that “provide social benefit[s] by
shedding light on an earlier work, and in the process, creat[e] a new one”); see
also Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 609–10
(2d Cir. 2006) ( promotional posters used in biography about rock music was “a
purpose separate and distinct from the original artistic and promotional purpose for which the images were created”); L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc.,
305 F.3d 924, 938–39 (9th Cir. 2002).
103. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1163–67
(9th Cir. 2007) (finding the use of thumbnails as highly transformative use);
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding the use of
thumbnail images in search engine as fair use); see also A.V. v. IParadigms,
L.L.C., 562 F.3d 630, 638–40 (4th Cir. 2009) (finding fair use for archival copies of student papers stored in digital form to help detect and prevent plagiarism); Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1118 (D. Nev. 2006).
104. Perfect 10, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1163–68 (holding that search engine compilation of thumbnail-sized photographs was fair use); Arriba Soft Corp., 336
F.3d at 822 (same). For the view that these cases really turn on nonexpressive
uses that do not substitute for the author’s original expression, see Sag, supra
note 2, at 1636–37.
105. See, e.g., Cliff ’s Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Grp.,
Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding parody not infringing given public interest in free expression); Corp. of Am. Sony v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454 (1984) (finding the factor of societal benefits weighted
in the outcome of fair use determination); Jerome H. Reichman, “Marching to
a Three-Step Tune,” (Comments, Program on the International Harmonization
of Copyright Limitations and Exceptions, Cardozo School of Law, March 30–
31, 2008); see also Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Copyright and Free Expression:
Analyzing the Convergence of Conflicting Normative Frameworks, 4 CHI.-KENT
J. INTELL. PROP. 45, 68–69 (2004) (discussing several cases and arguing,
“[w]hat is of interest here, however, is that in applying the fair use doctrine,
courts have sought to introduce an element of ‘public interest’ clearly not expressly mandated under the traditionally understood requirements of fair use”).
106. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
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promising the author’s reasonable expectations of commercial
gain. In this context, public scientific research had fared rela107
tively well under the fair use doctrine, at least until the Digi108
tal Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) was adopted in 1998.
For example, it was not customary in the United States for scientists to spend scarce research dollars on payments for photocopied articles for private research, as regularly occurs in Eu109
notwithstanding the absence of any private use
rope,
exception in the 1976 Act.
Underlying unresolved conflicts concerning the theoretical
groundings of fair use can, nonetheless, affect a court’s willingness to expand or contract the doctrine on a case-by-case ba110
sis. For example, much depends on whether fair use is seen
as a mere technical adjustment allowing infringement of exclusive rights in exceptional cases, or whether it covers areas of
use from which authors were granted no such exclusivity to
begin with, in which case it can or should be seen as a form of
111
“users’ rights.”
107. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1354 (Ct.
Cl. 1973), aff ’ d by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (holding fair
use permitted where copying of medical journals is for scientific purposes).
Professor Tushnet characterizes the pre-DMCA landscape as uncertain. Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright
Has in Common with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and
Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1, 24 (2000) (“After decades of
litigation, it is still difficult to tell when and whether one can photocopy copyrighted materials, even for scientific research.”).
108. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105–304, 112 Stat.
2860 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.); see infra notes 242–45
and accompanying text.
109. Thus scientists seem not to have encountered the difficulties that have
otherwise constrained documentary film makers in the United States. See,
e.g., Peter Jaszi & Patricia Aufderheide, Untold Stories: Collaborative Research on Documentary Filmmakers’ Free Speech and Fair Use, 46 CINEMA J.
133, 133–39 (2007).
110. See Wendy Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and
Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 1600, 1638–39 (1982) (discussing courts’ varying opinions regarding the
serving of public interest); Edward Lee, Technological Fair Use, 83 S. CAL. L.
REV. 797, 817–18 (2010) (discussing how technological fair use cases vary from
other fair use cases); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
577 (1994) (“The task is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the
statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis.”); cf.
Kate O’Neill, Against Dicta: A Legal Method for Rescuing Fair Use from the
Right of First Publication, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 369, 388–89 (2001) (urging courts
to abandon a dogged allegiance to 17 U.S.C. § 107’s four-factor analysis, at
least in “hard cases”).
111. See Mary W. S. Wong, “Transformative” User-Generated Content in
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More recently, under the influence of law and economics
theory, the extent to which fair use is justified by various forms
of market-failure analysis has attracted considerable attention
112
from courts and commentators. For example, at least one rel113
atively recent case concerning photocopies for classroom use
114
and another for use at a commercial scientific laboratory
seemed to presage a growing judicial resistance to fair use,
even for research purposes, especially where novel licensing
strategies had emerged. In this vein, courts began to reason
that yesterday’s market failure—due, say, to the high transaction costs of seeking and negotiating permissions to use in certain cases—might be cured by tomorrow’s establishment of
clearinghouses, standard-form contracts, and digitally regulated access controls, which facilitate pay-per-use mechanisms not
115
conceivable in a less technologically sophisticated era. Fair
use could then depend on the willingness of courts to envision
public good overrides that apply irrespective of market failure.
For a time, the influence of market-failure theory, coupled
with a surge in the “property rights” approach to intellectual
property law generally, elicited growing scholarly criticism of
116
an “incredibly shrinking doctrine of fair use.” Fortunately,
Copyright Law: Infringing Derivative Works or Fair Use?, 11 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 1075, 1096–97 (2009). See generally PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra
note 51.
112. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 110 (focusing attention on the use of a
market approach in fair use cases).
113. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d
1381, 1388–92 (6th Cir. 1996).
114. See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 931–32 (2d
Cir. 1994) (emphasizing that there was a convenient rights clearance regime
to handle the use in question).
115. See, e.g., id.; Tom W. Bell, Fair Use v. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Management on Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV.
557, 563–67 (1998); Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in a Changing World, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y USA 133, 137 (2003) (suggesting pay-as-you-go schemes in a digital environment); see also June M. Besek, Anti-Circumvention Laws and Copyright: A Report from the Kernochan Center for Law, Media and the Arts, 27
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 385, 472–73 (2004) (stating that “digital rights management systems” are advancing and many previously privileged uses may no
longer be considered fair uses); Lunney, supra note 96, at 815 (discussing the
move from guild control to copyright as a fundamental transformation that is
now endangered.); infra Part II.C.b.2.
116. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for
Rights Management Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 44 –47 (2001); Gordon, supra note 110; Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 1, 8–32 (1997).
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this period has lately given way to a series of more flexible decisions favoring transformative uses of various kinds and espe117
cially those performed by search engines. On the surface, these recent decisions would seem more favorable to scientific
research, subject to certain inherent constraints limiting the
application of the fair use doctrine as a whole. In reality, new
constraints arising from technological fencing measures under
118
the DMCA can enable content providers to effectively shut
down the fair use exception in the online environment, precisely where it is of greatest use to computational science. These
measures are discussed below.
B. NEW BOUNDARIES IMPOSED BY INTERNATIONAL LAW
So far, we have seen that the conceptual approach to limitations and exceptions affecting scientific research in domestic
copyright laws differed considerably in the European Union
and the United States. Later on, we shall evaluate the
strengths and weaknesses of each approach, with specific re119
gard to their implications for science. Before doing so, however, we must take account of developments at the international
level since 1994 that have greatly complicated the practical application of limitations and exceptions under either conceptual
approach.
As previously observed, a major turning point had already
occurred in 1967, when the Berne Union countries accepted a
package deal in which an author’s exclusive right of reproduction was codified in Article 9(1) of the Berne Convention and
simultaneously subjected to the “three-step test” in Article
120
9(2). Three decades later, history repeated itself when the
drafters of the TRIPS Agreement attempted unsuccessfully to
negotiate a set of designated limitations and exceptions to the
exclusive rights of copyright, patent, and trademark laws that
were about to be harmonized in a single convention for the first
time. When, at the end of the day, no agreement could be
reached on any of the listed proposals under consideration, the
drafters made the unprecedented—and some would say mindless—decision to extend that same three-step test, initially
adopted as an expedient in 1967, with some minor variations,
117. See Sag, supra note 2, at 1636–51 (discussing relevant cases); supra
notes 103–04 and accompanying text.
118. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201–05 (2006).
119. See infra Part I.C.
120. See supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text.
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to all the exclusive rights bestowed on authors, inventors, industrial designers, and trademark owners in the final version
121
of the TRIPS Agreement as adopted in 1994.
The three-step test thus became a universal norm of world
intellectual property law, binding on some 153 signatories to
122
the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.
Its enforcement also became subject to the WTO tribunals and
cross-sectoral remedies governed by the WTO’s Understanding
123
on the Settlement of Disputes (DSU).
1. Normative Blindness at the World Trade Organization
One major problem with the three-step formulation as em124
bodied in Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement is that it remains devoid of any intrinsic normative guidance. It thus fails
to tell courts and administrators what, if any, user pursuits are
particularly worthy, from a policy perspective, of affirmative relief from the right holders’ control under the exclusive rights
125
that the TRIPS Agreement obliges WTO members to provide.
So far, the only WTO panel to apply the three-step test of
Article 13 dealt with a broad exemption from the public performance rights for radio and television broadcasts of copy121. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, arts. 13 (copyrights), 30 ( patents), 26 (industrial designs), & 17 (trademarks, which emerged as a two-step
variant); DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND
ANALYSIS 5–27, 319–32 (1998); see also Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual
Property in the Twenty-First Century: Will the Developing Countries Lead or
Follow?, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1115 (2009).
122. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154; see Understanding the WTO, WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm
( last visited Jan. 26, 2012).
123. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU]; Panel Report, United
States—Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000)
[hereinafter US–Section 110(5) Panel Report].
124. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 13 (obliging WTO members to
“confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases
which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.”).
125. See id., arts. 9.1 (incorporating exclusive rights of the Berne Convention 1971), 11 (imposing rental rights on computer programs and cinematographic works), 14 (imposing recognition of related rights for performers, producers of phonograms (sound recordings) and Broadcasting Organizations), 16
(mandating exclusive rights of trademark owners), 28 (mandating exclusive
rights of patentees), & 26 (mandating exclusive rights of protected industrial
designs and subjecting them to still another version of the three-step test).
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righted musical works in bars and restaurants under § 110(5)
126
of the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976. After considering both the
breadth of the exemption as codified and evidence of its potential substitution effects on live or recorded music covered by Ar127
ticle 11bis of the Berne Convention, the panel held that
§ 110(5) was insufficiently “limited” to satisfy the first prong of
the three-step test set out in Article 13 of the TRIPS Agree128
ment.
Section 110(5) was accordingly inconsistent with foreign
authors’ exclusive public communication rights under Article
11bis of the Berne Convention as incorporated into the TRIPS
129
Agreement via Article 9.1. While recognizing that “normative
considerations” should play a part at step three, and possibly at
step two of any analysis under Article 13, the panel’s reified vi130
sion of “limited” exceptions under step one inhibited it from
telling us what those considerations might be or how that normative impact should be weighed against rights holders’
131
interests.
To be fair, the WTO panel in the Section 110(5) case found
little normative guidance in the legislative history accompanying the original three-step test adopted as Article 9(2) of the
126. US–Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 123; see also 17 U.S.C.
§ 110(5) (2006).
127. Berne Convention (1971), supra note 20, art. 11bis; TRIPS Agreement,
supra note 20, art. 9.1 (incorporating arts. 1–21 (minus art. 6bis) into the
TRIPS Agreement of 1994).
128. US–Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 123, ¶¶ 6.133, 6.160;
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 13 (“Members shall confine limitations
or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases . . . .”).
129. US–Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 123, ¶¶ 6.133, 6.160,
6.209–6.211; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, arts. 9.1; Berne Convention,
supra note 20, art. 11bis (1)(i)–(iii). Note, however, that a compulsory license
favoring foreign—but not necessarily U.S.—authors could have cured the violation by dint of Article 11bis(2) of the Berne Convention. National authors in
the country of origin have no standing under the Berne Convention. See Berne
Convention (1971), supra note 20, art. 5.
130. The panel conflated the term “certain special cases” in Article 13 on
exceptions to copyright protection with the term “limited exceptions” to patent
protection in Article 30, without explanation, while reifying the concept in
both cases. US–Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 123,¶ 6.109; GERVAIS,
supra note 121, at 89–91.
131. See US–Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 123, ¶ 6.179–6.189
(emphasizing that the beneficiary of an exception should not enter into competition with the rightholder); Jane C. Ginsburg, Toward Supranational Copyright Law? The WTO Panel Decision and the “Three-Step Test” for Copyright
Exceptions, 187 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D’AUTEUR [INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OF AUTHOR’S RIGHTS] 3, 20–25 (2001).
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Berne Convention at the Stockholm Conference in 1967. Rather, the experts who drafted that provision produced a single
laconic paragraph of explanation, embodied in the Rapporteur’s
Statement at Stockholm. According to this source, the threestep test can be read to mean that an objectively small taking
of protected matter may be allowed for some purposes, a large
taking for any purpose is strongly discouraged, while a medium-sized taking for a good normative purpose might be cured
133
by the payment of equitable compensation.
The WTO panel may indeed have made this normative
blindness even worse when, reasoning from trade law, it asserted that no public purpose was necessary to trigger application of the three-step test to any given dispute under Article 13
134
of the TRIPS Agreement. However, the WTO panel’s approach downplayed the fact that the TRIPS Agreement basical135
ly deals with private rights. Even though it constitutes a
treaty among sovereign entities, private rights holders are, in
effect, a class of third-party beneficiaries, rather like residents
of foreign enclaves whose ethnic, linguistic, and educational
rights were protected by certain bilateral and multilateral trea136
ties in the past. Without a public-purpose justification for
derogating from the private rights protected under TRIPS, lim132. US–Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 123,¶ 6.73.
133. Compare id., with Senftleben, supra note 48 (a more complex interpretation), and Mihály Ficsor, President, Hungarian Copyright Council, Paper
Presentation at the Fordham Intellectual Property Conference (Apr. 15, 2009),
available at http://fordhamipconference.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/
MihalyFicsor_Three-step_Test.pdf (noting that the application of three-step
test only recently became controversial). See also RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 32, at 639–46 (discussing three-step test); Geiger, supra note 33 (discussing different ways to interpret copyright limitations).
134. See US–Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 123, at 33–34. In
trade law, states are often tempted to couch would-be exceptions from the tariff bindings under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT ) in
terms of vague public-interest justifications. General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187. The WTO tradition thus
far is to focus on the literal fact of violation, which could only be rescued by
reference to a WTO or GATT Member’s reserved powers under article XX or to
other specified safeguard measures. See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994 art. XX, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 190; Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, Oct. 8, 1998.
135. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, pmbl.¶ 4 (recognizing that intellectual property rights are private rights).
136. See, e.g., Sovereignty Over Certain Frontier Land (Belg. v. Neth.),
1959 I.C.J. 209 (June 1959).
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itations in domestic laws—like those condemned in the Section
110(5) case—could merely allow a state to take money from one
137
private pocket and put it into another.
If the original three-step test embodied in Article 9(2) of
the Berne Convention was thus rather normatively blind, that
blindness became even more opaque after its incorporation and
138
expansion under TRIPS, Article 13. For example, there is no
express obligation to take third-party interests into account
under Article 13, as there is in the corresponding patent law
139
formulation embodied in Article 30 of the same Agreement.
Moreover, the one WTO panel so far convened to consider that
formulation in the patent context failed to take into consideration any of the rather evident public health effects of its deci140
sion when evaluating step one of the test.
Because the formula as thus applied appears normatively
blinkered, it tends to give undue positive weight to acquired
rights and to codified exceptions recognized in existing legisla141
tion, such as the list set out in the EC InfoSoc Directive. This
approach harbors a flawed methodology because such lists only
tell us the results of past legislative compromises. They do not
provide a sound normative foundation on which to build, caseby-case in the future, which could free domestic copyright laws
from temporal rigidity.
This rigidity is then magnified by the conventional view
that, for any given use to qualify as privileged under the three137. Cf. Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative
Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Restraint on Congress,
2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1192 (criticizing such an approach).
138. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 9.1 (incorporating arts. 1–
21 of the Berne Convention, except for art. 6bis); Berne Convention (1971), supra note 20, art. 9(2).
139. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, arts. 13 (“Members shall confine
limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do
not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.”), 30 (“Members may
provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests
of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.”
(emphasis added)).
140. See Panel Report, Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical
Products, WT/DS114/R, Mar. 17, 2000; see also Robert Howse, The Canadian
Generic Medicines Panel—A Dangerous Precedent in Dangerous Times, 3 J.
WORLD INTELL. PROP. 493, 502 (2000) (emphasizing what the Panel should
have considered).
141. See InfoSoc Directive, supra note 72, art. 5.
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step test, the decision maker must answer “yes” to all three
142
questions posed by that test. Until recently, this orthodox po143
sition went largely unquestioned, and modified versions of
this same approach have been extended to patents, trademarks, and industrial designs. Fortunately, the Max Planck Institute has launched a head-on challenge to this position, as we
144
shall explore in our discussion of possible reforms below.
2. Potential Flexibility Under the WIPO Copyright Treaty
With specific regard to copyright law, Article 13 of the
TRIPS Agreement expressly extended the three-step test to all
the exclusive pecuniary rights covered by the Berne Convention’s 1971 text, as incorporated into TRIPS by virtue of Article
145
9.1. Article 11 of the TRIPS Agreement also conferred new
exclusive rights on authors of computer programs and cine146
matographic works. On its face, Article 13 could thus be read
as a potentially narrowing super-norm applicable to both the
extant exceptions in the revised Berne Convention of 1971 and
to all preexisting exceptions in the domestic copyright laws of
Berne Union members, with perhaps due deference for socalled acquired rights (acquis), that is, certain state practices
known to the TRIPS drafters and never expressly challenged or
rejected during the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
147
Negotiations.
142. See, e.g., Senftleben, supra note 48, at 530–35.
143. See, e.g., Ficsor, supra note 133.
144. See infra notes 424 –35 and accompanying text.
145. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 9.1 (incorporating Articles
1–21 of Berne Convention as set out in the 1971 text and the Appendix thereto, except for Article 6bis, which deals with moral rights). Because moral
rights under Article 6bis of the Berne Convention were expressly not incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement under Article 9, the three-step test does not
apply to them at the international level. Whether the rights conferred on
broadcasting organizations under Article 14.3 of TRIPS are also subject to the
three-step test of Article 13 remains to be seen, as the relations between these
provisions and the Rome Convention of 1961, supra note 79, are not entirely
clear.
146. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 11 ( providing rental rights subject to an optional waiver for cinematographic works in the absence of “widespread copying” to accommodate U.S. law). Article 14.2 also seems to provide
an exclusive right of reproduction to producers of phonograms. However, Article 14.6 allows WTO Members to invoke “conditions, limitations, exceptions
and reservations to the extent permitted by the Rome Convention” for producers of phonograms covered by article 14.2. How to reconcile Article 14.6 with
Article 13 remains unclear.
147. See, e.g., US–Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 123,¶ 6.65 (“We
are not aware of any record in the Uruguay Round documentation of any
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Two years later at the Diplomatic Conference that produced the WIPO Copyright Treaty of 1996, the United States
and the European Union submitted a draft text that expressly
attempted to codify this narrowing interpretation of the threestep test, which the pending WIPO treaty was supposed to in148
corporate. However, after extensive debate and the vigorous
intervention of the U.S. science agencies and their representatives, a modified approach to the three-step test was enacted in
149
Article 10 of the final text, along with an Agreed Statement
150
unanimously adopted by the parties.
Article 10(1) of the WCT states expressly that contracting
parties “may” adopt limitations and exceptions to rights granted authors under the new treaty in conformity with the three151
step test; while Article 10(2) states that these same contracting parties, when applying the Berne Convention, “shall” con152
fine its limitations and exceptions to the three-step test. The
Agreed Statement, negotiated with direct inputs from the Presidents of the U.S. National Academies and then Vice-President
153
Gore’s office, further declared,
It is understood that the provisions of Article 10 permit Contracting
Parties to carry forward and appropriately extend into the digital environment limitations and exceptions in their national laws which
have been considered acceptable under the Berne Convention. Similarly, these provisions should be understood to permit Contracting Parcountry participating in the negotiations challenging or questioning the minor
exceptions doctrine being part of the Berne acquis on which the TRIPS
agreement was to be built.”).
148. See Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring
Rights Questions, Dec. 2–20, 1996, Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Certain Questions Concerning the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works to Be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference on Certain
Copyright and Neighboring Rights Questions, n.7.07, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/4
(Aug. 30, 1996), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/diplconf/en/crnr_
dc/crnr_dc_4.pdf (“The purpose of [Article 7(2)] is to make it possible to exclude
from the scope of the right of reproduction acts of reproduction that are not
relevant in economic terms. By reference to Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention, the limitations are further confined to cases that pass the three-step test
of that provision.”).
149. WCT, supra note 42, art. 10.
150. Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights
Questions, Dec. 2–20, 1996, Agreed Statements Concerning the WIPO Copyright Treaty, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/96 (Dec. 20, 1996) [hereinafter WCT
Agreed Statements], available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/
statements.html.
151. WCT, supra note 42, art. 10(1).
152. See id. art. 10(2).
153. Paul F. Uhlir & Jerome H. Reichman represented the National Academies in these negotiations.
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ties to devise new exceptions and limitations that are appropriate in
the digital network environment.
It is also understood that Article 10(2) neither reduces nor extends
the scope of applicability of the limitations and exceptions permitted
154
by the Berne Convention.

These changes were made for the specific purpose of avoiding posterior challenges to the fair use provisions of the U.S.
Copyright Act of 1976 (as some scholars had previously feared
155
could happen under the TRIPS Agreement) , but whose validity had not otherwise been compromised during the negotiations
that led the United States to adhere to the Berne Convention in
156
1989.
The full implications of this complex set of provisions remain to be worked out at both the national and international
157
levels. For example, these provisions could trump arguments
that the three-step test can retroactively undo limitations and
exceptions existing in national laws prior to the conclusion of
the TRIPS Agreement. What cannot be denied is that any future interpretation of the three-step test codified in Article 13 of
the TRIPS Agreement must also reflect the posterior, more
flexible gloss on that same test as adopted by essentially the
same parties two years later, in Article 10 of the WCT and its
158
Agreed Statement.
By the same token, these cumulative legislative enact154. WCT Agreed Statements, supra note 150.
155. Okediji, supra note 54, at 136 (expressing doubt as to whether the fair
use provisions could withstand a TRIPS agreement attack).
156. See The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-568, § 2(3), 102 Stat. 2853 (1988) (“The amendments made by this Act, together with the law as it exists on the date of the enactment of this Act, satisfy
the obligations of the United States in adhering to the Berne Convention.”).
157. See, e.g., Senftleben, supra note 48, at 544 –48 (describing the “openended” three-step test as “a flexible framework, within which national legislators . . . enjoy the freedom of safeguarding national limitations and satisfying
domestic social, cultural and economic needs”).
158. See, for example, Vienna Convention, supra note 80, art. 31:
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty and in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. . . .
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between parties.
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ments oblige the members of the WTO to take account of the
three-step test whenever they adopt or enforce limitations and
exceptions in their domestic copyright laws, under whatever
159
conceptual approach they prefer. Failure to do so could result
in adverse legal challenges at the WTO, with the risk of having
to pay damages to states whose bargained-for trade expectations suffered harm by dint of any failure of any given excep160
tion to satisfy this test.
C. THE SHRINKING REALM OF SCIENTIFIC USERS’ RIGHTS
UNDER EITHER APPROACH
Seventy years of practical experience with the teachings of
161
the legal realists has demonstrated, at the very least, that
162
the quest for legal certainty cannot be separated from a clear
159. See, e.g., P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ & RUTH L. OKEDIJI, CONCEIVING AN
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT ON LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO COPYRIGHT
7 (2008), available at http://www.soros.org/sites/default/files/copyright_20080
506.pdf (noting that states view the three-step test “as a constraint on the sovereign discretion of nations to provide flexibilities in their laws”); Reichman,
supra note 121, at 1156 (emphasizing the need for countries to reconcile potential “fair use” regimes with the three-step test).
160. See, e.g., US–Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 123.
161. See generally, e.g., KARL N. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE (1962) ( laying out a theory of legal realism); SOIA
MENTSCHIKOFF & IRWIN P. STOTZKY, THE THEORY AND CRAFT OF AMERICAN
LAW—ELEMENTS (1981). The ostensible benefits of establishing a closed list of
designated exceptions available to European legislators contemplating copyright reform are rooted in the myths of the positivist legal tradition, which appeal to practicing lawyers’ ceaseless quest for legal certainty. The tenacity of
this quest partly reflects the Continental approach to legal education and its
historic indifference to the legal realist movement. See James R. Maxeiner,
Some Realism about Legal Certainty in the Globalization of the Rule of Law, in
THE RULE OF LAW IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 41, 41–49 (2010) (explaining
the “centrality of legal certainty to the thinking of continental jurists” in comparison to American legal realism). Paradoxically, some of the most influential
leaders of that movement, including Llewellyn and Mentschikoff, were transplanted refugees from Europe, who made it their lives’ work to challenge the
shortcomings of both the civil and common law traditions. Cf. JACK
DONNELLY, REALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 15 (2000) (“Hans
Morganthau, an American refugee from Nazi Germany, was one of the leading
realists of the 1950s and 1960s and perhaps the purest as well as the most
self-conscious apostle of realism of his generation.”) (quotation omitted)).
162. Legal realists sought a higher synthesis that blended the best features
of both the civil and common law traditions, while avoiding their respective
defects, as reflected, for example, in Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, drafted by Llewellyn and Mentischikoff. See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE,
DEATH OF CONTRACTS 55–85 (1974) (describing the messy state of contracts
law before the reforms adopted in Article 2 of the UCC, which were deliberately designed to reform the general law of contracts).
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analysis of both the underlying purposes of any given set of
laws and the empirical experience accumulated over time from
163
judicial efforts to implement those same laws in actual cases.
With specific regard to copyright law, history also teaches that
changing factual conditions constantly elicit a need for creative
new solutions that are inherently slow to materialize, and destabilizing to boot, while the lobbying of special interests often
remains indifferent to the larger public interest that was supposedly to be advanced by any given set of enumerated exceptions.
For example, even the most enlightened policymakers
found themselves confronted by a rapidly changing world in
which legal categories designed for the print media collapsed or
164
converged in the digital online environment. Just when traditional scientific research methods were overtaken by the rise of
computerized information technologies requiring unfettered access to and use of data and information, researchers discovered
that the old categories of exceptions inherited from the print
media were so freighted with narrow, legalistic interpretations
that they could not readily be updated or accommodated to the
165
challenges of modern science, even with the best of will.
1. Impeding Scientific Research Even in the Print Media
In this Section, we first evaluate the existing approaches to
limitations and exceptions affecting copyrighted scientific re163. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1–2 (1881) (“The
life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. . . . The law embodies
the story of a nation’s development through many centuries, and it cannot be
dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics.”); LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927–1960 (1986); Karl
N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism: Responding to Dean Pound, 44
HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931), reprinted in AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 68, 72–75
(William W. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993) (“[Any law] needs constantly to be examined for its purpose, and for its effect, and to be judged in the light of both
and of their relation to each other.”). The Law and Economics Movement is itself a response to the challenge of the legal realists. See, e.g., RICHARD A.
POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 2–3 (1995).
164. Margaret Chon, New Wine Bursting from Old Bottles: Collaborative
Internet Art, Joint Works, and Entrepreneurship, 75 OR. L. REV. 257, 257–58
(1996) (“[A]s the old ‘bottle’ of print-based copyright law expands to cover new
media and new uses, the transformative possibilities of these new uses in new
media will occasionally pop the cork of existing legal categories.”).
165. See Hilty, Copyright Law and Scientific Research, supra note 2, at
315–327, 351; Hilty, Five Lessons About Copyright, supra note 2, at 109–18;
Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 2, at 324 (doubting the ability of legislators to
accommodate the needs of the scientific research community with tweaks to
an “increasingly high-protectionist regime”).
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search results as they have worked, or failed to work, in the
print media for which they were originally designed. We then
show how this fragile, predigital foundation was further undermined by efforts to strictly regulate transmissions of copyrighted works over the Internet, and by the database protection
166
laws adopted in the European Union after 1996.
a. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Designated Exceptions
Approach
The InfoSoc Directive adopted by the European Commission in 2001 was ostensibly an attempt to reconcile the “designated exceptions” approach of prior Continental copyright laws
with the provisions of both the TRIPS Agreement of 1994 and
167
the WCT of 1996. It was also supposed to harmonize the limitations and exceptions found in all the copyright laws of European Union member states, as well as those of affiliated and
168
would-be member countries. In reality critics complain that,
with respect to harmonization, the Directive failed in its essen169
tial purpose, while its response to the WCT digital copyright
provisions embodies a high-protectionist regime inconsistent
170
with the balancing norms actually adopted in that treaty.
166. See infra text accompanying notes 230–41.
167. See Bernt Hugenholz, Why the Copyright Directive Is Unimportant,
and Possibly Invalid, 22 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 499, 499 (2000).
168. David Gee, A Copyright Balance? An Overview for Librarians of Current UK Copyright Law, 35 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 47, 50 (2007) (stating that the
goal for the directive was to harmonize copyright law across the European Union); Veronica Syrtash, Supra-National Limitations on Copyright Exceptions:
Canada’s Ephemeral Exception and the “Three-Step Test,” 19 INTELL. PROP. J.
521, 549 (2006) (“The Copyright Directive introduced a regime of compulsory
and permitted exceptions to the three exclusive rights provided for by member
states.”).
169. See Séverine Dussollier, Fair Use by Design in the European Copyright
Directive of 2001, COMM. ACM, Apr. 2003, at 51, 55 (questioning the usefulness of the Copyright Directive’s “private orderings model”); Thomas Heide,
The Berne Three-Step Test and the Proposed Copyright Directive, 21 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 105, 109 (1999) (concluding that the Copyright Directive
leaves the three-step test “largely straitjacketed and therefore incapable of responding to the need for balance between various interests”); Hugenholz, supra note 167, at 499–502 (condemning the Directive as “a total failure”); Richard J. Peltz, Global Warming Trend? The Creeping Indulgence of Fair Use in
International Copyright Law, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 267, 283 (2009) (noting the shortcomings of the Copyright Directive).
170. See Jerome H. Reichman, Graeme Dinwoodie & Pamela Samuelson, A
Reverse Notice and Takedown Regime to Enable Public Interest Uses of Technically Protected Copyrighted Works, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 981, 983–85
(2007) (explaining that the Directive’s lopsided anti-circumventionist rules
prioritized owner rights over legitimate user interests).
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Whether or not these criticisms prove valid, the inadequacies of
this Directive with respect to scientific research remain painfully clear.
For example, even though Article 5(3)(a) of the Directive
adopts a soi disant exception for science at the regional level
171
that does not appear in the Berne Convention, its tortured
language may impose qualifiers that cut back upon the provisions of that Convention, which largely leave science at the
mercy of the three-step test. Moreover, the exception for science
in Article 5(3) is not mandatory, whatever its meaning turns
172
out to be.
If a European Union member country ignores Article
5(3)(a) of the Directive, it remains bound by Articles 10(1) and
10(2) of the Berne Convention, as revised in 1971, which make
173
no mention of science whatsoever. Even with regard to quotations or to other excerpts for teaching materials, Article 10(1)
limits the former to “fair practice . . . and [the] extent justified
174
by the purpose,” while Article 10(2) permits the latter only “to
the extent justified by the purpose . . . by way of illustration in
publications . . . for teaching, provided such utilization is com175
patible with fair practice.” These provisions have been nar176
rowly construed in the United Kingdom. while in major markets outside the European Union, such as Brazil, university
libraries reportedly ignore the analogous provision in the domestic copyright law altogether and deny students the possibil177
ity of photocopying even short excerpts from scientific texts.
If, instead, a European Union member state decides to codify the permissible exception for science as set out in Article
5(3)(a) of the InfoSoc Directive, would-be users of scientific
works are immediately confronted with the inherent ambiguities of the language in this provision that were identified earli-

171. See supra text accompanying notes 76–86.
172. InfoSoc Directive, supra note 72, art. 5(3).
173. See Berne Convention (1971), supra note 20, art. 10(2).
174. Id. art. 10(1).
175. Id. art. 10(2).
176. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 55, at 293 & n.847 (referring to the United
Kingdom’s “fair dealing” approach as an example of specified, narrow limitations on copyright). See generally ROBERT BURRELL & ALLISON COLEMAN,
COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONS: THE DIGITAL IMPACT (2005).
177. Pedro Paranaguá, Brazil’s Copyright Reform: Will Brazil Lead or Follow? 19–20 (Jan. 2012) (Duke University School of Law, draft SJD thesis) (on
file with the authors).
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178

er in this study. For example, do the words limiting use for
purposes of illustration pertain to both teaching and research,
or are they confined to teaching only? Even if the latter, more
liberal interpretation were to prevail, research uses would remain subject to both the non-commercial purpose clause and to
the prevailing judicial tendency to view all exceptions and limitations as subordinate to the dominant purpose of copyright
law, which in the European Union, is to protect the private in179
terests of authors and publishers.
This restrictive tendency is then reinforced by Article 5(5)
of the InfoSoc Directive, which makes the three-step test ex180
pressly applicable to all the exceptions set out in Article 5. As
noted, traditional European jurisprudence requires that all
three steps must be applied cumulatively and all must be given
an affirmative response if any given act is to avoid a claim of
181
infringement. In sum, under the existing regime, nothing
compels a European Union member state to favor scientific research, and those policymakers willing to do so encounter a
182
daunting battery of constraints, even without factoring in the
effects of special interest lobbying.
At least one expert on the three-step test nonetheless contends that both European courts and legislators could apply it
in a more flexible, open-ended manner, somewhat comparable
to fair use in the United States, despite the implicitly uncom183
promising approach of the InfoSoc Directive. To this same
end, the review of the legislative history pertaining to Article
178. See supra notes 76–86 and accompanying text.
179. Senftleben, supra note 48, at 524 –25. Contrast the accepted formula
in U.S. law, which holds that securing income to authors is but a means to the
promotion of knowledge in the public interest. Id.; see also Mazer v. Stein, 347
U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering
Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement
of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare
through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)); Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 82 (2d
Cir. 2010) (“The object of copyright law is to promote the store of knowledge
available to the public.”).
180. See InfoSoc Directive, supra note 72, art. 5(5).
181. See supra notes 157–60 and accompanying text.
182. See, e.g., Westkamp, supra note 78, at 15–18 (stressing inability of
three-step test to deal with multiple markets, which disfavors both private use
and research uses in general).
183. Senftleben, supra note 48, at 538–40; see also Geller, supra note 50, at
569–71 (arguing that neither the idea-expression dichotomy, nor constitutionality grounded constructions of limitations or exceptions, are subject to the
three-step test).
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9(2) of the Berne Convention by the Section 110(5) WTO tribunal did uncover a potentially more flexible interpretation than
184
that found in the decisions of many Continental courts. This
approach, if subsequently upheld, might have the advantage of
supporting greater use of liability rules to resolve hard cases in
the print media, which would constitute a welcome addition in
185
many sectors.
186
However, even liability rules, i.e., “take and pay” rules,
do surprisingly little to support digitally integrated research
methods, which ingest and mine massive amounts of data and
information. Attempting to track such uses for purposes of calculating royalty streams conjures up a vision of thickets of
rights and boundless transaction costs that could swallow the
most robust research budgets, even if some system of automatic
187
micro-payments were to be devised.
If anything, the implicit duty to pay equitable compensation that could emerge from a more flexible judicial scrutiny of
the three-step test only reinforces the express mandate to pay
equitable compensation for so-called private uses mandated by
188
Article 5(2)( b) of the InfoSoc Directive, and vice versa. Taken
together, Articles 5(2), 5(3), and 5(5) of the Directive cumulatively discourage, rather than enable, free access and reuse of
published scientific information and data by the public research
community, even though such research is normally funded by

184. See supra notes 126–29 and accompanying text.
185. See Geiger, supra note 33, at 524 –33 (arguing for a limitation-friendly
copyright regime supplemented with remuneration rules); Annette Kur and
Jens Schovsbo, Expropriation or Fair Game for All? The Gradual Dismantling
of the IP Exclusivity Paradigm, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN A FAIR WORLD
TRADE SYSTEM: PROPOSALS FOR REFORMING TRIPS 408, 408–46 (Annette Kur
& Marianne Levin eds. 2011) (defending the utility of liability rules in a copyright regime).
186. See J.H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging
Rights in Subpatentable Innovation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1743, 1776–86 (2000)
(explaining that liability rules entitle property owners to compensation for the
use of their innovations and are hence distinguishable from exclusive or hybrid property rights, which entail injunctive remedies that can pose high costs
for innovation).
187. See, e.g., Sag, supra note 2, at 1657–68, 1680–82 (stressing need for
copy-reliant technologies to cover the entire Internet, for unwilling beneficiaries to opt out, and tendencies of collective rights organizations to license potential substitutes). However, it may make sense to retain a liability rule
when whole, integral data sets or other data tools are used to develop downstream commercial applications. See infra text accompanying notes 429–44.
188. See InfoSoc Directive, supra note 72, arts. 5(2), 5(3), 5(5); supra text
accompanying notes 83–86.
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governments or other public entities and made available by researchers to advance knowledge (and their reputational inter189
ests), but not for financial gain.
All the rigidity and uncertainty inherent in the provisions
analyzed above are further compounded by the absence of any
190
true fair use provision in the relevant international treaties,
in the InfoSoc Directive, or in the domestic copyright laws of
191
the European Union. Besides enabling courts to infuse greater “play in the joints” to facilitate scientific research, as ex192
plained above, an explicit fair use provision in international
or regional instruments could induce both courts and legislatures to give more weight to Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS
Agreement, which expressly promote the public-interest goals
193
of copyright law, and to the express provision favoring scien194
tific research and education in the preamble to the WCT itself.
Lacking any such fair use provision, some European courts
concerned about excesses of copyright protection have recently
felt obliged to invoke human rights, especially constitutionally
protected fundamental rights to free speech, as counter195
weights. But such well-intentioned judicial ploys introduce
significant uncertainty into an already complicated legal sce196
nario, and they could destabilize even well-settled principles
189. See infra text accompanying notes 519–31. Arguably, there is no obvious or logical reason to treat such scientific research any differently from traditional and directly funded government publications that are, at least in the
United States, statutorily foreclosed from copyright’s reach. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 105 (2006).
190. Okediji, supra note 54, at 525–28, 538–40 (arguing that the current
European Union copyright regime suffers from both uncertainty and rigidity).
191. See Senftleben, supra note 48, at 524 –25.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 174–83.
193. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 7 (objectives); id. art. 8
( principles); Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 979, 981, 1028 (2009).
194. WCT, supra note 42, pmbl.
195. See, e.g., Geller, supra note 50 (discussing German judicial decisions
that broadened the infringement analysis as well as the exception for quotations to assure constitutionally protected freedom of expression); Peltz, supra
note 169, at 282–83 (2009) (summarizing cases); cf. Lea Shaver, The Right to
Science and Culture, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 121, 169–84 ( proposing a copyright regime that promotes universal access and author interests, in light of a conflict
between intellectual property rights and a human right of access to science
and culture).
196. Ruth Okediji, The Limits of Development Strategies at the Intersection
of Intellectual Property and Human Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
TRADE & DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
IN A TRIPS-PLUS ERA 355, 367–73 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2007). The major
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of copyright law without directly addressing the needs of scientific researchers as such. One virtue of the fair use provision in
U.S. copyright law is precisely its ability to foster a penumbra
in which public good uses of protected matter may occur within
197
copyright law itself, while blunting the temptation to reach
for more fundamental or constitutional justifications that could
198
produce unintended destabilizing effects.
Given these premises, any limitations favoring scientific
research that do manage to emerge from the InfoSoc Directive
as applied by the domestic laws of European Union member
states will likely remain unmanageable and unpredictable for
the foreseeable future. Hence, recent proposals to reform the
three-step test itself have attracted considerable attention from
scholars concerned about the prospects for digitally integrated
199
research methods, as will be discussed below.
Short of that, the ineluctable conclusion that emerges from
this analysis is that researchers in general, and digitally empowered scientists in particular, will face the dismal prospects
of choosing either to desist from pursuing promising research
projects, with enormous opportunity costs, or to carry on in the
knowledge that they are likely to infringe copyright laws at
200
every turn. Needless to say, this choice becomes even starker
when the European Union’s database-protection laws are fac201
tored into the equation.
b. Limits of the Fair Use Approach
At least in theory, the fair use exception enables courts to
human rights declarations expressly acknowledge the rights of authors as
human rights that need to be reconciled with other fundamental rights. See
LAURENCE R. HELFER & GRAEME W. AUSTIN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: MAPPING THE GLOBAL INTERFACE 53–56 (2011) ( listing significant human rights declarations).
197. Okediji, supra note 196, at 355–84.
198. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–20 (2003) (viewing the protection of free speech interests as embedded in the fair use doctrine). But see
DAVID L. LANGE & H. JEFFERSON POWELL, NO LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
IN THE IMAGE OF AN ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT 305–24 (2009) (asserting
the need for recourse to fundamental rights in order to curb recent excesses of
copyright protection); Shaver, supra note 195, at 169–83 (advocating greater
reliance on the basic human right of access to science and culture in rebalancing international intellectual property rights).
199. See discussion infra Part II.D.1.
200. Cf. TEHRANIAN, supra note 27, at 5–14 (stressing the delegitimization
of copyright law that results from analogous situations).
201. See infra Parts II.B.1.a&b.
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address fact patterns that legislators did not, or could not, have
foreseen at the time any given copyright law was enacted. This
property helps to keep needed responses to public interest priorities up to date without recurring amendments to existing
statutes. In this capacity, fair use buttresses both the idea202
expression principle (now codified in the TRIPS Agreement)
and constitutionally protected free speech in the United States,
which in itself tends to favor access to published scientific re203
search as a purveyor of unprotected facts and discoveries. To
this end, the preamble to § 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act of
1976 explicitly recognizes scientific research as a privileged
204
subcategory within the general fair use framework.
i.

Inherent Methodological Uncertainties

Nevertheless, whenever any given scientific work becomes
the subject of a litigated fair use enquiry, courts must move beyond the preamble and subject it to the four “balancing sub205
tests” codified in § 107, as previously described. On the whole,
the four-step test of U.S. fair use law accommodated conventional scientific research methods fairly well in the past, especially in view of the proresearch bias specified in the preamble.
With few exceptions, uses for scientific research were usually
202. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 9.2.
203. The well-known function of fair use to preserve a buffer zone between
infringement and free speech in the United States has its limits, however, and
the expansion of copyright law’s length and strength in the past thirty years
has elicited a growing challenge from First Amendment scholars. See, e.g.,
LANGE & POWELL, supra note 198, at 305–24; Eric Allen Engle, When Is Fair
Use Fair?: A Comparison of E.U. and U.S. Intellectual Property Law, 15
TRANSNAT’L LAW. 187, 209 (2002) (describing tension between First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and copyright law); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Asserting Copyright’s Democratic Principles in the Global Arena, 51 VAND. L.
REV. 217 passim (1998) (arguing that “copyright law serves fundamentally to
underwrite a democratic culture”); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 7 (2001) (“Copyright’s speech encumbrance cuts a wide swath, chilling core political speech
such as news reporting and political commentary, as well as church dissent,
historical scholarship, cultural critique, artistic expression, and quotidian entertainment.”) (footnotes omitted)); Melville Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge
the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV.
1180 (1970). Unless more attention is given to users’ needs, this trend could
eventually boomerang against both publishers and authors who depend on
copyright protection in far less sensitive areas than scientific research.
204. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for
purposes such as . . . teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.”).
205. See id.
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206

permitted, and this tradition played some of the role that a
207
private use exception had performed in Europe.
To the extent that photocopying became a problem for the
case-by-case approach of § 107, industry-wide rules governing
library photocopying were negotiated and codified in § 108 of
208
the Copyright Act of 1976. Under these provisions, neither
students nor researchers are normally charged for library copies made for even large research projects (unlike the situation
in the European Union), although charges will apply to copies
made for classroom distribution, usually under blanket licenses
from a collection society known as the Copyright Clearance
209
Center.
Occasionally, the federal appellate courts have rendered
decisions circumscribing the reach of fair use even with regard
210
to conventional scientific research methods. But these cases
usually turned on the inherently unstable line between commercial and noncommercial research purposes and on the growing ability of technological measures to overcome preexisting
211
market failures. For example, researchers at a petroleum
company were obliged to pay for additional copies of back-dated
scientific articles available from a collection society, despite
212
their subscription to the journal in question.
However, subsequent jurisprudence—especially at the fed-

206. See, e.g., Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct.
Cl. 1973), aff ’d without opinion by an equally divided court 420 U.S. 376
(1975). For efforts to enact an international treaty governing worldwide library
practices and needs, see INT’L FED’N OF LIBRARY ASS’NS & INSTS., TREATY
PROPROSAL ON LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS FOR LIBRARIES AND ARCHIVES
(2011), available at http://www.ifla.org/files/hq/topics/exceptions-limitations/
documents/TLIB_v4.1.pdf.
207. See supra notes 63–70 and accompanying text.
208. 17 U.S.C. § 108 (2006).
209. Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Author Autonomy and Atomism in
Copyright Law, 96 VA. L. REV. 549, 637 (2010) (describing the Copyright
Clearance Center, which provides licenses allowing individuals to reproduce
works that are listed with the CCC).
210. Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381,
1386–88 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that copy shop that sold coursepacks to university students without paying fees or royalties was not fair use). See generally U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPRODUCTION OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS BY EDUCATORS AND LIBRARIANS (2009), available at http://www.copyright.gov/circs/
circ21.pdf (explaining the judicial doctrine of fair use and when it applies in a
particular case).
211. See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1385–86; Am. Geophysical
Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 918–25 (2d Cir. 1994).
212. Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 915, 931–32.

2012]

COPYRIGHT LAW & SCIENCE

1407

eral appellate level—may correct questionable decisions. The
very dependence of the fair use doctrine on unique sets of facts
makes it relatively easy for later courts to ignore the appearance of stare decisis by relying on subtle distinctions in the un213
derlying fact patterns. This adds to the overall flexibility of
the U.S. approach.
Critics of the fair use doctrine tend to emphasize the rela214
tive uncertainty likely to attend any new fact pattern and the
high transaction costs arising from the need to litigate close
215
cases. Both objections have some merit but are easily over216
stated. The fair use doctrine cannot intrinsically claim the
kind of legal certainty apologists for the positivist approach
217
demand, disregarding their failures to achieve it in practice.
Because fair use decisions are always fact-specific, attorneys
can only base their predictions on general categories of fair use
218
Yet, as scholars have
as established by the precedents.
shown, when cases are bundled within specified subject-matter
219
categories, patterns of stability and predictability emerge.
Admittedly, any preexisting set of fair use precedents may
be enhanced or narrowed by the judicial zeitgeist prevailing at
213. Compare, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309–12 (2d Cir. 1992)
(denying fair use for a sculptor who made a sculpture based on artist’s photograph, where the sculptor specified that the sculpture had to be “just like the
photo”), with Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 251–54 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding
reproduction of photographic image by a painter as “transformative,” because
the painter had a new purpose in using the image which altered the original
image’s character, thus satisfying requirements for fair use).
214. See, e.g., David Nimmer, “Fairest of Them All” and Other Fairy Tales
of Fair Use, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 287 (2003); see also BURRELL &
COLEMAN, supra note 176, at 249–53 (citing authorities and stressing the risk
of hostile judicial attitudes); Okediji, supra note 51, at 157 (discussing the
problems associated with raising a fair use defense, such as a lack of financial
resources for litigation).
215. See Samuelson, supra note 54, at 2540–41.
216. See Beebe, supra note 35, at 575–76 (evaluating fair use win rates and
litigation costs); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 715, 733–34 (2011) (discussing perceptions about the fair use
doctrine); Samuelson, supra note 54, at 2540–41 (arguing that the fair use doctrine is more predictable than critics suggest).
217. See, e.g., Senftleben, supra note 48, at 527–28 (discussing the invalidity of counterarguments against the fair use doctrine that criticize its lack of
legal certainty).
218. Beebe, supra note 35, at 575–81.
219. Samuelson, supra note 54, at 2541; see also Netanel, supra note 216,
at 736–59 (discussing the patterns and probability of a favorable finding in
fair use cases). See generally Michael J. Madison, Beyond Creativity: Copyright
as Knowledge Law, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 817 (2010) (discussing the relationship between copyright and creativity).
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the time. This observation holds particularly true for swings in
the judicial pendulum from a more proproperty rights outlook
to a more procompetition outlook, and back again, as routinely
220
occurs in U.S. intellectual property jurisprudence. Care must
accordingly be taken when predicting a future outcome on a
past set of precedents to allow for shifts in the underlying
trends, especially with regard to federal appellate and Supreme
221
Court decisions. For example, some important older precedents lost their relative weight in the late 1980s when the
market failure approach temporarily squeezed other normative
222
considerations out of the fair use equation. But, as we noted
earlier, that trend itself has given way to the rebirth of a so223
called transformative use doctrine and its aggressive exten224
sion in recent decisions to search engines.
At least two commentators who dislike the uncertainty associated with fair use have expressed appreciation for a “public
225
interest” criterion instead. Yet, that criterion harbors a considerable degree of ambiguity all its own (given that copyright
226
law itself expresses one facet of the public interest). Besides,
220. Cf. Jerome H. Reichman & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Harmonization
Without Consensus: Critical Reflections on Drafting a Substantive Patent Law
Treaty, 57 DUKE L.J. 85, 107–22 (2007) (discussing shifts in judicial attitudes
to patents). These shifts, when they occur, can invite a more than customary
degree of forum shopping.
221. Cf. Gordon, supra note 110, at 1646–57 ( providing case studies of two
Supreme Court decisions affecting fair use).
222. Cf. id. (disavowing the judicial response to the fair use doctrine in several Supreme Court decisions and discussing flaws in the Court’s reasoning).
223. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578–79 (1994).
224. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1160–61 (9th
Cir. 2007) (finding that operator’s display of thumbnail images of copyright
owner’s photographs was fair use); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811,
822 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that search engine operator’s use of owner’s images as “thumbnails” in its search engine qualified as fair use); see also Field v.
Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1111 (D. Nev. 2006) (finding fair use in
Google search engine’s use of cached snapshots of websites). Contrast the situation in the European Union, where some member states, under the positivist
approach, have declined to consider digital developments as a basis for a more
flexible approach to the enumerated lists of exceptions contained in their copyright legislation. See Senftleben, supra note 48, at 550–52 (explaining the European Union approach to copyright limitations).
225. See BURRELL & COLEMAN, supra note 176, at 80–111, 249–74, 287–88.
226. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526 (1994) (“We have often recognized the monopoly privileges that Congress has authorized, while ‘intended
to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a
special reward,’ are limited in nature and must ultimately serve the public
good.” (citations omitted)); Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am.
Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1980) (emphasizing that copyright law
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as earlier noted, the federal appellate courts in the United
States almost invariably invoke an uncodified public interest
criterion when evaluating the express normative factors set out
227
in § 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act. Where science is concerned, moreover, both the public interest criterion and the
normative criteria of § 107 should typically favor use and reuse
of research results in close cases concerning research methods.
A more troubling source of uncertainty arises from the tendency of U.S.-style fair use decisions to operate under an all-ornothing premise that the challenged use must either infringe or
not infringe, in which case noninfringing uses imply no corre228
This practice leads some
sponding compensatory burden.
courts to hand down vacillating decisions depending on how
they evaluate the appearance of free riding in fact specific
229
situations.
In this respect, the three-step test embodied in the TRIPS
Agreement has something to teach U.S. courts and policymak230
ers. As acknowledged by a WTO tribunal, the legislative history concerning this test may allow equitable compensation—a
“take and pay” rule—to resolve hard cases where more than a
231
little was taken for a particularly valid public purpose. United States fair use law might benefit from this additional element of flexibility in close cases, even as European Union law
needs the flexibility of fair use, a topic to which we shall return
232
below.
These very sources of uncertainty can, in turn, exert a restraining effect on both publishers and would-be users of copyitself promotes the public interest).
227. Sometimes this criterion can be carried very far. See, e.g., Sony Corp.
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454 –56 (1984) (concluding
that time-shifting of commercial television programs promoted the public interest for fair use purposes, despite abundant evidence that most off-air reproductions were not motivated by time-shifting needs); see also Gordon, supra
note 110, at 1624 –25 (stating that a defendant must prove the nature of the
public interest served by his or her use).
228. See Reichman, “Marching to a Three-Step Tune,” supra note 105; Orit
Fischman Afori, Flexible Remedies as a Means to Counteract Failures in Copyright Law, 29 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 6 (2011).
229. See Afori, supra note 228 at 5–99.
230. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 13 (“Members shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.”).
231. See supra notes 136–38 and accompanying text.
232. See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing efforts for copyright reform in the
European Union).
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righted works, depending on the facts at issue in any given
case. While scientific entities must be wary of engaging in litigation that could issue in an adverse precedent for future research prospects, publishers must be equally wary of challenges
to the status quo that may further abridge the scope of yesterday’s exclusive rights. This inherent burden of reciprocal uncertainty tends to reduce transaction costs over time by discouraging overly adventurous fair use challenges as potentially too
233
costly for either side.
In this standoff, much fair use occurs by default, although
a threat of future litigation acts sometimes as a sword of Damocles. If scientists are frequently wholesale infringers even with
respect to conventional research methods, in the sense that
they refuse to allow unreasonable or obsolete laws to obstruct
customary or necessary research and teaching practices, rights
holders have traditionally been reluctant to sue their sources of
publication (often their customers as well) in cases where dam234
ages appeared modest at best.
Nevertheless, the high costs of litigation, combined with
235
may at
recent extraordinary statutory damages awards,
times deter would-be users from pursuing even meritorious
disputes that ought to enable courts to clarify the proper
236
boundaries of a fair use exception. Users may thus find themselves unable to defend their legitimate rights unless some
larger nonprofit entities can be found to finance the campaign
and absorb its potential costs if the cause is lost. The power of
publishers’ cease-and-desist letters in this regard adds to this
potential in terrorem effect by warning that certain cases will
237
lead to high legal transaction costs regardless of the merits.
At the moment, there is no expeditious, low-cost means of test233. Accord Afori, supra note 228, at 9–10 (agreeing that uncertainties in
the U.S. copyright approach can create disincentives to litigate).
234. We are grateful to Paul Uhlir for this insight.
235. See Pamela Samuelson et al., The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Reform, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 1196 (2010) (“[ W ]e are troubled that statutory damage awards sometimes appear arbitrary or grossly excessive in comparison with a realistic assessment of actual damages
incurred.”); Michael Traynor & Katy Hutchinson, Some Open Questions about
Intellectual Property Remedies,14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 453, 458–59, 459
n.35 (2010) (summarizing damage awards in copyright infringement cases).
236. Afori, supra note 228, at 2–3.
237. Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions
in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 241–42 (1998) (arguing that
preliminary injunctions should be available when there is a high probability of
success on the merits).
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ing a fair use defense without incurring such litigation costs,
although several proposals to remedy this defect have been put
238
forward.
ii. Outer Limits of the Case-by-Case Approach
None of these considerations addresses the deeper problems that render the fair use doctrine of little use to practitioners of the digitally empowered, computerized research techniques of primary concern in this Article. The systematic need
that researchers, as users of automated knowledge discovery
tools, have to survey vast or, indeed, unlimited amounts of literature and data in virtually every contemporary, large-scale
scientific investigation, particularly in the life sciences, overwhelms the boundaries set by the four-step test of § 107 and increasingly makes a mockery of the very concept of fair use.
Consider, for example, that the implicit purpose of the substantiality test set out in § 107(3) is to ensure that fair use reproductions of a protected text will be quantitatively and qualitatively reasonable in relation to the work as a whole. In no
239
area, not even parody, can this provision be interpreted to
permit wholesale reproduction (as technically defined) of every
relevant text in every relevant case, which routinely occurs in
computational science or in any scientific research project
240
where automated knowledge discovery tools are employed. By
241
the same token, the market-harm test of § 107(4) becomes
drained of precedential meaning if the scientific texts thus
scrutinized were published to serve both the research needs of
the scientific community and the commercial interests of
publishers.
Professor Matthew Sag’s brilliant article on copy-reliant
238. Emily Meyers, Art on Ice: The Chilling Effect of Copyright on Artistic
Expression, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 219, 220 (2007) ( proposing system to allow
exploitation of existing work so long as user does “not unreasonably commercialize or in any way merchandize her work without the consent of the appropriated work’s copyright owner”).
239. But see, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 593–94
(1994) (holding that entire song may be considered a parody under fair use);
Elsmere Music, Inc. v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 482 F. Supp. 741, 746–47 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (holding that television show “Saturday Night Live” parody of the song
“I Love Sodom” to the tune of “I Love New York” constituted fair use).
240. Robert C. Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the
Protection of Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 516, 536 (1981).
241. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2006) (stating that a factor to be considered in determining fair use is “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work”).
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242

technologies sheds considerable light on this conflict of interest. His efforts to reconcile the search engine cases with prior
decisions concerning transformative uses of copyrighted works
under § 107(1) leads him to posit that nonexpressive,
nonsubstitutional uses, in conjunction with copy-reliant technologies, should normally qualify as fair uses across the board,
especially if the technologies in question were geared to recog243
nize and implement an opt-in clause. When this intriguing
proposition is applied to digitally integrated scientific research
methods, however, it reveals a number of key differentiating
factors.
For example, one must immediately confront the possibility
that, from a rights holders’ perspective at least, massive copying of published research articles to generate further research
by means of automated knowledge discovery tools colorably
represents both a substitutional and an expressive use of those
same articles. Even if that were precisely what scientists qua
authors most dearly desired in their relentless pursuit of reputational benefits, gratis fair use on this scale is hardly con244
sistent with the aims of commercial science publishers.
If only scientific researchers were involved as both creators
and users of their own published outputs, then Professor Sag’s
default formula for fair uses in regard to copy-reliant technologies could significantly improve the research community’s
technical legal position, especially if it were underpinned with
an opt out, rather than an opt in default condition. Scientists
inclined to opt out of such a voluntary pool would immediately
incur countervailing peer pressure and perhaps risk jeopardizing future grants to boot. If, instead, scientists constitute the
market for published scientific research, and if that published
research cannot be freely and digitally perused without impermissible market harm to publishers, then automated research
tools risk becoming instruments of massive and systematic infringement, which no transformative use doctrine could excuse
if publishers’ customary interests are to be preserved.
That, indeed, poses one of the fundamental questions

242. See Sag, supra note 2.
243. See id. at 1675–82.
244. See, e.g., Letter from Michael Mabe, CEO, Int’l Assoc. of Scientific,
Technical & Med. Publishers, to Copyright Review, Dep’t. of Jobs, Enterprise
and Innovation, Dublin, Ireland (July 14, 2011) [hereinafter Letter from STM]
(“Consultation on the Review of the Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000”)
(strongly opposing fair use).
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raised by our present enquiry, namely, should scientific publishers’ customary interests be preserved at the expense of scientists’ need for wholesale access to, and reuse of, the exploding
universe of published scientific literature and data? That question, in turn, raises ancillary questions about what added-value
the scientific community obtains from its traditional reliance on
external, for-profit publishers, and what the opportunity costs
would be if the scientific communities were to break that tie to
the publishing industry. These and related questions will be
245
more directly addressed in the final Part of this Article.
For present purposes, what seems undeniable is that the
case-by-case approach of the fair use doctrine is currently
overwhelmed by the magnitude and scope of copying necessi246
tated by today’s digitally empowered research techniques. A
proper response to this challenge could require at least industry-wide negotiations and settlements, like those between research libraries and publishers that gave rise to § 108 of the
247
1976 Act. At best, new institutional arrangements would redefine (or eliminate) publishers’ interests in order to satisfy the
scientific community’s need for open access to publicly funded
research results in any form they were made available to the
248
public. Between these two poles, some possible incremental
legislative reforms are skeptically examined below.
As matters stand, however, it is the publishers’ lobby that
has driven copyright law and policy with regard to science since
249
the 1990s. Rather than supporting the needs of digitally integrated scientific research, publishers have managed to surround scientific information and data transmitted online with
legally impenetrable electronic fences and with codified database protection laws that threaten the very foundations of contemporary scientific methodology, as explained in the next two
Sections.

245. See infra Part III.
246. See Timothy K. Armstrong, Digital Rights Management and the Process of Fair Use, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 60–62 (2006) (discussing contemporary copyright after the advent of new technologies).
247. Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History,
72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 869–79 (1987).
248. See infra Part III.
249. See Armstrong, supra note 246, at 56–57.
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2. The Coup de Grâce: Digital Locks and Database Protection
Laws
A growing number of scientific journals are now published
250
online, without distribution in print copies at all. Once digitally transmitted online, researchers anywhere can, in principle, locate, analyze, and disaggregate any collection of scientific
information and data that has been made available to the public, subject only to the prevailing default rules of applicable intellectual property laws and to the contractual restrictions that
publishers or providers may otherwise impose.
Even when a journal continues to be published in print
copies, the articles it contains, along with the supporting data,
may often be made available online for the convenience of later
251
scientific researchers. Although, in principle, these developments greatly facilitate the traditional sharing norms of science, researchers can legally convert analog contents to digital
formats only if they remain within the confines of the limitations and exceptions to the reproduction rights discussed above.
Under the European Union’s InfoSoc Directive, this process
could be prohibitively expensive, as we have seen. Even under
the U.S. fair use provision, such quantitatively large amounts
of copying for research purposes could result in publishers’ demands for additional compensation, not to mention the costs
associated with the copying itself.
Regarding access to and use of information and data made
directly available online, whether or not initially published in
hard copies, researchers have discovered that virtually none of
the proscience measures of copyright law that still survive in
print media apply to works transmitted through telecommuni252
cation networks. The digital revolution that created such
promising opportunities for scientific research also generated
intense fears that publishers would become vulnerable to massive infringements online and to other threats of market fail253
ure. In response, publishers persuaded legislatures to recast
and restructure copyright law in the online environment so as
250. See, e.g., Paul Uhlir, Designing the Digital Commons in Microbiology—Moving from Restrictive Dissemination of Publicly Funded Knowledge to
Open Knowledge Environments: A Case Study in Microbiology, in DESIGNING
THE MICROBIAL RESEARCH COMMONS, supra note 12, at 77, 79.
251. See id. at 80 ( providing empirical data and citing authorities).
252. See, e.g., Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 2, at 383–84.
253. See id. at 317–21 (discussing the effects of the digital revolution on
copyright infringement).
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to preserve business models built around the print media.
These new laws make it difficult to trigger preexisting limitations and exceptions in the online environment, including
255
those favorable to science; and they enable publishers to embed pay-per-use machinery among other restrictions into electronic fences surrounding online transmissions of scientific ar256
ticles. The most fundamental postulates of so-called users’
rights, such as the idea-expression dichotomy or fair use in the
United States, may thus be entirely overridden by a combination of technical protection measures (TPMs), statutory cutbacks, and contractually imposed restrictions rooted in these
257
same provisions. In the European Union, moreover, sui generis database protection laws, mandated by the European Commission in 1996, further restricted access to the very facts and
258
data that are the lifeblood of basic scientific research.

254. See Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J.
INT’L L. 369, 374 –75 (1997).
255. See, e.g., Victoria Stodden, Enabling Reproducible Research: Licensing
for Scientific Innovation, 13 INT’L J. COMM. L. & POL’Y 1, 12–24 (2009) (discussing the impediments to reuse of scientific work).
256. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1205 (2006) ( providing for electronic fences and
digital rights management systems); InfoSoc Directive, supra note 72, art. 6
( providing obligations of member states regarding circumvention of technological measures); Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 34 –48 (1994) (discussing proposed changes to copyright
law in the digital milieu and arguing the case for better protection of the public interest); Samuelson, supra note 254, at 371–96 (discussing the goals of the
United States at the WIPO conference and the positions that technology companies took in objecting to treaty draft provisions).
257. See generally Reichman et al., supra note 170 (discussing safe harbors
from copyright liability and anticircumvention rules for Internet service providers along with rules prohibiting circumvention of Technical Protection
Measures (TPMs) used by copyright owners to argue that Congress did not adequately balance interests when establishing rules for TPMs). For the view
that these measures replace a copyright system designed to serve the public
interest with a “mere guild monopoly” like that of the Stationers’ Company of
London in the period 1556–1694, see Lunney, supra note 96, at 814 –20.
258. See Database Directive, supra note 22, art. 7; J.H. Reichman & Paul
F. Uhlir, Database Protection at the Crossroads: Recent Developments and
Their Impact on Science and Technology, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 793, 802–20
(1999) (exploring the damaging impact that the sui generis regime will likely
have on scientific research); J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual
Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 52, 113–24 (1997) (explaining the
implications of a sui generis regime for scientific research).
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a. Virtual Elimination of Limitations and Exceptions Favoring
Science in the Online Environment
259

The WIPO Copyright Treaty of 1996 (WCT), which established new rules governing digital transmissions of copyrighted
works, did not mandate the radical change of the legal infrastructure just described. On the contrary, the WCT reflects a
relatively balanced compromise that resulted from the negotiations of stakeholder coalitions with fairly equal bargaining
260
power on both the publishers and users’ sides. The preamble
itself thus recognizes “the need to maintain a balance between
the rights of authors and the larger public interest, particularly
261
education, research and access to information.”
However, the WCT said nothing about how states should
implement the anticircumvention norms that defend electronic
fences surrounding works transmitted online so as to preserve
public interest privileges and immunities. When the treaty was
translated into the domestic laws of the United States and European Union, powerful publisher interests persuaded the respective legislatures largely to ignore or override the safeguard
262
provisions otherwise available.
In the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998
263
(DMCA), for example, the U.S. Congress conditioned the ability of third-party users to invoke public interest measures, such
as the idea-expression dichotomy or fair use, on their having
first gained lawful access to the work being transmitted
264
online. Yet, the moment a would-be user seeks to gain lawful
259. WCT, supra note 42.
260. The users’ coalition was largely organized and managed by Professor
Peter Jaszi, American University School of Law, Washington, D.C. See
Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 258, at 810–28 (explaining the negotiations and
proposals to resolve database protection issues).
261. WCT, supra note 42, pmbl.¶ 5. Similarly, the agreed statement to Article 10 permits contracting parties “to carry forward and appropriately extend
into the digital environment” existing limitations and exceptions in their national laws and “to devise new exceptions and limitations that are appropriate
in the digital network environment.” WCT Agreed Statements, supra note 150
(concerning Article 10). Finally, the very Article 11 that imposed “obligations
concerning technological [ protection] measures” (TPMs), also expressly declared that such TPMs were not meant to “restrict acts in respect of [authors’]
works, which are . . . permitted by law.” WCT, supra note 42, art. 11.
262. See Reichman et al., supra note 170, at 983–85, 1059 (explaining that
efforts to implement a balancing of interests in the United States and European Union copyright laws have been unsuccessful).
263. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998).
264. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006); see also Timothy K. Armstrong, Digital
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access to the copyrighted work transmitted online, he or she
will normally encounter one-sided electronic contracts of adhesion that strip away most or all of the public interest user
265
rights nominally available from the domestic copyright law.
The DMCA thus arguably created a new exclusive “right of access” subject to virtually no preexisting privileges or immuni266
ties of interest to scientific users whatsoever.
A similar state of affairs (with different nuances in different jurisdictions) arises in the European Union. Article 6 of the
InfoSoc Directive of 2001 expressly enables domestic legislators
to authorize Technical Protection Measures (TPMs) that curtail
or override the preexisting limitations and exceptions otherwise
267
available in the hard copy format. Article 6(4) of the same Directive then piously admonishes member states “to ensure that
right holders make available to the beneficiary of an exception
Rights Management and the Process of Fair Use, 20 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 49,
67–74 (2006) (discussing fair use and the DMCA). See generally Dan L. Burk
& Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems, 15
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41 (2001) (evaluating legal and institutional infrastructures that could support a rights management system).
265. In effect, once the user is forced through an electronic gateway, the
contract of adhesion becomes a privately legislated intellectual property right.
See J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual
Property Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 875, 897–914 (1999) (discussing adhesion contracts for digital technologies); see also Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1099–102 (2003) (explaining how copyright
holders can use technological control systems to prevent access to digital content); Nima Darouian, Accessing Truth: Marketplaces of Ideas in the Information Age, 9 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 1, 26–46 (2010) (discussing
adhesion contracts and virtual marketplaces).
266. Jane C. Ginsburg, From Having Copies to Experiencing Works: The
Development of an Access Right in U.S. Copyright Law, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y
USA 113, 125 (2003); see, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and
the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 519–20 (1999) (arguing that the DMCA
antidevice provisions are overbroad, unclear, and need to be revised). However, some recent cases have looked askance at this result, and Professors
Reichman, Dinwoodie and Samuelson have demonstrated how these recent
precedents could lead courts to a more balanced solution in the future. See
generally Reichman et al., supra note 170 (discussing several recent cases that
have challenged the boundaries of copyright protection for digital works).
267. InfoSoc Directive, supra note 72, art. 6. See generally Guido
Westkamp, Code, Copying, Competition: The Subversive Force of ParaCopyright and the Need for an Unfair Competition Based Reassessment of
DRM Laws after INFOPAQ, 58 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y USA 601, 627–43 (2011)
(analyzing the aggregate effects of InfoSoc Directive, arts. 2, 5(1)–5(5), after
the European Court of Justice’s decision in Infopaq Int’l A/S v. Danske
Dagblades Forening).
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or limitation provided for in national law . . . the means of ben268
efiting from that exception or limitation.” In practice, however, the Directive provides member states with no legal basis for
implementing the thrust of Article 6(4), and national legislation
concerning TPMs so far tends to largely ignore Article 6(4) al269
together, with a few exceptions.
As a result, technological fencing devices, coupled with
electronic contracts, known respectively as TPMs and Digital
Rights Management tools (DRMs), enable publishers to automatically protect both data and information delivered through
online networks without gaps in enforcement and without any
traditional exceptions for science or other public interest pur270
poses. When these technological fences and electronic contracts are further supported by anti-circumvention measures
that forbid decryption or other means of cutting through such
271
fences, the publisher’s control becomes virtually absolute. Database protection laws enacted in the European Union can then
make this absolute control virtually perpetual to boot.
b. Exclusive Rights in Noncopyrightable Collections of Data
Compilations of facts and data receive relatively thin protection from the copyright laws of both the United States and
272
the European Union. Under these laws, only a creative selection and arrangement of facts or data qualifies as eligible subject matter, and the disparate facts remain available for use by
273
third-party compilers, at least in principle, if not always in
274
practice. In a remarkable further development, the U.S. gov268. InfoSoc Directive, supra note 72, art. 6(4).
269. For an exception, see, for example, Copyright and Related Rights Regulations, 2003, S.I. 2003/2498, art. 24, §§ 296(2), 296 ZD (2) (U.K.). For a more
detailed discussion of ways to implement art. 6(4), see generally Reichman et
al., supra note 170.
270. Reichman et al., supra note 170, at 982–87; Westkamp, supra note
267, at 675–77.
271. 17 U.S.C. § 1201( b) (2006).
272. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991)
(applying “thin” protection doctrine of functional works cases to factual compilations in general). For statutory support in the United States, see 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (defining compilations); id., § 103 (defining subject matter of eligible
compilations). For the European Union, see Database Directive, supra note 22,
Part I § 13 (dealing with harmonization of copyright rules applicable to eligible compilations of data).
273. See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text; see also Key Publ’ns,
Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ’g Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 512–14 (2d Cir.
1991) (discussing the test for infringement of original works and compilations).
274. See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text.
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ernment managed to codify both the idea-expression dichotomy
and the principle of limited protection for factual compilations,
275
of crucial importance to science, in the TRIPS Agreement and
276
the WIPO Copyright Treaty. Global copyright law thus, in effect, encourages states to protect so-called factual works
against little more than wholesale duplication of an otherwise
creatively organized compilation of facts or data, but not the
underlying facts or data as such.
In 1996, however, when promulgating its Directive on the
277
Legal Protection of Databases, the European Commission
took the unprecedented step of enacting a law that established
exclusive rights in the very data that copyright laws had left
278
freely available in the public domain. Ostensibly motivated
by the Commission’s stated goal of increasing the European
Union’s share of the global market for directories and compila279
280
tions in general, which so far has proved unattainable, this
sui generis regime introduced radical new restrictions on access
to and use of compilations of data that were previously unknown to any intellectual property paradigm.
For example, no element of originality or creativity is re-

275. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, arts. 9.2, 10.2.
276. WCT, supra note 42, arts. 3, 5. However, there is remarkably no mention of this same doctrine in the European Union’s Infosoc Directive of 2001,
notwithstanding the fact that the idea-expression doctrine has now been embodied at the multilateral level in both article 9.2 of the TRIPS Agreement and
in article 10 of the WCT. For this and other reasons, some commentators express reservations about over-reliance on this doctrine as a buttress to limitations and exceptions under the best of circumstances. See, e.g., BURRELL &
COLEMAN, supra note 176, at 20–25.
277. See Database Directive, supra note 22, arts. 1–11.
278. See id.
279. A more realistic motivation arose from the backing of the world’s largest publisher of scientific journals, with headquarters in the Netherlands,
which spearheaded ultimately unsuccessful efforts to enact a similar law in
the United States. Maria Canellopoulou-Bottis, A Different Kind of War: Internet Databases and Legal Protection or How the Strict Intellectual Property
Laws of the West Threaten the Developing Countries’ Information Commons, 2
INT’L J. INFO. ETHICS 1, 10 n.22 (2004), available at http://www.i-r-i-e.net/
inhalt/002/ijie_002_07_canellopoulou.pdf (referring to Reed Elsevier’s lobbying
for database protection).
280. COMM’N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FIRST EVALUATION OF DIRECTIVE 96/9/EC ON THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF DATABASES (2005) [hereinafter FIRST EVALUATION], available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/
copyright/docs/databases/evaluation_report_en.pdf; see also Elad Harison, Who
Owns Enterprise Information? Data Ownership Rights in Europe and the U.S.,
47 INFO. & MGMT. 102, 102 (2010) (stating that the United States continues to
dominate the database market).
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281

quired to qualify for this form of protection. Instead, the database laws are triggered by a “substantial investment” in obtaining, verifying, or presenting any given collection of facts
and data; and unlike copyright or patent laws, the exclusive
rights to extract or reuse the data in question protect that in282
vestment as such. Despite its anomalously low threshold of
eligibility, this regime arises automatically, as if it were part of
the copyright infrastructure. It thus poses a direct threat to
digitally integrated scientific research by endowing compilers of
noncopyrightable collections of data with exclusive rights to extract and reuse the disparate data that their sweat-of-the-brow
283
investment made available to the public.
These exclusive rights to data are potentially stronger and
284
more rigid than those of copyright law. Formally, independ285
ent creation remains a perfect defense, as it would under cop286
yright law. Realistically, however, independent generation of
costly accumulations of scientific data is economically unfeasi287
ble, even when conceptually possible. The Directive does allow a “small” amount of data to be taken without consequence,
281. Database Directive, supra note 22, art. 7(1).
282. Id.; see, e.g., Daniel J. Gervais, The Protection of Databases, 82 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1109, 1120 (2007) (“The Directive essentially does two things: it
confirms the application of copyright to compilations of data and creates a
non-copyright, sui generis right in databases to protect the investment of the
database maker.”).
283. Database Directive, supra note 22. For the rejection of sweat-of-thebrow protection of factual works in U.S. copyright law after a period of experimentation in that regard by some federal appellate courts, especially the Seventh Circuit, see generally Jane C. Ginsburg, No “Sweat”? Copyright and Other Protection of Works of Information after Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 338 (1992).
284. See J. H. Reichman, Mondialisation et Propriété Intellectuelle: Database Protection in a Global Economy, REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT
ECONOMIQUE [INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF ECONOMIC LAW] 455, 455–503
(2002) [hereinafter Reichman, Database Protection in a Global Economy] (discussing the evolution of intellectual property legislation and the issues relating to database protection and legislation). Until these laws were adopted, only the conduct-based liability rules of trade secrecy law were able to protect
investment in know-how applied to industry. See J.H. Reichman, How Trade
Secrecy Law Generates a Natural Semicommons of Innovative Know-How, in
THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY 185, 186–87 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss
& Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2011).
285. Database Directive, supra note 22, § 15 (stating that independent creation of a database is sufficient for protection).
286. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 7.2.2 (2d ed. 1996) (stating that “conveying evidence” of independent creation constitutes a perfect defense to an
action for copyright infringement).
287. Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 258, at 807 n.80, 814 –15.
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but courts have ensured that “small” means very small, and the
Directive expressly prohibits repeated extractions of even small
288
amounts of data from the same collection.
Permissible exceptions to the database regime are paradox289
ically truncated when compared with those of copyright law.
With specific regard to the use of protected data for scientific
research, the Directive allows states to adopt an exception
couched in the same ambiguous language as that of the InfoSoc
Directive of 2001, namely, “for the sole purpose of illustration
290
for teaching or scientific research.” As in the InfoSoc Directive, this exception is not mandatory, and major countries
291
such as France and Italy have ignored it. Even when countries adopt this exception, it seems to enable only extractions
for purposes of illustration, but not for reutilization of scientific
data or information in other collections, which is the normal
292
scientific practice.
Once obtained, database protection nominally expires after
293
fifteen years. However, if the compilers make another substantial investment, say, by adding or updating new data to the
preexisting collection, their efforts will renew the protection of
294
the entire database for another fifteen-year period.
In this respect, the sui generis database protection laws
paradoxically provide stronger protection for derivative compilations than for derivative works obtained under traditional
288. See Database Directive, supra note 22, arts. 6, 7(5), 8; British
Horseracing Bd. Ltd. v. William Hill Org. Ltd., 2001 E.W.C.A Civ 1268, ¶¶ 29–
48, 2001 WL 825162 (July 31, 2001) (finding that copying various pieces of information relating to British horseracing industry constituted extraction of a
substantial part of the database, in addition to repeated extraction of insubstantial parts), aff ’d Case C-203/02, 2004 E.C.R I-10415, ¶87.
289. See, e.g., Miriam Bitton, A New Outlook on the Economic Dimension of
the Database Protection Debate, 47 IDEA 93, 141–44, 150–53 (2006).
290. Database Directive, supra note 22, art. 6(2)( b); see supra notes 65–83
and accompanying text.
291. Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 258, at 803–04; Raquel Xalabarder,
Copyright Exceptions for Teaching Purposes in Europe (Internet Interdisciplinary Inst., Working Paper WP04 -004, 2004), available at http://www.uoc.edu/
in3/dt/eng/20418/20418.pdf.
292. See, e.g., ESTELLE DERCLAYE, THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF DATABASES:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 129–33 (2008) (arguing that the exception is overly
narrow and therefore over-protects database makers); see also Reichman &
Samuelson, supra note 258, at 79.
293. Database Directive, supra note 22, art. 10(1).
294. Id. art. 10(3); see also Wesley L. Austin, A Thoughtful and Practical
Analysis of Database Protection under Copyright Law, and a Critique of Sui
Generis Protection, 3 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 3,¶ 67 (1997).
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copyright laws. In the latter case, an original and creative derivative work receives copyright protection only for the eligible
295
new matter added to the preexisting matter. In the case of
the data protection laws, where no originality at all is required
for eligibility, any qualifying additional investment may renew
296
the protection of the collection as a whole. Perpetual protection thus becomes an attainable goal for the first time in the
history of intellectual property laws (disregarding, of course,
trademark laws, which operate on fundamentally different
297
principles).
In a series of recent decisions, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has subsequently introduced an elusive subjectmatter distinction between substantial investment for purposes
of obtaining data that are created (presumably ineligible), and
expenditures for purposes of obtaining data that are collected
(i.e., developed and maintained in databases as such) and
298
which presumably qualify for protection. In other words, “only resources used to collect data that [are] already in existence”
will qualify for database protection, but not “data compilations
that are generated quasi ‘automatically’ as by-products of other
299
activities.” To the extent that scientific databases are characterized as “created” under this slippery distinction, it might
conceivably reduce the total number of databases, particularly
295. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2006); see, e.g., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 223–
38 (1990) (finding that copyright protection extends only to the original content added to the derivative work); Waldman Pub. Corp. v. Landoll Inc., 43
F.3d 775 (2d Cir. 1994) (same).
296. See Database Directive, supra note 22, art. 10(3).
297. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 258, at 86 (“[A]ny publisher
who continues to make a substantial investment in updating, improving, or
expanding an existing database can look forward to perpetual protection.”).
298. See Case C-46/02, Fixtures Mktg. Ltd. v. Oy Veikkaus Ab, 2004 E.C.R.
I-10365, ¶49 (referred from Finland); Case C-338/02, Fixtures Mktg. Ltd. v.
Svenska Spel AB, 2004 E.C.R. I-10497, ¶27 (referred from Sweden); Case C203/02, British Horseracing Bd. Ltd. v. William Hill Org. Ltd., 2004 E.C.R. I10415, ¶¶50–56 (referred from the United Kingdom); Case C-444/02, Fictures
Mktg. Ltd. v. Organismos prognostikon anonon Podosfairou AE, 2004 E.C.R. I10549, ¶27 (referred from Greece).
299. Ritch, supra note 37, at 127 (citing Directmedia Publ’g GmbH v. Albert-Ludwigs-Universitat Freiburg [2009] 1 C.M.L.R. 7 (ECJ 4th Chamber));
see also Mark J. Davison & P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Football Fixtures, Horse
Races and Spin-Offs: The ECJ Domesticates the Database Right, 27 E.I.P.R.
113, 114 (2005) (stating that European Court of Justice discounts investments
in collecting data that are indivisibly linked to their creation); Estelle
Derclaye, Databases Sui Generis Right: Should We Adopt the Spin Off Theory?, 26 E.I.P.R. 402, 408–13 (2004) (finding that the database right should only protect investments that are directly attributable to producing a database).
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300

sole-source databases, eligible for protection. Courts could, for
example, exclude some collections of raw scientific data on the301
se grounds.
However, some commentators believe most scientific data
are better characterized as collected and, therefore, automati302
cally eligible for protection. Even when scientific data are
viewed as created, whatever this turns out to mean, entities
seeking protection could always spend more money on verification or on improving the conditions of access to and posterior
maintenance of the collection, which might have some scientific
value even if undertaken for secondary motives. In other words,
there is reason to believe that most collections of scientific data
and information could be made to fit within these judicially
contrived eligibility requirements by one means or another. If
so, any collection of scientific data or information that did qualify would obtain broad and virtually endless protection against
value-adding components of a future collection that made un303
authorized use of an existing one.
How the Database Directive actually affects science in any
given country will then depend on a number of uncertain variables. In the United States, where the scientific community
vigorously opposed enactment of database protection bills mod304
eled on the European Union Directive, only copyright law applies to compilations of data, although that law, as shown earli305
er, is much less science friendly today than in the past. In
European Union member states and affiliates, however, the sui
generis database protection laws remain firmly in place despite

300. For the dangers of protecting sole source databases under this regime
see, for example, Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 258, at 113–37.
301. See DERCLAYE, supra note 292, at 87–99 (arguing that there is no substantial investment in collecting, verifying or presenting raw scientific data
such as event data, timetables, telephone subscriber data and the like).
302. See, e.g., Davison & Hugenholtz, supra note 299, at 115–18 (arguing
that when a large mass of collected data has been created, there are significant costs associated with presentation and verification which may meet the
requirements of the Directive); see also Ritch, supra note 37, at 127.
303. Cf. DERCLAYE, supra note 292, at 255–67 (supporting the database
protection regime generally, but strongly criticizing its treatment of science).
304. See Mark Davison, Database Protection: Lessons From Europe, Congress, and WIPO, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 829, 853 (2007) (“In the United
States, the lack of database protection and, in particular, its defeat in the
Senate in 1998 was the direct product of the input of preexisting, institutionalized, funded, and Congressionally recognized scientific and educational lobby
groups such as the National Research Council.”).
305. See supra Part I.A.2.
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serious criticism from within the European Union itself. The
European Commission has also made strenuous efforts to extend similar database regimes to developing and LeastDeveloped Countries through a series of regional and bilateral
307
free trade agreements.
The sui generis database protection laws in the European
Union thus turn the relatively benign approach of traditional
copyright law upside down. They not only protect the very aggregates of facts and data that international copyright law expressly left in the public domain, they confer potentially
stronger and longer protection on these unoriginal compilations
308
than copyright laws afford original works of authorship.
Analogies drawn from the historical rhetoric promoting authors’ rights, whatever one’s view of them, were thus perversely
applied to an investment-based scheme of protection governing
309
the most fundamental building blocks of knowledge. What
the sui generis database laws actually codified instead was a
scheme of powerful exclusive property rights that protect infinitely expansible collections of data from extraction and reuse,
with a built-in propensity to favor the emergence of sole-source
310
providers over time. This regime conflicts head on with customary scientific research practices that long antedated the
digital universe and the accelerated research opportunities it
311
makes possible.
306. See FIRST EVALUATION, supra note 280, at 11–27 ( listing numerous
criticisms of the Directive and proposals for change).
307. See Denise Rosemary Nicholson, Intellectual Property: Benefit or Burden for Africa?, 32 INT’L FED. LIBR. J. 310, 316 (2006), available at http://ifl
.sagepub.com/content/32/4/310.full.pdf (“[T]he United States and European
Union [free trade] Agreements contain a TRIPS-Plus Chapter, which far exceeds all current international obligations for all types of intellectual property.”).
308. See Reichman, Database Protection in a Global Economy, supra note
284, at 463–67; see also Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 258, at 802–06.
309. Disregarding the impact of a powerful lobby, among other factors, see
Craig R. Whitney, European Union’s Commission Is Revamped After a Scandal; A ‘New Era’ Is Promised, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1999, at A6. The Commission responsible for elaborating the Database Directive completely failed to
recognize or observe the systemic limits of the copyright paradigm. Cf.
Denicola, supra note 240, at 518–41 (examining the scope of copyright protection available to writings and exploring the divergent and inconsistently applied rationales used to define property rights in factual works).
310. As correctly predicted by the German government, whose provision to
allow compulsory licenses against sole-source providers was deleted, behind
closed doors, by the Council of Ministers at the last moment, and without the
approval of the European Parliament. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note
258, at 86.
311. See David, supra note 25, at 19–33 (discussing the history and eco-
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Nor should one suppose that the social costs of this dismal
experiment, which cannot be repealed despite sweeping criticism from the Commission’s own officially appointed reviewers,
are confined to the some fifty-five countries that have adopted
312
similar regimes at the behest of the European Communities.
Consider, instead, that because science is a global public
313
good, search engines and other digitally empowered research
tools must transcend national borders in order to access all
publicly available sources of data and information relevant to
any given project. Standing in their way are all the formidable
legal barriers rooted in the territorial copyright and database
protection laws described above, which threaten to choke the
transnational flow of upstream scientific data and information
that would otherwise be capable of digital integration on a
314
global scale.
II. EMPOWERING DIGITALLY INTEGRATED SCIENTIFIC
RESEARCH ON A GLOBAL SCALE
The foregoing analysis of the existing intellectual property
framework portrays a set of rules and policies that are diametrically opposed to the needs of scientific researchers in a universe of discourse where automated knowledge discovery tools
must freely explore the entire range of thematically relevant,
315
digitally distributed literature and data. Consider, for example, that the Wellcome Trust found that eighty-seven percent of
nomic logic of “open science”); Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 258, at 799–820
(discussing the potential impact of the database protection laws on science and
technology); Paul A. David, The Digital Technology Boomerang: New Intellectual Property Rights Threaten Global “Open Science” 1–8 (Stanford Dept. of
Econ., Working Paper No. 00-006, 2000), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/
wpa/wuwpdc/0502012.html.
312. See FIRST EVALUATION, supra note 280, at 11–27 ( listing numerous
criticisms of the Directive): see also HARGREAVES, supra note 26, at 19 (“The
aim was to ensure the EU got a foothold in th[e] growing [database] sector at
an early stage. The European Commission[’s] . . . evaluation of the Directive in
2006 . . . found that EU database creation had declined since introduction of
the Directive, whilst it had continued to rise in the US, undermining the rationale for the right in the first place. The EU Database Directive remains unchanged.”).
313. See generally Stiglitz, supra note 24, at 65–115.
314. Paul Geller warns that the “interesting choice-of-law issues” are “[i]n
practice, a mess—likely to intimidate house counsel for any research institution. Here we approach the bottom line, the chilling effect of the lack of a
clear-cut exception with as global an application as possible . . . .” Letter from
Paul Geller to Jerome Reichman (Oct. 30, 2011) (on file with authors).
315. See supra Introduction Section A.

1426

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[96:1362

the material housed in the United Kingdom’s main medical research database (UK Pub Med Central) was unavailable for le316
gal text and data mining.
By the same token, a major independent study undertaken
for the British Government reports that existing copyright laws
make it virtually impossible to text mine about one thousand
journal articles from the first half of the twentieth century that
describe malaria in indigenous peoples and soldiers, as well as
317
details of therapeutic measures available at that period. Because of rights clearing requirements that appear out of all
proportion to any benefit the rights holders could want, “even if
they could be found,” researchers cannot digitally index or text
mine sources that offer potentially significant insights for the
development of methods for preventing and treating malaria
318
today.
A. AUTOMATED KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY TOOLS AS
INSTRUMENTS OF MASSIVE INFRINGEMENT
Wittingly or unwittingly, these laws force scientific researchers to choose between ignoring an unmanageable and
unreasonable set of legal constraints, in the interest of pursuing science as a public good, or foregoing research opportunities
in order to avoid thickets of rights, burdensome transaction
costs, and the fear of stirring up potential law suits down the
line. The end result puts both science and the larger public interest in a no-win situation, at a time when the resources
available to fund scientific research are shrinking.
If the relevant intellectual property laws were strictly enforced, and the scientific community continued to respect them,
scarce public resources earmarked for basic research would be
siphoned off to intermediaries from scientists seeking access to
and use of their own published research results. In that event,
the public pays twice for the same output, plus a surcharge for
mushrooming transaction costs, while the “incipient transnational system of innovation,” established by the TRIPS Agree319
is progressively deprived of essential
ment in 1996,
knowledge assets. Less innovation, not more, is the predictable
result over time.
316. HARGREAVES, supra note 26, at 47.
317. Id. at 46.
318. See Hogarth Chambers, The Hargreaves Review—Another Mixed Bag,
33 E.I.P.R. 599, 600 (2011) (criticizing United Kingdom’s copyright exceptions).
319. Maskus & Reichman, supra note 24, at 342.
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Conversely, if intellectual property laws are ignored by researchers determined to carry on with their work irrespective
of unreasonable legal constraints, automated knowledge discovery tools will have become transformed into engines of mas320
sive infringement. It is hard to see how systematic disregard
of intellectual property laws, coupled with growing contempt
321
for the legislative process that fosters them, will benefit authors, artists, and other creators in the long run, especially
when those condemned to outlaw status are not free-riders on
costly musical and cinematic productions, but publicly funded
scientific researchers in pursuit of greater knowledge and applications that benefit humanity as a whole.
While the pressing need to reform the laws that have pro322
duced such anomalous results has not escaped notice, efforts
in this regard are confronted with a conflict between the interests of scientists, on the one hand, and those of publishers on
the other. Scientists are authors whose primary interests in
publication are the rewards of attribution and integrity—the
so-called reputation benefits—that the moral rights of copyright laws, together with the norms of science itself, strive to
323
protect. These reputational benefits then serve to attract the
kind of financing and status rewards attendant on academic
324
success. Given a conflict between the needs of scientific re320. Cf. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913,
937–38 (2005) (stressing extent to which peer-to-peer music sharing schemes
had become instruments of “massive infringement”).
321. “Much of the data needed to develop empirical evidence on copyright . . . is privately held. It enters the public domain chiefly in the form of
‘evidence’ supporting the arguments of lobbyists (‘lobbyonomists’) rather than
as independently verified research conclusions.” HARGREAVES, supra note 26,
at 18.
322. See, e.g., id. at 11–27 (criticizing the InfoSoc Directive); Hilty, Copyright Law and Scientific Research, supra note 2, at 315–21 (citing problems
with European copyright law); Hilty, Five Lessons About Copyright, supra note
2, at 109–38 (discussing the reaction of the scientific community to copyright
over-protection).
323. In the United States, this is true at least in theory, if not in practice.
For doubts about the appropriate level of moral rights enforcement in U.S.
copyright law, see, for example, Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Originality in Context, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 871, 874 (2007) (“Sound reasons may support confining
the application of moral rights to a smaller category of works than are covered
by copyright law.”).
324. Scientists do have an interest in not sharing either research results or
data until they can obtain these reputational benefits via publication. See Davis & Connolly, supra note 17 (finding that there is some reluctance among
researches to use a repository if it could possibly jeopardize one’s publication
success); Jordan, supra note 17, at 82–85 (noting the importance of publication
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search and the dictates of copyright and database laws, one can
expect scientists normally to opt for the goals of research because their pecuniary interests lie elsewhere, and are, indeed,
325
dependent upon the reputation benefits just described.
In contrast, science publishers are the main pecuniary
beneficiaries of the current state of the law, which they have
lobbied hard to obtain, and they would resist any reforms likely
326
to be put on the table. This fact of life makes it logical to ask
why the scientific community continues to rely and depend on
publishing intermediaries in the first place. Disregarding the
historical origins of such reliance, one feels compelled to ask
whether the benefits of such reliance still outweigh the costs in
today’s digitally integrated, totally computerized research environment. No sensible scheme of reform can be devised without
addressing these questions, and no specific proposals will make
sense unless they are weighed against alternative options that
result from such an enquiry.
B. THE LIMITS OF INCREMENTAL LEGISLATIVE REFORM TO
ALLEVIATE OBSTACLES TO SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
To the extent that publishers retain their traditional role
as intermediaries, any efforts to reform applicable intellectual
property laws must reconcile the needs of science with the
327
needs of commercial publishers to turn a profit. This factor
greatly complicates the prospects for reform because the existing copyright and database laws so favor the interests of publishers over those of scientists that merely incremental or
piecemeal reforms rooted in traditional exceptions and limitaand priority for scientists).
325. See Jordan, supra note 17, at 82–85. This is often not the case with
patents, where deeper conflicts of interest arise. See Reichman & Dreyfuss,
supra note 220, at 107–22 (discussing shifts in attitudes towards patents).
326. See Statement by the Am. Chem. Soc’y, to the Comm. on the Impact of
Copyright Policy on Innovation in the Digital Era 5–6 (Oct. 15, 2010), available
at http://sites.nationalacademies.org/PGA/step/copyrightpolicy/index.htm (opposing sweeping policy changes that undermine peer reviewed publications); Letter from STM, supra note 244 (opposing proposals for a fair use exception); see
also HARGREAVES, supra note 26, at 42 (“[C]opyright exceptions for educational purposes and for research are intended to promote knowledge, skills and
innovation in the economy, without unduly undermining the incentive for educational and academic publishers to create the works that students, teachers
and researchers need.”).
327. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Copyright as Property in the Post-Industrial
Economy: A Research Agenda, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 141, 142–44 (comparing author incentives to capital incentives).
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tions are unlikely to give the research community what it
needs.
A more promising approach might emerge if the scientific
and publishing communities were to negotiate an industrywide settlement that accommodated the research needs of one
without sacrificing the commercial needs of the other. Arguably, one such example was the negotiated settlement between
publishers and the library community with regard to photocopying, which replaced the case-by-case fair use approach in the
328
United States with § 108 of the 1976 Copyright Act. However,
librarians have found this settlement unsuited to the digital
age, and they are demanding widespread reforms requiring legislative enactments of limitations and exceptions that publish329
ers strongly oppose. The extraordinary powers that publishers have obtained under the DMCA in the United States and
the InfoSoc Directive in the European Union make an industrywide settlement favorable to science far more difficult now than
it might have been prior to the 1990s.
In the remainder of this Article, we discuss possible solutions to the problems that intellectual property laws have created for digitally integrated scientific research from two very
different angles. First, we consider the kinds of legal reforms
that would be needed if commercial publishers continued to act
as intermediaries between producers and users of scientific information and data, as they do today, without regard to the
likelihood that such reforms would ever be enacted.
We then reconsider the role of publishers as such and ask
whether, from a cost-benefit perspective, it should be significantly modified or abandoned altogether. In that Section, we
328. See supra notes 91–96.
329. See, e.g., INT’L FED’N OF LIBRARY ASS’NS & INSTS., supra note 206, at
4 –5 (suggesting reforms to the current copyright regime); Fair Use: Its Effects
on Consumers and Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce,
Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
109th Cong. 6 (2005) (statement of Prudence S. Adler, on behalf of the Library
Copyright Alliance), available at http://www.ala.org/ala/issuesadvocacy/
copyright/LCANov05.pdf (arguing for fair use and stating that it safeguards
the collective interest in the flow of information); Statement of Principles on
Copyright Exceptions and Limitations for Libraries and Archives by Electronic
Information for Libraries, International Federation of Library Associations
and Institutions, and Library Copyright Alliance for WIPO Standing Comm.
on Copyright and Related Rights (May 25–29, 2009), available at http://www
.ifla.org/files/clm/statements/statement-of-principles-sccr20.pdf (urging WIPO
Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights to support immediate
reform of copyright exceptions and limitations).
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examine alternative strategies that the scientific community
itself could embrace in a concerted effort to manage its own upstream knowledge assets in ways that might avoid, or at least
attenuate, the obstacles to digitally empowered scientific research currently flowing from a flawed intellectual property
regime.
1. Possible Reforms of Domestic Copyright Laws
To the extent that the fruits of basic scientific research
continue to stimulate economic growth in advanced industrial
330
economies, improving the environment for digitally integrated scientific research will enhance the prospects for future innovation. In the words of an authoritative report to the British
Prime Minister in 2011:
Innovation may be blocked and growth hampered when unduly rigid
applications of copyright law enables rights holders to block potentially important new technologies. . . . Research scientists, including
medical researchers, are today being hampered from using computerized search and analysis techniques on data and text because copyright law can forbid or restrict such usage. . . . In these circumstances,
copyright in its current form represents a barrier to innovation and
331
economic opportunity.

This, along with other studies recently undertaken, could eventually lead to proposals for incremental legislative reforms that
would move in the right direction.
For example, officials of the European Commission recently undertook an enquiry into the ways that limitations and exceptions in copyright laws might be improved with specific re332
gard to scientific research. As a result, the European Union
330. See DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., supra note 1, at 129–51 (analyzing the
effects of and experience with U.S. university patenting before and after the
Bayh-Dole Act); David C. Mowery & Bhaven N. Sampat, The Bayh-Dole Act of
1980 and University-Industry Technology Transfer: A Model for Other OECD
Governments?, 30 J. TECH. TRANSFER 115, 116–18 (2005) (discussing how academic research influences industrial innovation); Bhaven N. Sampat, Changes
in University Patent Quality after the Bayh-Dole Act: A Re-Examination, 21
INT’L J. OF INDUS. ORG. 1371 (2003) (examining the growth of university patenting and licensing); Bhaven N. Sampat, Patenting and US Academic Research in the 20th Century: The World Before and After Bayh-Dole, 35 RES.
POL’Y 772, 781–82 (2006) [hereinafter Sampat, Patenting and US Academic
Research) (same).
331. HARGREAVES, supra note 26, at 43.
332. See COMM’N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, GREEN PAPER ON COPYRIGHT IN THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 3 (2008), available at http://ec.europa
.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/copyright-infso/greenpaper_en.pdf [hereinafter EC Green Paper] (aiming to foster a debate on how knowledge for research, science and education can best be disseminated in the online
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might conceivably decide to revise the InfoSoc Directive. Alternatively, it might wait for an overall codification of European
Union copyright law, as contemplated in the Treaty on the
333
Functioning of the European Union (FEU).
In the United States, a group of scholars has been considering the need to update existing limitations and exceptions
with a view to a prospective revision of the 1976 Copyright
334
Act. The National Academies of Science has just commissioned a study of the impact of copyright laws on scientific re335
search. A thorough-going study of this same topic as it affects
developing countries is also under way within the ambit of the
336
WIPO Development Agenda.
These and other similar initiatives might conceivably restore a better balance between public and private interests
than currently exists under the global copyright regime as
strengthened since the 1990s. To this end, the next Section of
this Article outlines a set of incremental reforms that could at
least attenuate the obstacles to digital research that were identified above.
However, we remain skeptical that proposals for incremental reform, even in the unlikely event of legislative enactment,
would adequately address the roots of the problem. As we view
the matter, the head on conflict between e-science and copyright law depicted above cannot be resolved without fundamental legal and institutional reforms designed to prevent both
copyright and database protection laws from reaching into the
domain of basic scientific research in the first instance.
environment).
333. See Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 118 (consolidated version), Sept. 5, 2008, O.J. C115/96 [hereinafter F.E.U.] (“[T]he European Parliament and the Council . . . shall establish measures for the creation
of European intellectual property rights to provide uniform protection of intellectual property rights throughout the Union and for the setting up of centralised Union-wide authorisation, coordination and supervision arrangements.”).
334. See Pamela Samuelson et al., The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Reform, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 1181–82 (2010) ( presenting
conclusions of the Copyright Principles working group).
335. See Committee on the Impact of Copyright Policy on Innovation in the
Digital Era, THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES’ BOARD ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY,
AND ECONOMIC POLICY, http://sites.nationalacademies.org/PGA/step/copyright
policy/index.htm ( last visited Apr. 18, 2012) (creating a committee to evaluate
and propose how to expand and improve research on the impacts of copyright
policy, particularly on innovation in the digital environment).
336. See WIPO, COMM. ON DEVELOPMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
PROJECT ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (2010), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/cdip_4/cdip_4_3.doc.
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a. Improving the Information Society Directive in the
European Union
Any serious reform effort in the European Union should
start with a codification of the idea-expression principle, a subject-matter exclusion of fundamental importance for scientific
337
research. Most scientific literature conveys ideas and facts,
not expression. Although the TRIPS Agreement and the WCT
338
both embodied this exclusion in international copyright law,
the drafters of the InfoSoc Directive conveniently ignored it in
339
2001, perhaps on the technical ground that it was not a limitation on, or exception to, authors’ exclusive rights as such. All
European Union member states should have to embody this
principle in their domestic copyright laws.
Turning to the express exception for scientific research
340
that the InfoSoc Directive introduced in Article 5(3)(a), the
first step in any incremental set of reforms would be to make
this exception also mandatory and binding on all member
341
states. Absent such a measure, countries such as the United
Kingdom might simply ignore this provision and continue to rely on older exceptions allowing quotations for certain purpos342
copies made for libraries and educational establishes,
343
ments, as well as the new provision subjecting “private use”
344
to fair compensation. The byzantine snares emanating from
domestic law implementations of such narrow provisions are
345
exemplified in a recent survey of the relevant U.K. laws.
Second, the express exception for science in Article 5(3)(a),
346
once made mandatory, must be rid of its inherent ambiguity.
337. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102( b) (2006) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process,
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the
form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work.”).
338. See WCT, supra note 42, art. 2; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art.
9.2 (“Copyright protection shall extend to expressions and not to ideas, procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts as such.”).
339. See supra notes 72–90.
340. See supra notes 77–83.
341. Accord HARGREAVES, supra note 26, at 51.
342. See InfoSoc Directive, supra note 72, art. 5(2)( b).
343. See id. art. 5(2)(c).
344. See id. art. 5(3)(d).
345. See BURRELL & COLEMAN, supra note 176, at 15–163; see also
HARGREAVES, supra note 26, at 11–52.
346. InfoSoc Directive, supra note 72, art. 5(3)(a); see supra notes 77–83
and accompanying text.
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Like the relatively more transparent phrase used in the Rome
Convention of 1961, for example, the revised provision could directly permit “use solely for the purposes of teaching or scien347
tific research” and thus remove any reference to the confusing
348
term for “purpose[s] of illustration.”
Third, any mandatory exception for scientific research
must then be cloaked in some substantive content that promotes flexibility within an inherently proscience framework
and deflects narrowing legalistic interpretation in advance. In
particular, the revised provision should eliminate the current
language that limits scientific use “to the extent justified by the
349
non-commercial purpose to be achieved.” This language is
unworkable in practice because, as we have noted earlier, virtually all scientific research conducted at today’s universities
and other public research entities can be perceived as abetting
350
commercial ends that financially benefit their sponsors.
To achieve even these minimalist proscience ends without
departing from existing legislative models, the European
Commission should also consider embedding a mandatory exception for science within a broader fair use framework, like
351
that adopted in § 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976. Re352
cent European scholarship endorses this approach, although
353
opposition to it is strongly entrenched in business circles.
However, United States fair use law retains potential defects of
its own that could limit its effectiveness if used to regulate digi347. International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers
of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations art. 15.1(d)., Oct. 26, 1961,
496 U.N.T.S. 43.
348. InfoSoc Directive, supra note 72, art. 5(3)(a).
349. Id.
350. See, e.g., supra notes 82–86 and accompanying text. But see
HARGREAVES, supra note 26, at 49 (recommending extension of private copying exception to the use of analytics and data mining tools, but only for “noncommercial” research).
351. See supra Part I.A.2.
352. See, e.g., Senftleben, supra note 48, at 526 (stating that fair use “raises the fundamental question of appropriate balancing tools . . . Flexible rights
necessitate flexible limitations . . . . [Given] new technological developments . . . broad exclusive rights are likely to absorb and restrict new possibilities of use . . . . [F ]lexible fair use factors ensure a fast reaction . . . [and] allow
the courts to reestablish a proper balance between freedom and protection”(emphasis added)).
353. See, e.g., HARGREAVES, supra note 26, at 44 (“Most responses to the
Review from established UK businesses were implacably hostile to adoption of
a US fair use defence in the UK on the grounds . . . that it would
bring . . . massive legal uncertainty.”).
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tal research in the European context. Accordingly, suggestions
to improve the fair use approach in the United States highlighted below should also be considered for possible application
in the European Union context.
b. Improving the Fair Use Approach
We previously pointed out that the fair use approach in the
United States, while more flexible than the designated exceptions approach in the European Union, could not readily cope
with either quantitative or qualitative amounts of copyrighted
matter that digitally driven scientific research would have to
process. Similarly, application of the market-harm test in such
cases might be difficult if publishers successfully insisted that
such uses constituted the natural market for their proprietary
354
outputs.
Here, we note a further possible snag in the transformative
use doctrine described earlier, which the federal appellate
courts have recently expanded as a tool for equating public
355
good uses of protected works with presumptively fair uses.
Tensions arise because the very concept of transformative use
356
partakes of the definition of a derivative work, and U.S. copy357
right law gives strong protection to derivative works. Today,
354. See supra notes 242–45 and accompanying text.
355. A growing number of cases, building on this doctrine, have begun to
expand a fair use exception that had shrunk during the 1980s and 1990s. See,
e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1146 (9th Cir. 2007)
(finding that operator’s display of thumbnail images of copyright owner’s photographs was fair use); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 811 (9th Cir.
2003) (holding that operator’s use of owner’s images as “thumbnails” in its
search engine was fair use); see also Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d
630, 642–45 (4th Cir. 2009) (finding fair use for archival copies of student papers stored in digital form to help detect and prevent plagiarism). See generally Netanel, supra note 216, at 759–68 ( providing illustrative cases of the legal
development of fair use).
356. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“A ‘derivative work’ is a work based upon
one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement,
dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art
reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work
may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions,
annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an
original work of authorship, is a ‘derivative work’.” (emphasis added)).
357. See, e.g., Ralph S. Brown, The Widening Gyre: Are Derivative Works
Getting Out of Hand?, 3 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 10–20 (1984) (examining rights in derivative works); Paul Edward Geller, Beyond the Copyright
Crisis: Principles for Change, 55 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 165, 168–99
(2008) (discussing the evolution of derivative rights in the United States); Paul
Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPY-
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indeed, some U.S. courts have begun to distinguish transformative markets from transformative uses, which captures the exquisite ambiguity of the underlying concept and could begin to
wrap so-called transformative uses in the numbing foil of mar358
ket-failure analysis once again.
In the leading Supreme Court decision on fair use, Justice
359
Souter dropped a footnote identifying this very conflict. He
suggested that a judicially imposed license allowing a transformative use with equitable compensation to the derivative
360
right holder could resolve the dilemma in close cases. To date,
no U.S. court has taken the hint, which is why U.S. fair use decisions often vacillate between all-or-nothing outcomes in a
361
path that sometimes defies logic or rationalization. Perhaps
the recent pertinent decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in
362
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, will finally focus the copyright courts’ attention on the possibility of using a liability rule,
363
in place of an injunction, in appropriate cases.
RIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A.

209, 211–15 (1983) (same).
358. Bill Graham Archives, LLC v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605,
614 –15 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing “transformative markets”); Castle Rock
Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 150 F.3d 132, 146 n.11 (2d Cir. 1998)
(“[C]opyright owners may not preempt exploitation of transformative markets,
which they would not ‘in general develop or license others to develop,’ by actually developing or licensing others to develop those markets. Thus, by developing or licensing a market for parody, news reporting, educational or other
transformative uses of its own creative work, a copyright owner plainly cannot
prevent others from entering those fair use markets.” (citations omitted)).
359. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994)
(discussing the fact that the goal of copyright law is “to stimulate the creation
and publication of edifying matter” and this interest is not always best served
by automatically granting an injunction in “parody, news reporting, educational or other transformative uses”; thus 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) gives courts discretion in granting injunctions, because “there may be a strong public interest
in the publication of the secondary work [and] the copyright owner’s interest
may be adequately protected by an award of damages for whatever infringement is found” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)); see also
Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1479 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding “special circumstances” that would cause “great injustice” to defendants and “public injury” were injunction to issue), aff ’d sub nom. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207
(1990).
360. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578 n.10.
361. Compare, e.g., Elsmere Music, Inc. v. Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc., 482 F.
Supp. 741, 746–47 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff ’d, 632 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980), with
MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 425 F. Supp. 443, 453–54 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff ’d and modified by 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981) (finding copyright violation where infringer did not comment on original work itself ), and Walt Disney Prods. v. Mature
Pictures Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1397, 1398–99 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (same).
362. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
363. See David Carson, Copyright Office Gen. Counsel, Remarks at the
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On this issue, the three-step test familiar from European
law (and now mandatory under international law) may have a
valuable lesson to teach U.S. courts. In cases where normative
considerations sounding in the larger public interest favor a
given use, but the amount of the taking appears relatively large
with some negative impact on the potential market for the copyrighted work, the legislative history of the three-step test
would support allowing that use in return for equitable compensation from the proceeds of the otherwise unauthorized use,
if any, to the authors whose support of the public interest had
364
thus been co-opted. Should the European Union decide to
365
adopt a modified fair use provision along these lines, it might
move world copyright law toward some new synthesis that
could combine the normative wisdom of U.S. fair use law with
the practical wisdom of those reticent drafters of the gloss on
366
Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention.
Fordham Intellectual Property Law Institute: Intellectual Property Law and
Policy (Apr. 8–9, 2010) (on file with authors), ( program available at
http://fordhamipconference.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/2010Conference
Program.pdf) (stating that eBay’s extension to copyright law was “likely”); see
also Christopher Phelps & Assocs., LLC v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 535 (4th
Cir. 2007) (applying eBay rationale to copyright cases). In Salinger v. Colting,
607 F.3d 68, 74 –75 (2d Cir. 2010), a copyright infringement action, the Second
Circuit announced a standard for injunctive relief that had been approved by
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). The three-judge panel
in Salinger held that a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction in a copyright case must show (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that “he is
likely to suffer irreparable injury in the absence of an injunction”; (3) that
“remedies at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate
for that injury”; (4) that the balance of hardships tips in his favor; and (5) that
“the ‘public interest would not be disserved’ by the issuance of a preliminary
injunction.” Salinger, 607 F.3d at 77–80 (citations omitted). Although the panel in Salinger explicitly limited its holding “to preliminary injunctions in the
context of copyright cases,” it also saw “no reason that eBay would not apply
with equal force to an injunction in any type of case.” Id. at 78 n.7. Moreover,
U.S. copyright law can impose statutory damages or lost profits for infringement, a possibility that must be factored into the equation in some cases. See
17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006) ( providing for statutory damages). The outcome depends on how one views the court’s equitable powers, and also on whether or
not the court deems an infringement to have occurred in the first place.
364. Accord GERVAIS, supra note 121, at 71–79 (discussing the legislative
history of Article 9 of the Berne Convention); see also supra notes 129–33 and
accompanying text.
365. See Senftleben, supra note 48, at 541–44 for an argument in support
of such a solution. “Fair use in the EC . . . would not necessarily mean use free
of charge.” Id. at 551.
366. Any such synthesis would also have to take account of the privacy interests recognized in the European Union’s traditional exceptions for private
use. See InfoSoc Directive, supra note 72, art. 5.2( b) (requiring compensation
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The trouble even with this sort of adjustment is that it
would probably not meet the needs of twenty-first century computational science, however beneficial it might be in other areas of literary and artistic endeavor. Because U.S. fair use cases
remain so fact specific, the four normative criteria set out in
§ 107 of the Copyright Act could play out differently when tested before different judicial panels. In particular, the amount of
material taken for digital research and, increasingly, included
in new research results could always make some courts fearful
of undermining the derivative work right, as mentioned above,
even though strong derivative work rights make economic
sense only in the entertainment sector.
Much would depend on the federal courts’ continued willingness to defend the transformative uses of science in the
name of an overriding public interest. Even then, some decisions—though often criticized—introduce into U.S. fair use law
the same untenable distinction between so-called commercial
367
and noncommercial scientific research that European Union
law has codified in its basic exception to the reproduction right
368
favoring science. Because we believe that U.S. fair use law
will have to take the internationally mandated three-step test
369
more fully into account as time goes on (at least where for370
eign authors’ rights are at stake), this element alone could
add an additional reason to fear a chilling effect on scientific
research stemming from the uncertain application of the fair
371
use doctrine to digital and computational science.
To obviate this uncertainty in U.S. law, economist Paul
David has proposed codifying an “automatic fair use exception”

for private use); see also HARGREAVES, supra note 26, at 48–49 (recommending
limited private copying exception that corresponds to “what consumers are already doing,” but recognizing that private copying exceptions in European Union member states usually carry levies on copying equipment).
367. See, e.g., Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 37 F.3d 881, 889–91
(2d Cir. 1994) (addressing distinction between commercial and noncommercial uses), order amended and superseded by 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir.
1994).
368. See supra text accompanying notes 195–99 (discussing exceptions for
science in InfoSoc Directive).
369. See infra Part II.C.1.
370. See supra note 195.
371. See Stodden, supra note 255 at 20–24 (discussing the effects of lesser
copyright protections for scientific research); Senftleben, supra note 48, at
522–25 (stressing tendency of three-step test to narrow preexisting exceptions
in European courts, but not usually to broaden them).
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372

for these purposes. That exception could operate in tandem
with voluntary contractual waivers, like those of the Creative
373
Commons and Science Commons initiatives, discussed below.
By the same token, the Hargreaves Review favors a new exception in the United Kingdom’s copyright law allowing uses enabled by technology that do not directly trade on the underlying
374
creative and expressive purpose of the work. Reportedly, the
375
U.K. government is favorable to this proposal. Some clearinghouse arrangements might nonetheless become necessary for
purposes of guaranteeing reputational benefits through proper
376
attribution.
A codified automatic fair use provision for e-science, or at
least a strong normative guideline to the same effect, would not
impede the publishers’ ability to price discriminate their initial
subscriptions in keeping with the subscribers’ capacities to
377
378
pay. Both print publishers (whose numbers are decreasing)
379
and online publishers (discussed below) could legitimately extract more revenue from commercial entities than from public
science institutes under this approach. An automatic fair use
provision might also further encourage commercial publishers
to accept open access subsidies from science funders, a trend we
372. See David, supra note 25, at 29 (discussing automatic fair use exception); Anselm Kamperman Sanders, Limits to Database Protection: Fair Use
and Scientific Research Exemption, 35 RES. POL’Y 854 passim (2006) (comparing European Union copyright law with U.S. copyright law in the area of sharing scientific research); Stodden, supra note 255, at 20–25 (arguing for less
stringent regulation of copyrights in the scientific arena).
373. About the Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, (Jan. 17, 2012, 5:43 PM)
http://creativecommons.org/licenses (describing licensing scheme); Science,
CREATIVE COMMONS, (Jan. 17, 2012, 5:46 PM) http://creativecommons.org/
science (stating that Creative Commons licensing should be extended to scientific and technical research); see also Stodden, supra note 255, at 20–24 ( proposing a more comprehensive form of private ordering for computational science, known as the Reproducible Research Standard).
374. HARGREAVES, supra note 26, at 4; see also CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ
INTELLECTUELLE arts. L.134 -1-134.9, (Fr.) (creating a public database dedicated to out-of-print books that is accessible at no charge).
375. See Chambers, supra note 318, at 600 (noting, however, that the European Commission’s Intellectual Property Strategy ignores any such move).
376. See HARGREAVES, supra note 26, at 46–48 (discussing issues with data
mining to determine authors of orphan works).
377. See John P. Conley & Christopher S. Yoo, Nonrivalry and Price Discrimination in Copyright Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1801, 1818–20 (2009)
(discussing price discrimination in the context of copyright law).
378. For evidence concerning the rise of online and open access publishing
in the field of microbiology, see Uhlir, supra note 250, at 77–87.
379. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
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380

discuss below.
However, even an enlightened fair use approach raises obstacles rooted in print media models that ought to simply become irrelevant to the conduct of online, worldwide scientific
research. In this context, for example, it makes little sense to
381
focus on “reasonable” uses of published scientific articles, or
to attempt to track revenue streams from upstream uses of
published scientific information and data by researchers who
382
exploit automated knowledge discovery tools. On the contrary, we believe intellectual property laws should not permit publishers to further control uses or reuses of their authors’ scientific research results for purposes of further research at all.
2. What E-Science Really Needs from Any Legislative Reform
We doubt that the foregoing proposals to incrementally reform existing measures bearing on scientific research could be
enacted in an uncompromising format that would provide digital science with the user-friendly regime it needs to flourish.
Any such proposals could easily become entangled in the coils
of more intricate, legalistic provisions largely derived from experience in the entertainment sectors. Precisely because these
so-called reforms would be deemed science friendly in name,
they could mire modern science ever more deeply in the need to
make unpalatable choices between obeying complex, inherently
obsolete provisions or ignoring them altogether.
a. A Tailor-Made Exemption for Scientific Research
The only workable solution is to adopt a broad and uncompromising exemption for scientific uses that requires no gloss,
no fine print, and no elaborately contrived exceptions to a
380. See infra notes 459–65 and accompanying text.
381. Cf., e.g., BURRELL & COLEMAN, supra note 176, at 288–93 ( proposing
to make the designated exceptions under U.K. law more favorable to science).
382. See Sag, supra note 2, at 1648–49 (calculating Google’s transaction
costs, in the absence of fair use, in millions or even billions of dollars, depending on coverage and strategic behavior of copyright proprietors). However,
some exceptions to this general proposition become more feasible when researchers make use of data tools or whole data libraries for specific downstream applications. For arguments that “compensatory liability rules” may
legitimately be applied in such cases see JEROME H. REICHMAN ET AL., GLOBAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGIES FOR THE MICROBIAL RESEARCH COMMONS: GOVERNING DIGITALLY INTEGRATED GENETIC RESOURCES, DATA AND
LITERATURE (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter GLOBAL IP STRATEGIES FOR THE
MICROBIAL RESEARCH COMMONS] (Part III); Ritch, supra note 37, at 183–84;
see also discussion infra Part II.D.1.
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grudgingly acknowledged “exception” for scientific research. To
this end, the Max Planck Institute’s response to the European
383
Commission’s Green Paper in 2008 proposed that such a
broad and general provision, allowing use and reuse of published research materials for virtually any scientific purpose,
should expressly legitimize storage, archiving, data extraction,
384
linking, and the like.
While endorsing this proposal, which makes a good start,
we think even more may be needed. In particular, scientists
must be free to subject any published article (and, as we shall
385
see later, any article made publicly available online) to data
mining procedures and data manipulation by automated
knowledge discovery tools, including virtual scientific experimentation, without any constraint other than attribution under
386
the norms of science. The same exemption must apply to the
public release of selectively chosen material in any scientific
paper or report. Such a regime should be applied directly, and
in harmonized express terms, in the copyright laws of every
European Union member state, without any allowance for the
sort of off-setting, detailed provisions that are currently
thought necessary for “a workable system . . . of users’
387
rights,” which in practice usually means an unreasonable
system of publishers’ constraints on science.
Such a broad exemption should expressly clarify its application to so-called derivative works, a concept that has virtually no meaning in upstream scientific research as currently
practiced. So long as prior research results are incorporated into new scientific work with clear and appropriate attribution,
there is no need for permission, which, in effect, operates as a
388
de facto prior restraint on scientific speech. Nor should any
383. See RETO M. HILTY ET AL., EUROPEAN COMMISSION–GREEN PAPER:
COPYRIGHT IN THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY–COMMENTS BY THE MAX PLANCK
INSTITUTE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, COMPETITION AND TAX LAW (2008),
available at http://www.ip.mpg.de/files/pdf1/comments_on_the_green_paper1.pdf
[hereinafter MAX PLANCK RESPONSE TO EC GREEN PAPER].
384. See id.; see also HARGREAVES, supra note 26, at 48 (“The Government
should introduce a UK exception in the interim under the non-commercial research heading to allow use of analytics for non-commercial use . . . as well as
promoting at EU level an exception to support text mining and data analytics
for commercial use.”).
385. See infra notes 459–65 and accompanying text.
386. See, for example, Stodden, supra note 255 passim for a discussion regarding attribution and its problems.
387. BURRELL & COLEMAN, supra note 176, at 276.
388. One who applies a scientific theory or finding to some new phenome-
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commercial/noncommercial distinction be embedded in the
copyright law’s broad research exemption, for the primary reason stated earlier, that basic scientific research results are
properly to be treated as a public, not a private good, regardless
389
of their origin.
Effort should then be made to persuade the United States
and other WTO members to adopt a similar provision, over and
above any existing fair use provisions. Pending the formulation
of a truly transnational science funding entity in the European
Union, the Commission’s own science funding division should
help to enforce such a broad scientific research exemption, as
well as any other proscience provisions that may exist in the
domestic copyright laws. The developing countries should also
throw their weight behind a strong exemption for scientific re390
search, in keeping with the WIPO Development Agenda.
b. Breaking the Digital Locks
No provision exempting scientific research from the exclusive rights of copyright law, as proposed above, could fully
achieve its purpose unless complementary legislative action
were taken to ensure its effectiveness in the online environment. Here we encounter the blocking effects of technical protection measures (TPMs) as implemented in the domestic
391
whose drafters ignored the proscience mandate exlaws,
392
pressed in the preamble to the WCT itself, as well as other
393
balancing provisions set out in that treaty.
If rights holders who make scientific works available
through digital networks can simply enclose those works behind technological fences and then abolish all user-friendly
provisions by contract, little would be gained by clarifying the
idea-expression dichotomy or the scope for private and fair uses, or by enacting broad exceptions for scientific research and
teaching as advocated above. The imposition of private intellec-

non is not a derivative author, even though his or her work necessarily applies
and draws on prior work. See supra notes 230–37 and accompanying text (discussing importance of idea-expression principle for science).
389. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text.
390. See DEVELOPMENT AGENDA FOR WIPO, WIPO (2007), available at
http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/agenda/ (advocating a strong copyright
exception for scientific research).
391. See supra notes 230–37 and accompanying text.
392. WCT, supra note 42, pmbl.
393. See supra notes 137–50 and accompanying text.
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tual property rights by such technological means also raises
profound conflicts with constitutional law in the United
395
396
States and with fundamental rights in Europe.
In effect, publishers of digitally transmitted scientific articles online have the same legal entitlements as owners of music, films, and other cultural assets under the framework established by the DMCA in the United States and by parallel
397
legislation in the European Union. These provisions give publishers the best of two worlds. On the one hand, if Internet Service Providers (ISPs) transmit copyrighted scientific articles
without permission, publishers may force them to remove the
offending publications under a set of provisions known as the
398
“notice and take down” regime.
Scientific researchers, on the other hand, like users of cultural goods from the mundane to the sublime, enjoy virtually
no analogous powers to oblige online publishers to respect any
of the privileges and immunities that are supposed to defend
399
their interests. On the contrary, copyright laws protecting
digital transmissions give publishers virtually absolute control
over use and dissemination, as reinforced by their ability to
impose licensing terms and conditions backed up by the impen400
etrable electronic fencing discussed earlier.
Science publishers, who thus combine private law tools
with the exclusive rights of intellectual property laws, can operate as unregulated ISPs under no obligation to respect the
sharing norms of science and with a direct financial interest in
394. See Reichman & Franklin, supra note 265, at 884 –914 (discussing the
protection of copyright owners’ rights through a combination of technological
means and adhesion contracts).
395. See, e.g., LANGE & POWELL, supra note 198, at 108 (stating that the
conflict between intellectual property regimes and constitutional rights is “a
conflict in multiple dimensions, in which interests in property are pitted
against freedom of expression”); Netanel, supra note 203, at 30–36 (discussing
developments in First Amendment law as they pertain to copyright law).
396. See, e.g., Natali Helberger & P. Bernt Hugenholtz, No Place Like
Home for Making a Copy: Private Copying in European Copyright Law and
Consumer Law, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1061, 1083 (2007) (discussing fundamental rights to be considered in shaping European consumer policy); see
also HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 196, at 259–83 (“Article 10 of the
ECHR . . . provides the principle framework for balancing copyright and the
right to freedom of information in European human rights jurisprudence.”).
397. See supra notes 86–110 and accompanying text.
398. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 512(e)(3) (2006) (outlining “Elements of
notification”).
399. See discussion supra Part I.C.2.
400. See supra Part I.C.2.

2012]

COPYRIGHT LAW & SCIENCE

1443

deciding whether or not collaborative research and innovation
will occur, and under what terms and conditions. Yet, there is
simply no policy justification for subsuming the needs of science, with its far different economic and social considerations,
and far larger impact on human life, to the current undiscriminating framework of copyright and database protection laws.
Some courts in both jurisdictions have begun to push back
401
against these controversial digital locks, and numerous proposals have been made for legislative or administrative solu402
tions to pry them open. For example, some have suggested a
system of “electronic locks and keys,” which, however, could
trigger costly and burdensome administrative procedures that
could indirectly exert a chilling effect on users’ freedom to build
on preexisting scientific and technological data and infor403
Professor Dan Burk has proposed a doctrine of
mation.
404
“anticircumvention misuse” to deal with this same problem,
while Professors Reichman and Franklin would impose “a fair
and reasonable terms,” standard on all non-negotiable restrictions on access to and uses of computerized information
405
goods. Still other proposals, while not without merit, would
401. See, e.g., Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware, Eng’g & Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Lexmark Int’l. Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004); Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v.
Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Senftleben, supra
note 48, at 545–46 for examples of German cases that show how the European
Union has dealt with this issue.
402. See, e.g., Robert C. Denicola, Access Controls, Rights Protection, and
Circumvention: Interpreting the Digital Millennium Copyright Act to Preserve
Noninfringing Use, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 209, 214 (2008) (“There have been
legislative bills and academic proposals to amend the anti-circumvention provisions in order to accommodate noninfringing use of technologically-protected
works.”); Jacqueline D. Lipton, Solving the Digital Piracy Puzzle: Disaggregating Fair Use from the DMCA’s Anti-Device Provisions, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
111, 113 (2005) ( proposing an administrative complaint mechanism to address
DMCA restrictions on fair use); Aaron K. Perzanowski, Rethinking
Anticircumvention’s Interoperability Policy, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1549, 1610–
16 (2009) (suggesting two legislative changes); see also Dan Burk,
Anticircumvention Misuse, supra note 265, at 1102–10 ( proposing a new doctrine of “anticircumvention misuse” to deal with the problem).
403. Reichman, supra note 121, at 1159 (noting that a reverse notice and
takedown system would be “less costly and burdensome” than a system of
“electronic locks and keys” (citations omitted)); see also Lunney, supra note 96,
at 845–69 (discussing methods by which to address copyright issues without
foisting unnecessary costs on the public for administration of those laws).
404. Burk, supra note 265, at 1132–40.
405. See Reichman & Franklin, supra note 265, at 930 (“All mass-market
contracts, non-negotiable access contracts, and contracts imposing nonnegotiable restrictions on uses of computerized information goods must be
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generally entail a considerable amount of political and legislative
momentum and, unless carefully implemented, could in some
406
cases complicate rather than simply avoid existing obstacles.
Legislatures enacting appropriate exceptions for scientific
research, like the one proposed above, should also simultaneously implement the proviso set out in Article 11 of the WCT,
which expressly exempts “acts . . . which are . . . permitted by
law” from the obligation of signatories to “provide adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the circum407
vention of effective technological measures.” For example, the
copyright revision bill now languishing in Brazil initially took a
major step forward by prohibiting content providers from using
TPMs to defeat privileged uses or to impede access to public
408
domain matter. Whether these and other provisions that seek
409
to expand the copyright misuse doctrine will survive the legislative process in that country remains to be seen, as are the
means of implementing them in practice, which future regulations would have to specify.
Meanwhile, one relatively expedient suggestion is the “reverse notice and takedown” regime put forward by Professors
410
Reichman, Dinwoodie, and Samuelson. Under their proposal,
bona fide public interest users could avoid passing through a
content provider’s electronic gateway and, instead, send a request or “flaming arrow” over the electronic fence to catch the
made on fair and reasonable terms and conditions, with due regard for the
public interest in education, science, research, technological innovation, freedom of speech, and the preservation of competition.”); see also Darouian, supra
note 265, at 36–40 (endorsing this standard).
406. See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 96, at 851–58 (discussing possibility of
levies with clear entitlement to private copying, among other proposals); see
also Westkamp, supra note 78, at 45–50 (discussing legislative barriers to effective lawmaking in this area).
407. WCT, supra note 42, at 71, art. 11.
408. Law No. 9610 of 19 February 1998, on Copyright and Neighbouring
Rights, Consolidated with the Bill in Public Consultation since 14 June 2010,
available
at
http://www.vgrass.de/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Brazilian_
Copyright_Bill_Consolidated_June_2010.pdf ( last visited Jan. 25, 2012) (English translation); see also Pedro Paranaguá, A Comprehensive Framework for
Copyright Protection and Access to Knowledge: From a Brazilian Perspective
and Beyond, in HOW DEVELOPING COUNTRIES CAN MANAGE INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS TO MAXIMIZE ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE 103, 106–07 (Xuan Li
& Carlos M. Correa eds., 2009) (discussing the Brazilian National Copyright
Forum).
409. See generally Burk, supra note 265.
410. See Reichman et al., supra note 170, at 1032–39 (discussing the contours of the proposed “reverse notice and takedown regime”).
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411

copyright proprietors’ attention. This notice would signal that
the user intended to obtain specified matter held by the proprietor in an online repository for purposes allowed under speci412
fied limitations and exceptions. It would give proprietors a
period—say fourteen days—in which to accede to the request or
deny it on specified grounds that it was willing to defend in
413
court or an administrative proceeding.
In the latter event, both sides would know that a judicial
test of the validity of the request under relevant exceptions
would be the likely outcome, and the copyright authorities
could establish an expedited judicial or administrative proce414
dure for this purpose. Once the legitimacy of the request was
established, the relevant authority or court could enable third
parties, if necessary, to disarm or decrypt the TPMs in order to
extract the desired scientific material for the specified research
415
purposes. Publishers who needlessly barred the initial request and thereby necessitated a judicial inquiry should bear at
least the transaction costs and might be made subject to addi416
tional penalties for abuse of TPMs.
While a “reverse notice and takedown” regime might entail
palpable transaction costs at the outset, it would likely give rise
to a jurisprudence of exceptions to TPMs that would, over time,
417
facilitate use of the method. Besides, to the extent that a
broad exemption for scientific research purposes were enacted
along the lines indicated above, requests for access to and use
of technically protected data and information should normally
418
elicit an automatic positive response.
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. Cf. Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright
Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1351–52
(2004) (discussing how changing procedures for enforcing copyrights would affect behavior of those infringing them).
415. See Reichman et al., supra note 170, at 1032–34.
416. Cf. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1154 –56
(N.D. Cal. 2008) (requiring publishers who send notice and takedown requests
under DMCA § 512 to evaluate fair use considerations in advance); Burk, supra note 265, at 1127–32; see also Reichman & Franklin, supra note 265, at
929–32 (discussing a “public interest unconscionability” doctrine in contract
law).
417. See Reichman et al., supra note 170, at 1032–38 (arguing that a new
reverse notice and takedown regime should develop through case law, rather
than through administrative rulings).
418. At the same time, publishers would retain a measure of control over
how the process was implemented. First, they must decide whether or not to
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Recent case law in the United States has made judicial resort to a reverse notice and takedown procedure more feasible
419
even without enabling legislation. However, given the massive amounts of literature and data processed by automated
knowledge discovery tools, even the reverse notice and
takedown regime—backed by supporting judicial decisions—
could break down unless published scientific works in general
were governed by some globally effective “digital copyright ex420
change,” like that recommended in the Hargreaves Review.
Even then, much would depend on the willingness of science
funding agencies to insist that science publishers either refrained from surrounding scientific works transmitted online
with TPMs and DRMs or that they made such works automatically accessible to scientists seeking access to them through
approved portals for research purposes.
In sum, absent some procedure like the reverse notice and
take down regime for freeing up unprotectable scientific information, the TPMs become a means of inducing massive abuses
421
of the copyright law, much as peer-to-peer file sharing can
risk a decision on the merits of a specific request, with probable precedential
value, as occurs routinely under U.S. fair use practice today. Second, if publishers acquiesced in a valid request to avoid litigation, they would remain in a
position to acknowledge the precise uses for which the material had been requested and to monitor the actual uses to which it was put. Hence, users must
adhere to a good faith implementation of their own proposals and be prepared
to negotiate if they needed to go farther. See id. at 1032–37.
419. For example, two antilockout cases have provided various legal bases
for overcoming TPMs that deny access to unprotected matter. See Storage
Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng’g & Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307
(Fed. Cir. 2005); Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178
(Fed. Cir. 2004). But see MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d
928, 950 (9th Cir. 2010) (sympathizing with the policy underlying these decisions, but rejecting their legal reasoning), as amended on denial of reh’g, Nos.
09-15832, 09-16044, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 3427 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 2011). One
recent district court case has obliged proprietors to take fair use factors into
account before sending a request for notice and take down under the existing
regime regulating safe harbors and the secondary liability of ISPs. See Lenz,
572 F. Supp. 2d at 1154 –56.
420. HARGREAVES, supra note 26, at 28–35 ( proposing a digital copyright
exchange); see also Joel Smith & Rachel Montagnon, The Hargreaves Review—
A “Digital Opportunity,” 33 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 596, 597 (2011) (stressing need for “digital copyright exchange” to facilitate cross-sectoral and crossborder licensing, plus codes of practice for collection societies).
421. See Burk, supra note 265, at 1100; Reichman et al., supra note 170, at
1023 (arguing how people can design TPMs in order to “opt out of those parts
of the copyright system they dislike”). Such an approach, if upheld at the appellate level, further supports the impropriety of denying fair use by technical
means when it is proprietors who must respond to the needs of scientists.
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become an instrument for inducing massive infringements of
422
A reverse notice and take down regime
exclusive rights.
would at least enable scientific researchers to avoid access controls and any resulting electronic contracts that imposed waivers of statutory limitations and exceptions or other harsh restrictions on use and reuse of privileged information and data.
This feature should make it particularly attractive to the European Commission in that it would finally provide them with a
practical means of fulfilling the obligation that Article 6(4) of
the InfoSoc Directive already imposes on member states to ensure the availability of the specified exceptions set out in Arti423
cle 5 when implementing the Directive itself.
c. Disciplining Contractual Overrides
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that no set of limitations and exceptions enacted by enlightened legislators can
achieve the goal of strengthening scientific research so long as
the proprietors of scientific publications can contractually override them, whether in print media or in the online environment. For this reason, the Max Planck Institute rightly proposes that both new and existing exceptions favoring scientific
research must be made peremptory, mandatory, and
424
nonwaivable.
422. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545
U.S. 913, 918–20 (2005) (holding a peer-to-peer platform liable for copyright
infringements of its users). To ensure its success both in the United States and
the European Union, legislative endorsement of the reverse notice and
takedown proposal would, ultimately, be desirable. Such an enactment should
also establish an administrative or judicial authority to break through the
technological fence once the relevant authority sided with a public-interest user against a recalcitrant rights holder. In that event, the legislation must immunize the public-interest user from liability for breaking through the fence to
extract privileged matter if the rights holder refused to open the lock or ignored an injunction to do so. See Reichman et al., supra note 170, at 1023 (arguing that there is “no incentive for copyright owners or TPM vendors to finetune TPMs to enable non-infringing uses”).
423. See Reichman et al., supra note 170, at 1039–40 (discussing how a reverse notice and takedown would be consonant with Article 6(4) of the European Union InfoSoc Directive). Nevertheless, paragraph 4 of art. 6(4) would
require an amendment or at least some clarifying interpretation to this end.
See InfoSoc Directive, supra note 72, art. 6(4)¶ 4.
424. Accord HARGREAVES, supra note 26, at 51 (“Applying contracts in this
way means a rights holder can rewrite the limits the law has set on the extent
of the right conferred by copyright. It creates the risk that should Government
decide that UK law will permit private copying or text mining, these permissions could be denied by contract.”); see also MAX PLANCK RESPONSE TO EC
GREEN PAPER, supra note 383, at 11–16 ( proposing various exceptions to gov-
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Short of this logical proposal, other important, if less efficacious measures, remain available. For example, Professor
Burk’s principle of anticircumvention misuse mentioned earlier
could be adopted on both sides of the Atlantic to limit private
interference with specified public good uses of copyrighted
425
works. To the same end, Professors Reichman and Franklin’s
proposals for a “public interest unconscionability” standard for
non-negotiable contracts could be employed to give courts more
common law tools for alleviating conflicts between private or426
dering and the goals of federal copyright and related laws.
There is reason to believe such a tool would fit well within
certain existing European approaches to consumer protection
427
and contract laws in general. Professor Hilty also stresses the
possibility of invoking European competition law, with its concept of abuse of a dominant position, when proprietors leverage
their power in the market for scientific articles to inhibit use and
428
reuse of scientific contents by downstream investigators.
What matters is that legislatures concerned with promoting scientific research should take a forthright position against
contractual overrides of lawful and permitted uses while also
clarifying scientific research as a peremptory example of a lawful and permitted use. In reality, however, there is no reason to
expect any such enlightened approach in the immediate future.
On the contrary, newly proposed measures on enforcement, in
ern scientific use).
425. See Burk, supra note 265, at 1132–40.
426. See Reichman & Franklin, supra note 265, at 929–32; see also
Darouian, supra note 265.
427. Mel Kenny, Globalization, Interlegality and Europeanized Contract
Law, 21 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 569, 575 (2003) (noting “the trend towards
higher standards of EC consumer protection”).
428. See Hilty, Copyright Law and Scientific Research, supra note 2, at 315
(calling the European Union Directive “designed one-sidedly to protect the entertainment industry . . . thwarting the efforts to make Europe the leading
centre for research”). Prospective development of a competition-based limit to
the abuse of TPMs and to contractual limits on use and reuse of
uncopyrightable data remains one area where the international regime established by the TRIPS Agreement remains relatively unburdened by the strictures of the three-step test or other rigid limitations to national discretion concerning the design of an appropriate copyright system. TRIPS Agreement,
supra note 20, art. 40; ESTELLE DERCLAYE, AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TO WHAT
THE CONDITIONS OF ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION OF COPYRIGHT SHOULD
BE 6 (2003), available at http://www.serci.org/2003/derclaye.pdf (noting “that a
dominant position or even a monopoly is (or rather: can be) a natural consequence of the grant of a copyright”); Sara K. Stadler, Relevant Markets for
Copyrighted Works, 34 J. CORP. L. 1059 passim (2009) (arguing that reframing
copyright law as a species of competition law would benefit the public interest).
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429

their present form, could actually strengthen the proprietors’
ability to impose privately legislated intellectual property
430
rights on the scientific research community.
c. Aligning Database Protection Laws with Broad Exceptions
for Science in Copyright Law
Any legislative reform of domestic copyright laws that ignored the database protection laws in the European Union
would inadvertently allow the latter to surround the former
with a net that would block access to and use of the very facts
431
and data that the copyright paradigm ostensibly left free. It
would also impede transnational efforts to pool large collections
of scientific data by automatically subjecting contributions from
providers in the European Union to a strong regime of exclu429. See, e.g., Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of
the Council on Measures and Procedures to Ensure the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, COM (2003) 0046 final (Jan. 30, 2003), available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52003PC0046:
EN:NOT ( proposing to protect countries from the “growing phenomenon” of
counterfeiting and piracy issues); see also Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Dec. 3, 2010, opened for signature Mar. 1, 2011, available at http://www
.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2417 [hereinafter ACTA]; Charles R. McManis, The
Proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA): Two Tales of a Treaty,
46 HOUS. L. REV. 1235, 1235–39 (2009) (discussing the ACTA controversy);
THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, THE ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE
AGREEMENT–SUMMARY OF KEY ELEMENTS UNDER DISCUSSION (2009), available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/1479 (summarizing discussions of anticounterfeiting agreements among different countries).
430. See ACTA, supra note 429; Steven Seidenberg, Tough Measures:
ACTA May Replace Global IP Treaties with an International Regime More Favorable to IP Owners, INSIDE COUNSEL, June 1, 2010, at 24, available at 2010
WLNR 16875706 (noting that “ACTA would impose a tougher international
stance against anyone seeking to circumvent technological protections on copyrighted works”); Am. Univ. Washington Coll. of Law, Text of Urgent ACTA
Communique, PIJIP (June 23, 2010) http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/actacommunique (finding that ACTA has “grave consequences for the global economy”); cf. Reichman & Franklin, supra note 265, at 913 (writing that “the
power to impose privately legislated rights . . . becomes a power to determine
the competitive boundaries of the underlying intellectual property rights
themselves”).
431. See Database Directive, supra note 22, arts. 1, 3; Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 258, at 52–53 (noting the “breakdown” of the patentcopyright dichotomy towards the end of the twentieth century). The information economy most likely to emerge from an unrestricted exclusive right in
data would then “resemble models already familiar from the Middle Ages,
when goods flowing down the Rhine River or goods moving from Milan to Genoa were subject to dozens, if not hundreds of gatekeepers demanding tribute.”
Reichman, Database Protection in a Global Economy, supra note 284, at 484;
see also HELLER, supra note 3, at 3 (discussing the practices of German “robber barons” in the Middle Ages and subsequent damage to free trade).
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sive property rights not applicable to other contributors. For
433
these and other reasons, neither science nor culture could fully attain the payoffs that digital technologies make possible
without ancillary adjustments of the Database Directive.
When the Max Planck Institute called for a broad exemption from the exclusive rights of the European Union’s domestic
copyright laws for published scientific information and data, it
logically demanded that the Commission should also insert
434
similar language into the Database Directive as well. In effectuating any such alignment, the Institute insists that the exceptions for science in both copyright laws and database protection laws should be preemptory, mandatory, and immune from
435
both contractual overrides and TPMs.
As was the case with copyright law, a broad exemption
that clearly allowed extraction and reutilization of noncopyrightable data for scientific research must expressly empower the use of automated knowledge discovery tools for this
436
same purpose. Such language should ensure the rights of scientists to aggregate data and information in a research commons, to conduct data mining and similar techniques, and to
extract data embedded in scientific articles for use in further
437
research.
To the extent that the production of scientific data remains
largely government-funded, no exclusive property rights should
normally attach, even to downstream commercial uses of such
432. See, e.g., John Wilbanks, Public Domain, Copyright Licenses and the
Freedom to Integrate Science, 7 J. SCI. COMM. 1, 4 (2008) (discussing legal tools
necessary to develop open data sharing). Waivers become necessary to achieve
the research goals of the pool, which would hinge on the lowest common denominator set of default intellectual property rules. Id. at 5.
433. For the adverse effects of digital copyright on new forms of cultural
expression, see Mira Burri-Nenova, Trade versus Culture in the Digital Environment: An Old Conflict in Need of a New Definition, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 17,
57 (2009) (“Since these [traditional copyright law] models are often too rigid to
allow full realization of the possibilities of the digital mode of content production and distribution or render them illegal, obstructing the ‘creative play’,
[sic] some new hybrid models for the protection of authors’ rights have
emerged.”); Senftleben, supra note 48, at 521 (arguing that current EC copyright law is likely to frustrate cultural development); Wong, supra note 111, at
1084 –97 (describing conflicts between copyright law and new forms of creative
expression in digital media).
434. See MAX PLANCK RESPONSE TO EC GREEN PAPER, supra note 383, at
14 –15.
435. Id.
436. See supra notes 385–87 and accompanying text.
437. See id.
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438

data. However, commercial uses of large semi-autonomous
data sets as functional tools, such as microarrays or diagnostic
439
tools, could become suitable candidates for equitable compen440
sation under nonexclusive licenses. In such cases, a compensatory liability regime—i.e., a take-and-pay rule described earlier—might provide a workable incentive without the blocking
effects that patents tend to impose on research tools in gen441
eral.
Still other measures are necessary to attenuate the deleterious effects that the European Commission’s Database Directive has imposed on all scientific, educational, and cultural
pursuits that depend on ready access to published facts, data,
and information. For example, compulsory licenses should become available when the database is the sole source for the da442
ta in question. The Directive as approved by the Council of
Ministers was stripped of such a provision at the last minute,
and the importance of restoring a comparable provision is clear
443
from hindsight. The potentially unlimited duration of database protection also remains an untenable assault on basic
principles of intellectual property law. Provision for the entrance of older data into the public domain after a specified period of expiry should be a governmental priority even as new
438. See, e.g., Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 2, at 326 (demonstrating why
the scientific community should be able to access government-funded research
via the research commons); So et al., supra note 1, at 2078 (arguing in favor of
government-funded research managed in the interest of the public).
439. See, e.g., Stodden, supra note 255, at 13 (citing authorities).
440. Accord Ritch, supra note 37, at 148.
441. In such a case, there would be no general distinction between commercial and noncommercial research or any prior restraint on access, use, or
reuse of published scientific information and data for scientific research purposes. Nor would there be a “compulsory license,” in the traditional sense, (i.e.,
an ex post modification of an author’s anticipated ex ante exclusive rights). On
the contrary, such a “compensatory liability rule” should be conceived as an ex
ante entitlement to compensation for specified commercial uses, accompanied
by an equally clear ex ante third party entitlement to make such uses subject
to a duty to pay reasonable compensation for them. See Reichman, supra note
186, at 1791–93 (discussing a compensatory liability regime); see also Mark
Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 129 (2004) (contrasting differences between ex ante and ex post
theories).
442. See Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 2, at 338; see also DERCLAYE, supra
note 292, at 280 (arguing such licenses should apply in the case of users not
falling within specified exceptions).
443. Jacqueline Lipton, Information Property: Rights and Responsibilities,
56 FLA. L. REV. 135, 147 (2004) (describing some techniques of overpropertization by various European Union member states).
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data added to the collection attracts new protection rights.

C. ADJUSTING THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK TO
ACCOMMODATE THE NEEDS OF SCIENCE
The prevailing international minimum standards of intellectual property protection are not necessarily in conflict with
the proposals set out above. First, the standards themselves are
broad and open to interpretation, as will be shown in more detail below, while both Article 1.1 of the TRIPS Agreement and
Article 14(1) of the WCT contain crucial deference provisions
that deliberately leave room to maneuver when states make a
good faith effort to conform these standards to national needs
445
and policy. Second, the flexibility built into the TRIPS and
WCT standards applies in two directions. Although tightening
the exclusive rights with more restrictive conditions is always
446
an option, it remains equally possible to flesh out the limitations and exceptions, along with other balancing features, in a
manner more favorable to the provision of public goods than
has been the case in some OECD countries and in many devel447
oping countries as well.
444. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 258, at 90; Reichman & Uhlir,
supra note 2, at 412 ( providing an example of the problems behind extracting
underlying data from a protected database even after the expiration of a nominally expired patent).
445. See WCT, supra note 42, art. 14(1) (“Contracting Parties undertake to
adopt, in accordance with their legal systems, the measures necessary to ensure the application of this Treaty.”); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art.
1.1 (“Members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal systems and
practice.”). See generally J.H. Reichman, Securing Compliance with the TRIPS
Agreement After U.S. v. India, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 585 (1998) (noting awareness of WTO Appellate Body of this deference provision). The WTO gave significant weight to this deference norm in the WTO’s most recent TRIPS decision bearing on copyright law in China. See Panel Report, China–Measures
Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights
WT/DS362/R (09-0240) (Jan. 26, 2009) (showing the United States and China
disputing the meaning of Article 1.1); see also TRIPS Agreement, supra note
20, arts. 7 (objectives), 8 ( principles); Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 193, at 1008–18 (discussing TRIPS
article 8).
446. See, e.g., Bryan Mercurio, TRIPS-Plus Provisions in FTA’s: Recent
Trends, in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 215,
215–37 (Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino eds., 2006) (discussing the possibility of TRIPS-plus provisions affecting many different areas of IP law).
447. Okediji, supra note 196, at 350 (remarking on TRIPS setting “important limits on the scope of copyright protection . . . in some cases for the
first time in history”); see also WIPO DEVELOPMENT AGENDA PROPOSAL, supra
note 390 ( pledging “to ensure that development considerations form an inte-
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For these and other reasons, we remain confident that the
positive law mandates of the treaties do not negate the proposals for reform outlined above, so much as a lack of political
will and an absence of the kind of collective action needed to
stimulate it. In what follows, nonetheless, we devote particular
attention to the three-step test itself, which some consider the
biggest obstacle of all to reform.
1. Reinterpreting the Three-Step Test
At least one expert believes that the three-step test already
allows more open-ended assessments of both existing and future limitations and exceptions, in the manner of U.S.-style fair
448
use decisions, than many courts and commentators suppose.
On this view, the extension of the three-step test to all of copyright law would actually provide a tool—if properly worked—
that could help to deal with fact-specific cases, without necessarily undermining the force of general exceptions for research
449
and education. Support for this view exists in a number of re450
cent decisions by German Courts, in the Agreed Statement to
451
Article 10 of the WCT, and in the willingness of one WTO
panel to read the TRIPS Agreement in light of subsequent de452
velopments under Article 10 of the WCT itself. Unfortunately, the EC’s InfoSoc Directive ignored these openings and deliberately used the three-step test to further confine even
gral part of WIPO’s work”); HUGENHOLTZ & OKEDIJI, supra note 159, at 7 (noting the reconsideration of balancing principles within the framework of international copyright); Maskus & Reichman, supra note 24, at 35 (observing the
possibility of governments acting as “defenders and promoters of a transnational system of innovation in which properly balanced intellectual property
rights were not ends in themselves, but rather the means of generating more
scienti•c and technical inputs into a healthy competitive environment”).
448. See Senftleben, supra note 48, at 543 (observing that “the three-step
test sets forth open-ended factors”); see also Geller, supra note 50, at 571 (arguing that neither the idea-expression distinction nor constitutionally rooted
exceptions favoring free speech and other uses ought to be subject to the threestep test).
449. See Senftleben, supra note 48, at 545–52 (analyzing the three-step test
in the context of fair use).
450. See Geller, German Approach, supra note 50, at 563 (describing the
methodology by which German judges analyze infringement cases); id. at 535–
40 (discussing German cases in detail). But see Senftleben, supra note 48, at
530–34 (discussing rigidity of the Netherlands and French courts).
451. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
452. See US–Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 123,¶ 6.67 (outlining
the position of the United States regarding Article 10 of the WIPO Copyright
Treaty).
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preexisting limitations and exceptions in the copyright laws of
453
member states, an outcome Professor Senftleben has deemed
454
“a worst case scenario.”
More promising in this regard are recent proposals from
the Max Planck Institute for judges applying the three-step
test, which could induce them to undertake a more normative
455
analysis than in the past. That type of analysis is something
456
European positivist courts are unaccustomed to doing, although under a fair use provision, as codified in U.S. copyright
law in 1976, for example, courts must routinely perform this
457
very task.
The Max Planck proposals deliberately build on the preamble to the WCT, which recognizes “the need to maintain a
balance between the rights of authors and the larger public interest, particularly education, research, and access to infor458
mation . . . .” In that vein, the proposal would:
 Mandate that courts applying the three-step test falling
under Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement in copyright
cases take into account the interests of third parties, including individual and collective interests of the general
459
public, and not just the interests of rights owners;
 Avoid prioritizing any one step, or requiring an affirmative answer to all steps, but would instead require a judicial balancing of the different prongs, as occurs under

453. See supra text accompanying note 72.
454. Senftleben, supra note 48, at 528–29.
455. See Christophe Geiger et al., Declaration: A Balanced Interpretation of
the “Three-Step Test” in Copyright Law, 39 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 707, 708 (2008) [hereinafter Max Planck Declaration on the
Three-Step Test].
456. And should not do, according to some. See, e.g., Ficsor, supra note 133.
457. One should recall that the relevant WTO Panels do insist that the test
has normative content, but without so far specifying its nature, and indirectly
limiting its impact. See, e.g., US–Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note
123,¶ 6.184 (describing the EC’s emphasis on potential impact of an exception
versus the actual market effects); cf. Panel Report, Canada–Patent Protection
of Pharmaceutical Products,¶ 7.54, WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000), (writing that
the panel believes the word normal used in Article 30 “can be understood to
refer either to an empirical conclusion about what is common within a relevant community, or to a normative standard of entitlement”).
458. WCT, supra note 42, pmbl.
459. Such a provision was expressly inserted into Article 30 of the TRIPS
Agreement with regard to patents. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art.
30 (extending the three-step test to patent law for the first time while adding
the words “taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties”).
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460

U.S. fair use law;
 Give particular weight to unauthorized uses that are un461
derpinned by fundamental rights and other “common
interests,” notably “in scientific progress and cultural or
462
economic development;”
 Seek to promote competition, especially in secondary
markets, by a correct balancing of interests, but without
making the three-step test a proxy for competition law;
 Expressly recognize that adequate compensation may be
less than market pricing where other public concerns are
at stake, including third-party interests or the general
463
public interest.
The Max Planck Institute’s carefully considered reforms
would introduce a healthy dose of legal realism into the traditional positivism surrounding European copyright jurisprudence. They would counter the prevailing notion in Continental
copyright law, which favors narrowly confined exceptions in
464
deference to the authorial interest. They would also curb the
460. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (discussing fair use). But see Ficsor, supra
note 133 (arguing that the legislative history of the Berne Convention prohibits this approach, even though the three-step test itself has now been recodified with significant variations in both art. 30 ( patents) and art. 17 (trademarks) of the TRIPS Agreement). It is not clear why the legislative history of
the experimental “package deal” that gave us article 9 of the Berne Convention in 1967 should operate as a deadweight bar to a judicially more enlightened approach to the revised three-step test as now applied, with significant
variations, to all four of international intellectual property law’s major subjectmatter categories. Otherwise, we are obliged to assume that only authors’
rights remain somehow immune from the need “to take into account the interests of third parties” at the international level.
461. Cf. HUGENHOLTZ & OKEDIJI, supra note 159, at 31 (noting fundamental rights must be balanced with other IP rights); LANGE & POWELL, supra
note 198, at 171–72 (stressing the First Amendment); see also HELFER &
AUSTIN, supra note 196, at 221–33 (examining interface between fundamental
rights and intellectual property rights in both American and international
contexts). But see Laurence R. Helfer, Toward a Human Rights Framework for
Intellectual Property, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 971, 994 (2007) (arguing that if
authors’ interests are fundamental rights, government regulation of those
rights should be narrow).
462. Max Planck Declaration on the Three-Step Test, supra note 455, at
712; cf. Chon, supra note 164, at 275–76.
463. See Max Planck Declaration on the Three-Step Test, supra note 455,
at 712; Shaver, supra note 195, at 183–84 (calling for a reexamination of the
consistency between IP policies and the greater public interest in science).
464. However, at least one authority questions the ability of courts adjudicating private law disputes to tinker with international public law mandates.
Email from Paul Geller to Jerome Reichman (Oct. 9, 2011, 12:08 EST ) (on file
with the authors); see also Ficsor, supra note 133.
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European Commission’s tendency to fall back upon a market
465
failure rationale for limitations and exceptions, a tendency
from which U.S. courts have increasingly retreated in recent
466
important decisions bearing on fair use.
2. Leveraging the WIPO Development Agenda
The outlook for these proposals could depend in part on the
continued spread of the fair use doctrine beyond the United
467
States, and on the extent to which the developing countries
affirmatively responded to them within the ambit of the WIPO
468
Development Agenda. This Agenda has already mandated
formal scrutiny of limitations and exceptions under the prevailing copyright conventions, with a view to clarifying the extent
to which they insufficiently promote access to knowledge in developing countries. The WIPO Development Agenda has also
spawned a major normative reexamination of limitations and
exceptions, prepared by Professors Hugenholtz and Okediji, to
469
this same end.
465. See BURRELL & COLEMAN, supra note 176, at 167–87.
466. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. It is worth noting that Dr.
Ficsor claims one could interpret the three-step test to yield the flexibility that
the Max Planck Declaration on the Three-Step Test seeks to attain, albeit by
more traditional means. See Ficsor, supra note 133.
467. See, e.g., Lei No. 9.610, de 19 de Fevereiro de 1998, DÍARIO OFICIAL DA
UNIÃO [D.O.U], (art. 46 (viii)) de 20.2.1998 (Braz.) ( listing transformative and
incidental uses among non-violations of copyright); Copyright Act, R.S.C.
1985, c. C-42, § 29 (Can.) (“[f ]air dealing”); Copyright and Related Rights Act
2000 (Act No. 28/2000) § 50(2), (Ir.), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/
en/text.jsp?file_id=128034 (“[f ]air dealing”); Copyright Act, 5768-2007 2199
LSI 34, § 19 (2007) (Isr.), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?
file_id=132095 (allowing use for, among other things, research by an educational institution); INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE, § 185 (Phil.), available at
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=129343 (noting that fair use for
reporting, teaching and other educational uses is not copyright infringement).
But see HARGREAVES, supra note 26, at 5 (declining to follow this trend).
468. See Treaty on Access to Knowledge (Draft) art. 1-1, May 9, 2005,
available at http://www.cptech.org/a2k/a2k_treaty_may9.pdf ( last visited Jan.
23, 2012) ( providing that the objectives of the treaty “are to protect and enhance [expand] access to knowledge, and to facilitate the transfer of technology to developing countries”); HUGENHOLTZ & OKEDIJI, supra note 159, at 8
(finding the goal of the WIPO Development Agenda is to bridge knowledge and
technology gaps between nations with differing economic conditions); WIPO
DEVELOPMENT AGENDA PROPOSAL, supra note 390 (underscoring the importance of development considerations).
469. See HUGENHOLTZ & OKEDIJI, supra note 159, at 30–34 (reexamining
limitations and exceptions in the context of human rights, competition law,
and consumer law); see also SÉVERINE DUSOLLIER, WORLD INTELLECTUAL
PROP. ORG., SCOPING STUDY ON COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS AND THE
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If influential WIPO members lent it their support, these initiatives could at least produce a soft-law declaration of normative content that might turn the three-step test into a pathway
470
towards a proper users’ rights formulation. A soft-law instrument adopted at WIPO could become particularly influential if it endorsed or incorporated the Max Planck Institute’s
471
own “Declaration on the Three-Step Test.” If, moreover, a regional group of, say, Latin American, Asian, or African countries decided to implement proposals emerging from these de472
liberations in their domestic laws, as Brazil had begun to do
473
at the time of writing, it could trigger a broader movement for

PUBLIC DOMAIN 12–13 (2010), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/
mdocs/en/cdip_4/cdip_4_3_rev_study_inf_1.pdf (discussing the role of the public domain as a “repository of traditional knowledge”).
470. HUGENHOLTZ & OKEDIJI, supra note 159, at 49 (discussing the idea
“that a joint initiative between the WIPO and WTO could be an ideal and appropriate expression of a soft-law modality with real impact for collective action on an international instrument on L&E’s”). In this connection, we would
particularly welcome recognition from the WIPO process that government use
of copyrights for, say, science and educational purposes, trumps all other legal
or normative considerations. See Daniel J. Gervais, Making Copyright Whole:
A Principled Approach to Copyright Exceptions and Limitations, 5 U. OTTAWA
L. & TECH. J. 1, 22 (2008) (Can.) (contending that “[c]opyright rights should
not prevent governmental use in the public interest”).
471. See Max Planck Declaration on the Three-Step Test, supra note 455,
at 711–13 (reformulating practical applications of the three-step test).
472. Cf. Laurence R. Helfer, Karen J. Alter & M. Florencia Guerzovich, Islands of Effective International Adjudication: Constructing an Intellectual
Property Rule of Law in the Andean Community, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 2–4
(2009) (noting that the Andean Tribunal of Justice, an international court in
South America, has helped solidify appropriate IP laws); see also ACCESS TO
KNOWLEDGE IN AFRICA: THE ROLE OF COPYRIGHT (C. Armstrong et al. eds.,
2010); Karen J. Alter et al., Transplanting the European Court of Justice: The
Experience of the Andean Tribunal of Justice 19–23 (Duke Law Faculty Scholarship Paper 2458, 2012), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_
scholarship/2458.
473. Current Brazilian law already implements a provision on “transformative and incidental uses” while novel pending proposals could more aggressively expand this provision within the context of the three-step test. See
Paranaguá, supra note 177, at 29–42. However, the current Brazilian Government may retreat from the positions staked out by its predecessor. Pedro
Paranaguá, Brazil’s Copyright Reform–an update, PEDRO PARANAGUÁ (Apr.
19, 2011), http://pedroparanagua.net/2011/04/19/brazils-copyright-reform-an
-update/ (stating “[t]he whole work and progress [on copyright reform] of the
past 8 years undertaken under Lula’s government is at risk”); Pedro
Paranaguá, Inside Views: Brazil’s Copyright Reform: Schizophrenia?, IPWATCH (Feb. 8, 2011), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2011/02/08/inside-views
-brazils-copyright-reform-schizophrenia/ (questioning the viability of some pending reforms).
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codification of users’ rights at the international level.

III. ENABLING E-SCIENCE TO MANAGE ITS OWN
UPSTREAM RESEARCH ASSETS
So far, our focus on measures to make copyright and related laws more science friendly has operated on the premise that
publishers would continue to play their traditional role in the
process of disseminating research results. This very premise,
however, makes it unlikely that the legislative or judicial reforms outlined above are implementable within the OECD
countries in the near future, despite growing attention to the
conflict between intellectual property laws and the needs of sci475
ence in a digital age.
The lobbying power of publishers has never been greater.
Concerns about protecting the interests of the entertainment
and cultural industries continue to elicit stronger intellectual
property laws at both the national and international levels,
with little or no regard for their potentially deleterious effects
476
on scientific research or the provision of other public goods.
Whether reform efforts underway in some emerging economies
477
may create a countervailing trend is impossible to predict,
474. See generally Reichman, supra note 121 (noting the possibility of intellectual property institutions benefitting countries at varying levels of economic
development if developing countries lead, rather than follow, on the path to
reform).
475. But see HARGREAVES, supra note 26, at 43 (demanding relief for science as a fillip to economic growth); NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCE COMMITTEE ON THE IMPACT OF COPYRIGHT POLICY ON INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL
ERA, http://sites.nationalacademies.org/PGA/step/copyrightpolicy/index.htm (last
visited Jan. 23, 2012) (stating the goal of the Board is “to expand and improve
research on the impacts of copyright policy, particularly on innovation in the
digital environment”).
476. See supra notes 428–30, 446 (citing EC’s Enforcement Directive,
ACTA, SOPA, and FTAs). However, SOPA has stalled for the moment, and
there are also some other exceptions to this trend. In the EC, for example, see
Ritch, supra note 37, at 66–77. In the United States, sponsors of the Sabo Bill
would have placed all published articles resulting from publicly funded research results in the public domain, but this proposal has never moved forward. H.R. 2613, 108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003).
477. Cf. Amy Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case
Study of TRIPS Implementation in India’s Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CALIF. L.
REV. 1571 (2009); Rochelle Dreyfuss, The Role of India, China, Brazil and
Other Emerging Economies in Establishing Access Norms for Intellectual
Property and Intellectual Property Lawmaking 1–3 (Inst. for Int’l Law and
Justice, Working Paper 2009/5, Public Law Research Paper No. 09-53, 2009),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1442785 (discussing the role of developing nations in the larger context of developing intellectual property law); see
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but the benefits of such a trend—if it emerges—would likely
play out over a lengthy period, and might not extend, at best,
beyond certain regional alignments.
Science policy will, accordingly, have to evolve defensive
measures of its own in order to neutralize interference from the
default rules of copyright, contract, and database protection
laws as they stand. Scientists, in short, will increasingly have
to manage their own upstream research assets as global public
goods, sheltering them within a reinvigorated sharing ethos, in
the interests of a more productive downstream innovation system otherwise driven by the incentives of industrial property
478
laws.
As will be seen below, the scientific community, led by
many dedicated and visionary individuals and institutions, has
already taken steps to widen the choice of open distribution
outlets for scientific literature and data. These promising initiatives nonetheless remain hampered by the community’s continued reliance on publishing intermediaries. In this Part, we
first reevaluate the role that these intermediaries should play
under existing institutional constraints. We then ask if better
solutions are not likely to emerge from a change of paradigm, in
which the outsourced intermediaries are either downgraded or
abandoned altogether, open access modes of dissemination were
to take their place and the knowledge production and scholarly
communication functions were increasingly to be absorbed into
479
digitally integrated thematic research environments.
A. REASSESSING THE ROLE OF PUBLISHING INTERMEDIARIES
Until recently, the customary practice of the scientific
community was to rely almost entirely on external publishing
also Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Designing a Global Intellectual Property System Responsive to Change: The WTO, WIPO, and Beyond,
46 HOUS. L. REV. 1187, 1212 (2009) (remarking on emerging nations discovering different interest balancing methodologies than those in the developed
world); Reichman, supra note 121, at 1118–19 (noting the pressures developing countries face to mimic the legislation of other OECD countries and the
possibilities for exerting new leadership).
478. Maskus & Reichman, supra note 24; Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 2.
For applications to patented research inputs, see Lee, supra note 110, at 901
(arguing that upstream patents on research tools in the biomedical arena may
adversely affect downstream productivity).
479. Uhlir, supra note 250, at 83. See generally Jorge L. Contreras, Data
Sharing, Latency Variables, and Science Commons, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1601 (2011) (suggesting latency analysis and other design techniques be implemented to support the information commons).
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intermediaries, even though the bulk of published scientific re480
search would have been government-funded. In conformity
with this practice, authors of scientific articles normally assign
their copyrights to publishers, who are either commercial entities or learned societies and other not-for-profit scientific organ481
izations. As a result, it was publishers, rather than authors,
that initially determined the conditions for access to these
same articles and for reuse of the information and data they
482
contain. At the same time, authors benefit from the peerreview mechanisms many of these publishers manage, which
makes them reluctant to publish outside traditional, wellestablished or high impact outlets, when they have the choice.
1. Costs and Benefits of the Traditional Approach
Historically, the logic behind this custom was the need to
defray high front-end publishing costs and to perform laborious
tasks, such as typesetting and formatting, as well as the physi483
cal distribution of printed copies. A second factor was the
willingness of many scientific subcommunities to entrust
learned societies with the publication task, which in turn became a primary source of revenue for the societies whether they
actually performed the publishing service, or, increasingly in
recent years, outsourced it to a commercial publisher in return
for a share of the proceeds. Over time, the possibilities for profit
480. See, e.g., JOHN WILLINSKY, THE ACCESS PRINCIPLE: THE CASE FOR
OPEN ACCESS TO RESEARCH AND SCHOLARSHIP 2 (2006) (reporting that NIH
itself funds some 60,000 scientific papers per year); Contreras, supra note 479,
at 1652 (reporting that some “50,000 different scientific journals [were] in
print at the end of 2003, many of which are published by commercial entities
that charge significant subscription fees”).
481. See, e.g., Contreras, supra note 479, at 1652–55 (reporting that the
three largest publishers of scientific journals—Reed Elsevier (about 1800 titles), Taylor and Francis (about 1000 titles) and Springer Verlag (about 500
titles) together control about sixty percent of scientific research content).
482. See, e.g., Hilty, Copyright Law and Scientific Research, supra note 2,
at 326; Hilty, Five Lessons About Copyright, supra note 2, at 123–24. Professor
Hilty, among others, stresses that for-profit publishers tend to impose greater
restrictions on access and use than authors or the scientific community more
generally would deem desirable, given that the latter receives motivation
through reputation benefits that may accrue from unhindered diffusion. See
supra note 2 and accompanying text.
483. See Hilty, Five Lessons About Copyright, supra note 2, at 120–21 (discussing the decline of such high-end tasks with the rise of personal computer
programs). However, university presses absorbed these or similar functions
with respect to specialized books subject to market failure in the normal book
trade. Eugene Volokh, The Future of Books Related to the Law?, 108 MICH. L.
REV. 823, 838–40 (2010) (discussing markets and academic book publishing).
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have enticed commercial publishers to buy out the learned societies, although some commercial publishers do make continu484
ing payments.
485
Lately, scholars have challenged such logic, and some
have argued that the value added by such intermediaries has
486
reached diminishing returns. The once costly front-end publishing function has increasingly been reduced to desktop pub487
while the peer-review
lishing and automated formatting,
function, of great importance to the integrity of science, is performed gratis by scientists who themselves gain power, reputation, and advanced access to new developments from their vol488
untary labor. This built-in quid pro quo within the scientific
community has perpetuated the dominance of the proprietary
intermediaries, along with the practice of negotiating the sale
(now licensing) of subscriptions directly to libraries without inputs from users. Meanwhile, the supervisory or editorial role of
484. See Toby Miller, “Drowning in Information and Starving For
Knowledge”: 21st Century Scholarly Publishing, 1 INT’L J. COMM, 123, 125
(2007), available at http://ijoc.org/ojs/index.php/ijoc/article/viewFile/121/56
(“Since that time, the development of digital technologies has seen for-profit
[science] publishers proliferate, as the cost of entering the industry has diminished, and prices have continued to outstrip inflation . . . .”); Interview by Research Information Staff with Rene Olivieri, CEO, Blackwell Publ’g (Jan./Feb.
2005) available at http://www.researchinformation.info/features/feature.php?
feature_id=92 (stating that “[t]hree quarters of the top 200 and two-thirds of
the top 500 ISI-ranked titles are owned by societies or other non-profit organisations. The majority of these titles are self-published, but between a quarter
and a third are contracted out to another publisher”).
485. Among the many excellent analyses, too numerous to cite, see, for example, WILLINSKY, supra note 480; Nancy Kranich, Countering Enclosure: Reclaiming the Knowledge Commons, in KNOWLEDGE AS A COMMONS, supra note
10, at 85, 98 (noting the popularity of papers posted on open access databases
versus those not available on such databases); Peter Suber, Creating an Intellectual Commons through Open Access, in KNOWLEDGE AS A COMMONS, supra,
at 171, 185–86 (Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom eds., 2007) (noting the cancellation of expensive databases by libraries at Harvard, Cornell, Duke, and University of California in favor of open access platforms); see also Contreras, supra note 479, at 1652–55 (citing authorities).
486. See Hilty, Copyright Law and Scientific Research, supra note 2, at
326–27.
487. See, e.g., id. at 325–26 (noting that Internet-based web sources did
away with the need to produce tangible goods).
488. Even this traditional form of peer review is now under attack. Cf. Linda Hooper-Bui, A Gulf Science Blackout, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2010, at A21.
Note, however, that some journals pay scientists to conduct peer reviews of
articles. The Economic Case for Open Access in Academic Publishing, FREE
ACAD. RES. ASS’N (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.faraweek.org/?p=6 (“If a journal
is highly selective, it must pay for peer review of many articles for each article it
accepts.”).

1462

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[96:1362

the learned societies, with some exceptions, has diminished
over time, although the dependence of such societies on income
489
from publishing seems ironically to have increased.
This web of traditional practices and interests carries into
the digital age, even though digital networks offer repeated opportunities to break with the limits of the print model and
make whole new dimensions of publishing possible. What really
changes in the online environment are not the basic principles
490
of scientific collaboration, so much as the burdens and role of
publishing intermediaries in the sciences, who increasingly
may never publish a physical print copy at all.
This growing tendency to rely on online distribution in the
sciences has undermined prior balancing effects of the first sale
491
principle under traditional copyright law. For example, there
are fewer printed copies extractable from initial revenues and
then freely redistributed, and the subscription price per journal
492
may rise prohibitively. Even when printed copy distribution
continues, the role of publishing intermediaries’ in the online
environment changes radically, as they add less value to the
493
authors’ own research results and become online service pro489. Exceptions occur if the learned society maintains its own editorial
subsidiary, as occurs with the Journal of the American Medical Association
(JAMA). In Latin America, and probably most other developing countries, scientific journals are still published at universities. Universities in OECD countries have themselves massively entered the book publishing trade to overcome market failure attributable to commercial presses, while oddly
remaining aloof from the publication of scientific journals, with rare exceptions. See GLOBAL IP STRATEGIES FOR THE MICROBIAL RESEARCH COMMONS,
supra note 382 (Part III).
490. See, e.g., David, supra note 25, at 21 (describing the various ethos and
norms within various academic fields); Stodden, supra note 255, at 33 (finding
“public safeguards should also enable digital telecommunications networks to
link the providers of scienti•c and technical inputs in an endless research
commons”).
491. See, e.g., R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks, 44 B.C. L. REV. 577, 577–78 (2003) (discussing first-sale doctrine
and the effect of technology).
492. See, e.g., Contreras, supra note 479, at 1652–53 (discussing the cancellation of subscriptions by academic libraries due to rising costs); see also NAT’L
ACAD. OF SCIS. ET AL., ENSURING THE INTEGRITY, ACCESSIBILITY, AND STEWARDSHIP OF RESEARCH DATA IN THE DIGITAL AGE 78 (2009) (observing rise in
subscription prices for scientific, medical, and technical journals).
493. See, e.g., Hilty, Five Lessons About Copyright, supra note 2, at 123
(questioning the added value of electronic-only data compiled and formatted
by the researchers themselves); Hilty, Copyright Law and Scientific Research,
supra note 2, at 326–27 (indicating a lack of added value within the electronic
data management framework); MAX PLANCK RESPONSE TO EC GREEN PAPER,
supra note 383, at 5–6 (categorizing the divergent roles and interests of inter-
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viders whose primary contribution to authors is convenience.
Notwithstanding these changed conditions, the rules of
copyright law have simultaneously been extended to the digital
environment, and the protections available have been greatly
strengthened, as demonstrated earlier, in order to make the
online environment safe for the transmission of printed text.
Because scientific publishing has drifted along with this tide,
the full possibilities of digitally manipulating research results
for new scientific discoveries are hamstrung by the layers of protection inherited from these legal and institutional developments, and there is a pressing need to avoid the resulting harm
495
to science.
The open access movement is a major response to this challenge. Today, an ever-growing number of scientific journals are
496
published online, on a fully or partially open access basis,
although these are not yet always the most prestigious journals
497
in their respective fields. To the extent that the learned sociemediaries).
494. This characterization, among others, is of course hotly contested by
publishers who see themselves as indispensable pillars of the scientific endeavor that add considerable value to its research outputs, whereas less rigorous “open access” methods enable less deserving articles to be published. See
John Ochs, Am. Chem. Soc’y, ACS Submission to the National Academies’
Committee on the Impact of Copyright Policy on Innovation in the Digital Era,
Address Before the Board on Science, Technology and Policy 2–4 (Oct. 15,
2010) available at http://sites.nationalacademies.org/PGA/step/copyrightpolicy/
PGA_066845; see also Letter from STM, supra note 243 (extolling large
amounts STM publishers invest in digital technologies to benefit researchers).
In reality, not only have publishers sought to configure the online environment on the model of print media, they have also tried to subordinate the new
class of intermediaries that digital technology has generated, the Internet System Providers (ISPs), to their own ends, adding yet another layer of potential
barriers and transaction costs to the diffusion of research results. See, e.g.,
Okediji, supra note 51, at 116 (calling for meaningful fair use standards);
Okediji, supra note 196, at 349–50 (describing the process by which owners
used new technological advances to stake claims to previously noncopyrighted
material).
495. See, e.g., HARGREAVES, supra note 26 at 46–47; Kranich, supra note
485.
496. See, e.g., Contreras, supra note 479, at 1652–57; Lucie Guibault, Owning the Right to Open Up Access to Scientific Publications, in OPEN CONTENT
LICENSING: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 137, 137–67 (Lucie Guibault & Christina Angelopoulos eds., 2011). For empirical evidence in one major field, see
Uhlir, supra note 250, at 79–80 (summarizing evidence about microbiology
journals from GLOBAL IP STRATEGIES FOR THE MICROBIAL RESEARCH COMMONS, supra note 382).
497. Many of these journals are relatively new, while the ISI index (which
counts only citations) does not begin tracking impact until a journal has been
published for a five-year period. Moreover, some open access journals have
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ties themselves resist the drive for greater use of open access
modalities, their dependence on royalty streams from commercial publishers for scholarly pursuits and other activities may
explain their reluctance to change more than the economics of
publishing itself.
While the outsourcing of scientific journals to commercial
publishers may still make sense, despite an array of other options, there is a growing trend to subsidize the open access format, even in an otherwise commercial context, as part of the
publicly funded research process. The funding agencies, foundations, and universities that support specific research projects
may thus provide supplementary funds to pay the commercial
498
publisher a set fee in lieu of royalties or other compensation.
In such cases, the funders may—and increasingly will—set
499
open access terms as the quid pro quo of the subsidy itself.
Commercial publishers are increasingly disposed to allow this
option, and science funders have begun aggressively to insist on
500
it in some disciplines, although the sustainability of this approach obviously depends on the continued availability of financial resources for this purpose.
The point is that desktop-publishing techniques and online
transmission have made it technically (if not culturally) feasible to redefine the role of existing intermediaries who benefit
from research-hostile intellectual property laws and practices.
By the same token, once publicly funded research results are
achieved high impact in recent years. For pressures by the Harvard faculty
advisory council to “move prestige to open access [journals]” in order to offset
soaring subscription prices, see Faculty Advisory Council, Faculty Advisory
Council Memorandum on Journal Pricing, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, Apr. 17,
http://isites.harvard.edu/icb/icb.do?keyword=k77982&tabgroupid=icb
2012,
.tabgroup143448.
498. See, e.g., Contreras, supra note 479, at 1655–57.
499. Raym Crow, Developing an Institutionally-Funded Publishing Channel: Context and Considerations for Key Issues, ECOMMONS@CORNELL 10–11
(July 1, 2004), http://hdl.handle.net/1813/178; Research Funders’ Open Access
Policies, SHERPA, http://www.sherpa.ac.uk/juliet/index.php ( last visited July
29, 2011) (showing a number of research funders whose guidelines require
open access to funded research).
500. See Robert Terry & Robert Kiley, Open Access to the Research Literature: A Funder’s Perspective, in OPEN ACCESS: KEY STRATEGIC, TECHNICAL
AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS 101, 101–03 (Neil Jacobs ed., 2006); Open Access Policy, WELLCOME TRUST, http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/About-us/Policy/Policy-and
-position-statements/WTD002766.htm ( last visited Apr. 20, 2012); Policy on
Enhancing Public Access to Archived Publications Resulting from NIHFunded Research, 70 Fed. Reg. 6891-01 (Feb. 9, 2005), available at
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-05-022.html; see also
Contreras, supra note 479, at 1652–55.
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made available to the scientific community, with due respect
for attribution, it becomes logical to ask why scientists qua users should ever pay scientists qua authors, irrespective of what
the default rules of copyright and database laws provide to the
501
contrary.
2. Redefining the Role of Publishing Intermediaries under
Current Institutional Constraints
Given the diminished costs incurred by today’s intermediaries in the online environment, and the shrinking amount of
added value they actually contribute under modern condi502
tions, one must logically ask what entitlements they should
be allowed to claim for secondary uses of published scientific
research results in either the print media or the online environment, and how such claims should be implemented when
recognized. At bottom, what science publishers provide in the
online environment are measures to maintain quality assurance and control, marketing and distribution, plus certain
technical services that the research community could provide
for itself, yet typically does not in rich countries, perhaps because of inertia. The reputational benefits that are of primary
importance for authors accrue from the peer-review function
that is largely provided gratis by other reputable scientists.
The intermediaries’ utility stems from maintaining and updating electronic collections, possibly also from electronic indexing
of these collections, and possibly from the provision of other
technical services needed to make embedded data and infor503
mation available upon request.
501. As noted earlier, the scientists’ incentives flow almost exclusively from
reputational benefits. See Davis & Connolly, supra note 17 (noting researchers’ reluctance to release results before publication); Jordan, supra note 17
(noting the importance of publication and priority for scientists).
502. As providers of digital services, publishing intermediaries increasingly
resemble the Red Hat Corporation, which provides services to users of Linux
Software but does not control the rights to Linux. Robert Young, Giving it
Away: How Red Hat Software Stumbled Across a New Economic Model and
Helped Improve an Industry, 4(3) J. ELEC. PUB. (Mar. 1999), available at
http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=jep;view=text;rgn=main;idno=
3336451.0004.304; see also BITS OF POWER, supra note 36, at 111–13. However, the science publishers insist that they actually contribute more services
than are identified in the text and at considerably greater investment costs
than are recognized in the text. See, e.g., Letter from STM, supra note 244.
The question is whether these investments actually benefit research science or
merely ensure greater profits to publishers under restrictive copyright laws.
503. See Young, supra note 502; Letter from STM, supra note 244. But cf.
BITS OF POWER, supra note 36, at 111–13 (discussing the ways in which the
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Although science publishers must necessarily charge for
these services, funding agencies should, and increasingly do,
ensure that government-funded research results remain freely
available in public or private repositories, so that to defray these costs, users could perform the needed technical services on
504
their own. Such a policy also serves to attenuate the problems
of sole-source providers, who monopolize public science and can
pose serious challenges for digitally integrated scientific re505
search.
Recognizing that publishers must charge for their technical
services need not extend to endowing them with exclusive
rights to downstream uses or reuses of the scientific product
they make available. On the contrary, the proprietary restrictions that such rights enable intermediaries to impose in
the name of authors’ rights, without any palpable authorial
contribution, should be swept away as inconsistent with both
the needs of science and the principles of sound exceptions to
copyright and database laws as expounded above.
Because publishers of scientific journals depend, in the
first instance, on contractual relationships with the learned societies (or other sponsors of academic journals), these regulatory adjustments can be achieved by contract, without need of
506
legislation. For example, institutional mandates can restrict
the transfer of copyrights in publicly funded research results
price imposed by private intermediaries for these services is “countercultural”
to scientific communities in which “exchange is not monetized but depends on
social norms specifying expected and well-understood levels of contribution”).
504. See HARGREAVES, supra note 26; Stodden, supra note 255 (discussing
NSF Guidelines, Creative Commons and Science Commons licensing and proposing a new standard contractual template of her own); Michael W. Carroll,
Complying with the National Institutes of Health Public Access Policy: Copyright Considerations and Options, SPARC/SCIENCE COMMONS/A-RL White
Paper (Feb. 2008), available at http://www.arl.org/sparc/bm~doc/NIH_
Copyright_v1.pdf; US Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Quick Facts About The
NIH Public Access Policy, PUB. ACCESS NIH (Mar. 2009), http://publicaccess
.nih.gov/Public_Access_Brochure.pdf.
505. See, e.g., HARGREAVES, supra note 26; Reichman & Uhlir, supra note
258, at 799–812.
506. For example, universities and publishers have negotiated six to twelve
month embargo periods giving the latter a term of exclusivity before articles
are deposited in open access repositories. See, e.g., Contreras, supra note 479,
at 1616, 1654 ( labeling this practice as “knowledge latency”). For a recent
analysis, see Jorge L. Contreras, Wait for it . . . Commons, Copyright, and the
Private (Re)ordering of Scientific Publishing 37–38 (Working Paper, Mar. 4,
2012),
available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2015885 ( proposing that scientific authors grant publishers a 1-year license to
recoup costs and make a profit).
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and require that such results be made available in appropriate
repositories. Until this transformation of the current publishing model occurs, however, funders of scientific research—
whether government agencies, foundations, or academic institutions—should insist on open access publishing conditions as
507
part of the grant-making process.
So long as the subscription model is preserved, intermediaries whose services are deemed of value to the relevant scientific communities should thus be required to allow scientists to
make any and all needed research uses of published scientific
articles, including full digital empowerment for uses of automated knowledge discovery tools, computational tools, and the
like, without need for express permission, in exchange for fixed
compensatory charges built into the online subscription price.
That price could be tiered to reflect the for-profit nature of a
subscribing entity, but it should never be calculated on a payper-article basis or the like.
Intermediaries would then be recognized for what they are,
i.e., information brokers, and permissible charges would be negotiated on a reasonableness basis, one for example resembling
the virtual-market criteria proposed by the Max Planck Insti508
tute. In this context, however, we stress that the “market” for
published scientific articles is already an artificial construct to
begin with, built more on captured products than on verifiably
509
value-adding services, and increasingly sustained by compromise embargo periods following publication before some ar510
ticles are deposited in open access repositories.
511
Under such a contractually reconstructed regime, scientists should have a right to use digitally provided content for
any research purpose, including both personal use and redistribution, subject to the above-mentioned negotiated-service
charges to cover the costs of delivery and maintenance. Disputes over the reasonableness of costs should not bar access to
the use of these resources, but would have to be settled offline
507. See infra Section IV.B.
508. See MAX PLANCK RESPONSE TO EC GREEN PAPER, supra note 383, at
10–11; see also Hilty, Copyright Law and Scientific Research, supra note 2, at
315, 331–35 (elaborating the need for a response to the “prohibitive conditions
of access and use” created by intermediaries).
509. See Uhlir, supra note 250; see also Reichman & Uhlir, Database Protection, supra note 258 at 796–869 (discussing the commodification of data and
fears of its effects on science).
510. See, e.g., Contreras, supra note 479, at 1616, 1654.
511. Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 2.
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by mediation, arbitration or, as a last resort, litigation. Resort to collection societies could then be avoided precisely because there would be no need to monitor actual use for payment
purposes.
Only the actual costs of the intermediaries’ brokerage services would need to be taken into account, along with a negoti513
ated surcharge for profit. All parties should understand that
outer limits on the aggregate online service charges necessarily
follow from the fact that taxpayers largely support the entire enterprise; from the need to conserve scarce resources for scientific
investigation; and from the implicit threat that, if intermediaries
refuse to cooperate, the funders themselves could support alternative arrangements, like those discussed below, including some
514
institutionally organized not-for-profit providers.
In fact, the movement to implement open access scholarly
journals has rapidly expanded in the past decade, with over
515
7500 journals currently operating on this basis. Under this approach, authors, research funders, and institutions (or some
combination thereof) cover the costs of publication. Absent such
an approach, care must be taken to avoid fostering sole-source
512. In practice, these prices could perhaps be set via negotiations between
funding agencies, scientific subcommunities, and intermediaries, with a baseline open access proviso.
513. Any such negotiations must take into account the ways in which open
access publishing itself is funded, including author pays, research funder pays
or institution pays models. See, e.g., INT’L COUNCIL FOR SCI.: COMMITTEE ON
DATA FOR SCI. AND TECH., http://www.codata.org ( last visited Apr. 20, 2012);
Sponsoring Consortium for Open Access Publishing in Particle Physics,
3
SCOAP , http://scoap3.org ( last visited Apr. 20, 2012); Jet Propulsion Lab.:
Cal. Inst. of Tech., SCI FLO NETWORK, http://sciflo.jpl.nasa.gov/SciFloWiki/
FrontPage ( last visited Apr. 20, 2012).
514. See infra Parts IV.B & C. For-profit intermediaries may require some
protection from copyright law and unfair competition law in order to prohibit
wholesale duplication of an existing proprietary compilation. But such
measures should not impede good-faith competitors from accessing public repositories and starting up comparable endeavors of their own, especially if
these endeavors add new value to preexisting information. That, indeed, is the
true thrust of the “thin copyright” doctrine. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). In that event, the negotiations under the contractual setup would presumably determine whose services were of value at
what prices to the relevant subcommunities. In our opinion, however, reliance
on not-for-profit intermediaries is always the preferable option. In that event,
the negotiations under the contractual set up would presumably determine
whose services were of value at what prices to the relevant subcommunities.
515. For a browsable directory of such journals, see DIRECTORY OF OPEN
ACCESS JOURNALS, http://www.doaj.org ( last visited Jan. 3, 2012); see also
NAT’L FED’N OF ADVANCED INFO. SERVICES, http://www.nfais.org ( last visited
Jan. 25, 2012).
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monopolies over unsubstitutable scientific materials that can
never realistically be regenerated or otherwise readily obtained
516
from public repositories.
B. FUNDERS’ ABILITY TO CONTRACTUALLY REGULATE ACCESS,
USE, AND REUSE OF SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE AND DATA
Implicit in the foregoing analysis is the premise that most
published scientific research results, at least in OECD countries, will have been funded largely by governments or nonprofit foundations. These entities have the power to impose conditions on use and reuse of the research results they fund, at
517
least with respect to literature and data.
For example, governments can dedicate governmentgenerated work to the public domain, as occurs in the United
518
States. Funding agencies can mandate the deposit of publications in open access journals or, at least, in open access reposi519
tories, as is happening ever more frequently in both the United States and the European Union. They can even impose
analogs to fair use and to other codified limitations and excep520
tions by contract, which both publishers and individual scien516. See Hilty, Copyright Law and Scientific Research, supra note 2, at
353; MAX PLANCK RESPONSE TO EC GREEN PAPER, supra note 383, at 14–16.
See generally BITS OF POWER, supra note 36 (discussing the impact that
strengthened protection of private databases could have on the public-good uses of scientific data).
517. See, e.g., Contreras, supra note 479, at 1641–57 (examining steps taken by the NIH and Department of Energy to ensure that the output of the
Human Genome Project was released to the public); Reichman & Uhlir, supra
note 2, at 331–51 (discussing the formal and informal means by which institutions can shape the use of government-funded data). Patented research results
would, of course, be subject to the Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2006
& Supp. III 2009). Given the likely pushback from publishers and learned societies, however, the extent to which funding agencies would fully exercise this
power remains to be seen.
518. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2006); see also supra note 36 and accompanying text.
For similar efforts underway in the European Union, see Miriam Bitton, Implementing the Public Sector Information Directive, 34 E.I.P.R. 75, 75–86
(2012).
519. See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 504, at 2–3 (discussing NIH’s mandatory
policy of public accessibility); Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 2, at 331 (same);
Stodden, supra note 255, at 9 (same); see also Lee, supra note 110, at 963–65
(comparing the freedom of states to regulate the public accessibility of patents
as opposed to that of the NIH and the California Institute for Regenerative
Medicine).
520. See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 504, at 10–16 (discussing Science Commons licenses); Stodden, supra note 255, at 20–25 ( proposing a Reproducible
Research Standard to ensure attribution and facilitate the sharing of scientific
works).
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tists, as grantees, have to respect, especially if they wished to
qualify for future grants. Funders can also support or reinforce
self-archiving practices, and they increasingly provide for the
521
costs of open access publishing in their grants.
Besides building open access provisions into their research
grants, funding agencies can support the formation of digitally
integrated research commons to serve the needs of diverse
522
Universities can lend their own
thematic communities.
523
weight to all these initiatives, and many have established
open repositories for their employees’ scholarly works. Individual scientists can adopt existing Creative Commons and Sci524
ence Commons licenses when publishing their works. Innovative proposals that go even farther, such as Victoria Stodden’s
proposed Reproducible Research Standard, should also be test525
ed and perfected.
The common feature of these and other initiatives is that
relevant information is made openly and freely available in digital format and online. Through many of these initiatives, material is made available either under suitably reduced proprie526
tary terms and conditions set out in permissive licenses (e.g.,
527
the GNU licenses for open source software, or Creative Com528
mons licenses for open access journals or for some works in
529
open repositories), or it will have entered the public domain.
521. See, e.g., Contreras, supra note 250, at 1653–54, 1656.
522. See Uhlir, supra note 479. For examples, see GLOBAL IP STRATEGIES
FOR THE MICROBIAL RESEARCH COMMONS, supra note 382.
523. See, e.g., Stodden, supra note 255, at 48–49; Faculty Advisory Council,
supra note 497 (describing efforts by Harvard to reduce subscription costs).
524. See Mia Garlick, A Review of Creative Commons and Science Commons, 40(5) EDUCAUSE REV., Sept./Oct. 2005, at 78–79; see also Niva ElkinKoren, Exploring Creative Commons: A Skeptical View of a Worthy Pursuit, in
THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN INFORMATION LAW 325, 329–31 (Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006).
525. See Stodden, supra note 255, at 36–42; see also Guibault, supra note
496; Contreras, supra note 506 ( proposing 1-year license for publishers’ subscription).
526. For an overview of such permissive licensing approaches spanning all
information types, see Lawrence Liang, Guide to Open Content Licenses
(2004), http://www.theartgalleryofknoxville.com/ocl_v1.2.pdf.
527. See GNU, http://www.gnu.org/ ( last visited Jan. 3, 2012).
528. See supra notes 345, 492 and accompanying text.
529. See generally BOYLE, supra note 3 (illustrating several ways in which
works enter the public domain). Apart from overt decisions to abandon copyright protection, information enters the public domain when it meets the following conditions: (1) the information is not copyrightable, such as factual
compilations or data sets that lack creativity and originality in their selection
and arrangement; (2) the information is produced by a government that does
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Under other mechanisms, such as the delayed open availability
option, the works retain full copyright protection, but eventually become freely and openly accessible, at least on a read-only
530
basis.
Taken together, these activities are part of the emerging
broader movement in support of both formal and informal peer
production and dissemination of publicly funded scientific (and
other) information in a globally distributed, voluntary, and
531
open networked environment:
[They] are based on principles that reflect the cooperative ethos that
traditionally has imbued much of [the] academic and government (civilian) research agencies; their norms and governance mechanisms
may be characterized as those of “public scientific information commons,” rather than of a market system based upon proprietary data
532
and information.

How far these open access initiatives can be carried remains to be seen. The potential unwillingness of intermediaries
or grantees to accept such contractual templates, in addition to
intrinsic constraints on funders’ abilities to defray the costs of
such institutional arrangements over time, effectively limit the
533
regulatory powers of funders to achieve these objectives. With
respect to grantees, a requirement to publish only in open access journals or only under Creative Commons or Science

not apply copyright to its own works (e.g., the U.S. federal government); or (3)
the statutory period of intellectual property protection has expired, which in
many jurisdictions now is the life of the author plus 70 years.
530. See, e.g., Contreras, supra note 479, at 1653–54.
531. BENKLER, supra note 9, at 2 (discussing the role this movement has
played in creating “new opportunities for how we make and exchange information, knowledge, and culture”); Elinor Ostrom & Charlotte Hess, A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge Commons, in KNOWLEDGE AS A COMMONS,
supra note 10, at 41, 41–82; Michael J. Madison et al., Constructing Commons
in the Cultural Environment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 657, 669–74 (2010).
532. Paul A. David & Paul F. Uhlir, Creating the Information Commons for
e-Science: Toward Institutional Policies and Guidelines for Action, CODATA
NEWSLETTER 91 (Int’l Council for Sci., Paris, France), July 2005, at 1; see also
BENKLER, supra note 9, at 2 (noting that this broader movement has “increased the role of nonmarket and nonproprietary production”). For governance issues, see GLOBAL IP STRATEGIES FOR THE MICROBIAL RESEARCH COMMONS, supra note 382 (Part IV).
533. See Terry & Kiley, supra note 500, at 106–08 (arguing that open access initiatives are sustainable). The extent to which funders actions with regard to copyrighted literature (and data) might or might not be limited by the
Bayh-Dole Act depends on how broadly one interprets that Act. Cf Arti K. Rai
& Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine,
66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 293 (2003) (discussing the limits the BayhDole Act imposes on funders’ ability to oversee the use of patents by grantees).
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534

could hinder publication in some high
Commons licenses
prestige, peer-reviewed journals and breed resistance from
leading members of the relevant scientific communities.
Whether funding agencies, and the research community itself,
can persuade these journals to become more open remains to be
seen, but the evidence suggests that there is considerable mo535
mentum in that direction.
C. INTEGRATING THE INTERMEDIARIES’ FUNCTIONS INTO
TRANSNATIONAL DIGITAL KNOWLEDGE ENVIRONMENTS
Aggressive resort to open access licensing conditions espoused by funders could, but not necessarily would, persuade
some private publishers to abandon the field. This has not happened so far because funders are increasingly willing to enable
grantees to purchase open access conditions from publishers at
prices that appear to remain profitable for them. Pressure from
funders can thus change the commercial publishers’ business
model and persuade some to allow scientists to purchase open
access rights and even make a profitable business out of selling
such rights at about the same costs as publishing in an open
536
access journal. Unfortunately, the percentage of grantees that
actually opt to exercise this option, when not otherwise manda537
tory, still remains relatively small.
Although reliance on intermediaries is deeply entrenched
in the system, science policymakers might eventually want to
reevaluate the costs and benefits of maintaining customary relationships with them and consider alternative strategies for
disseminating research results. Such an exercise could, in particular, focus attention on the advantages of absorbing the publishing function, when feasible, into integrated, open-knowledge
538
environments—as one study underway now advocates.
534. See supra notes 345, 492.
535. See, e.g., Contreras, supra note 479, at 1647–48, 1652–57 (discussing
the Budapest, Bethesda, and Berlin declarations, and similar initiatives).
536. David J. Brown, Repositories and Journals: Are They in Conflict? A
Literature Review of Relevant Literature, ASLIB PROCEEDINGS, Mar. 1, 2010,
at 116, available at 2010 WLNR 25881660 (noting that Springer Science and
Business Media recently acquired BioMed Central).
537. See Contreras, supra note 479.
538. See Uhlir, supra note 250, at 83–87 (summarizing Open Knowledge
Environments (OKEs) thesis, with illustrative examples developed in GLOBAL
IP STRATEGIES FOR THE MICROBIAL RESEARCH COMMONS, supra note 382,
Part III). Obviously, much depends on the availability of funding. For the view
that such funding would yield greater benefits per research dollar than the
present system, see Paul F. Uhlir et al., Measuring the Social and Economic
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Once anchored in appropriate institutions and freed from
the legal and commercial fetters of both the professional societies and the commercial publishers, the very object of the publishing exercise could dramatically change. No longer would it
be bound by obsolete concepts of the print model, which treat
each monthly installment as a discrete legal and substantive
unit. Rather, every new collection of research results made
available to the relevant thematic community could enrich and
expand an ever growing, digitally integrated database of aggregate scientific results.
Each of these thematically organized repositories, in turn,
would remain fully open to data mining, manipulation, and
other automated knowledge discovery tools, with full respect
for reputational benefits but without palpable legal or economic
539
constraints. Moreover, digital portals could link the formally
published literature with so called grey literature, i.e., conference proceedings, and the like (which are not peer-reviewed).
This aggregate resource can then be further linked with other
data and relevant information bearing on all aspects of the science, including voluntarily contributed data pertaining to re540
search of interest to a given thematic community.
While this is not the place to fully elaborate on this concept, the astounding creative possibilities of unlimited, fully integrated knowledge hubs along these lines clearly dwarfs the
gains that could be made from incremental or even structural
reforms of the global intellectual property system. We believe
that these or similar initiatives are essential for the progress of
both science and culture, and would especially be needed to implement the sweeping new research vision that the National
541
Research Council recently put forward for the life sciences.
Support for these and other initiatives could further encourage publishing intermediaries either to accommodate the
Costs and Benefits of Public Sector Information Online: A Review of the Literature and Future Directions, in NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE SOCIOECONOMIC EFFECTS OF PUBLIC SECTOR INFORMATION ON DIGITAL NETWORKS: TOWARD
A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF DIFFERENT ACCESS AND REUSE POLICIES 61, 62
(Paul F. Uhlir ed., 2009) ( listing reports on benefits of open access for publicly
funded data and literature).
539. See Uhlir, supra note 250, at 83–87.
540. See id. at 83–89 (finding that the “logical response is to cut the Gordian knot by retaining ownership and control of all knowledge assets produced
by the relevant research community with public funding within the science
framework itself, rather than assigning them to external publishing intermediaries”).
541. A NEW BIOLOGY, supra note 4.
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open access movement or leave the scientific publishing business. By the same token, digitally integrated knowledge hubs
could greatly magnify the creative and educational powers of
542
universities and other analogous research institutions.
For all these reasons, we question the customary practices
of wholesale reliance on external-information brokers in a scientific world where it has become conceptually and technically
feasible to link a given thematic community’s essentialknowledge resources into a seamless, digitally integrated network of inputs and outputs that remains open to all the con543
tributors to any given research commons or semi-commons.
The scientific community, now operating within a hostile intellectual property environment, faces the challenge of organizing
and managing these knowledge assets with a view to establish544
ing a broad upstream research space in which its own contractually imposed rules could apply without compromising the
possibilities for commercial exploitation of downstream applica545
tions of the resulting research results.
Nevertheless, the long-term drive to achieve these science
policy goals should not obscure nor detract from the pressing
short-term need to make the global intellectual property system more science-friendly than at present, along the lines we
have explored. Legislatures concerned about the future of sci-

542. In principle, universities themselves could consider reintegrating
some academic journals into their publishing operations. Alternatively, one or
more universities could jointly produce the journals in question, with direct
support of the funding agencies. In so doing, they could integrate the skills
and services of different departments, such as the relevant scientific groups,
the computer and technical service departments, and especially library services, which could coordinate and manage editorial and publishing functions.
Students and postdoctoral candidates could similarly be co-involved at all levels as part of their educational experience, a phenomenon that routinely occurs in U.S. law schools. University librarians so far exposed to these proposals have expressed a positive response. See, e.g., Charlotte Hess,
Institutional Design and Governance in the Microbial Research Commons, in
DESIGNING THE MICROBIAL RESEARCH COMMONS, supra note 255, 177, 184;
Interview with Richard Danner, Duke Univ. Sch. of Law librarian in Durham,
N.C. However, we think more is to be gained from thematically organized digitally integrated knowledge hubs, as indicated in the text. See generally
REICHMAN ET AL., GLOBAL IP STRATEGIES FOR THE MICROBIAL RESEARCH
COMMONS, supra note 382 (Part III) (discussing the concept of “Open
Knowledge Environment”); Uhlir, supra note 250, at 83–89 (discussing the
“open knowledge environment”).
543. See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 10, at 123–44.
544. See A NEW BIOLOGY, supra note 4.
545. Cf. Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 2.
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entific research in the digital online environment should take
steps now to reconfigure a legal domain that has become increasingly inimical to the needs of the scientific research community. Policymakers in OECD countries should join with key
national institutions, such as the U.S. National Institutes of
Health, in affirmatively promoting open access to scientific
publications.
To this end, the relevant government agencies and private
foundations should become funders of first resort for scientific
publications and for the institutional repositories and ecommons in which those publications can be collected. Policymakers should likewise support the process of making government-funded research publications widely available through selfarchiving and institutional archiving, with the fewest possible
547
restrictions on use or reuse of published results.
FINAL OBSERVATIONS
Scientific discoveries depend upon access to a robust public
domain, in which preexisting discoveries become the building
548
blocks of future investigations and existing information and
data become inputs to future-knowledge assets that cannot be
549
generated nearly as effectively without them. However, the
recent tendency to elevate standards of intellectual property
protection at both the national and international levels has
been motivated largely by interests seeking to protect existing
knowledge goods, destined mainly for end users, with insufficient regard for the social costs and burdens imposed on future
creation and innovation, and with a corresponding bevy of new
550
problems that hinder both objectives. This movement has
generated thickets of intellectual property rights, high transac546. See, e.g., EC Green Paper, supra note 332. See generally Ritch, supra
note 37, at 136–81.
547. For a positive step in this direction, see the U.K. government’s response to the Hargreaves Review’s call for a broad research exemption that
cannot be overridden by contract, see Chambers, supra note 318, at 600; see
also HARGREAVES, supra note 26.
548. See, e.g., BOYLE, supra note 3, at 160–78; David, supra note 25, at 16;
David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
147, 165 (1981).
549. See Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 2, at 332.
550. See, e.g., MOWERY ET AL., supra note 1, at 184 –92; David, supra note
25, at 27–28; Sampat, Patenting and US Academic Research, supra note 330,
at 784–86; see also Maskus & Reichman, supra note 24, at 20–23 (discussing
the imbalance in modern intellectual property regimes resulting from a “prolonged effort to strengthen the protection of investors”).
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tion and litigation costs, receding access to the public domain,
growing anticommons effects, and the stifling of privileged uses
by means of technological protection measures and digital
551
rights management tools in the online environment.
In this Article, we have traced the contradictory measures
in copyright and related laws that have increasingly impeded
upstream scientific investigation and thereby complicated the
exploitation of downstream applications of research results. By
over-extending the protection of scientific information and data,
these laws have made it harder for all investigators to build
upon, rework, or further elaborate upon the contributions of
others and to harness the astounding research potential of digital information technologies to their fullest extent.
From this perspective, the worldwide copyright system as
it has lately evolved can hardly be said to benefit scientists qua
authors. On the contrary, authors and compilers of scientific
works and databases are still often obliged to surrender their
outputs to publishers from whom they must buy back the very
information and data they supplied (often at government expense). Rather than opening new vistas for producers of research data and information—as occurred after the printing
press was invented and at regular intervals of technological
change since then—copyright and database protection laws in
the digitally networked environment seem bent on closing off
new horizons in order to defend old business models for which
552
publishers have sought few alternatives.
A. BRIDGING THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN PRIVATE RIGHTS AND
PUBLIC SCIENCE
Given the opportunities that digital networks and automated knowledge discovery tools make possible, the logical goal
for policymakers is to remove obstacles that the existing legal
infrastructure poses for twenty-first century scientific endeavor. In this context, copyright law’s limitations and exceptions
have an important role to play. They are not some nuisancelike sideshow of demands to be appeased as narrowly as possible. Rather, they should at least be viewed as a form of users’

551. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 3 (dealing with patents); HELLER,
supra note 3, at 1–22; see also Geller, supra note 357, at 166 (“Copyright law is
in crisis . . . . [ I ]t has become more and more complicated and less and less reliable, while losing legitimacy.”); Lunney, supra note 96, at 869–92.
552. See HARGREAVES, supra note 26, at 41–42.
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553

rights, which help to supply inputs for scientific discoveries,
innovation, and trade that are as indispensable to the dynamic
production and dissemination of knowledge goods as suitably
crafted incentives for authors and inventors.
A fundamental change of attitudes would be necessary. A
top priority for policymakers should be to avoid generating legally established fiefdoms, in which a few private rights holders
can combine the bulk of all scientific data and literature into
monopolized repositories where access and use are restricted
and controlled from the top down, and in which the
commodified inputs of publicly funded science are distributed
on a proprietary basis. Failure to achieve such a shift in priorities places digital and computational science in developed countries at risk of becoming progressively entangled in “copyright
554
thickets” precisely at a time when these countries face stiff
challenges from the growing scientific and technological capaci555
ties of the emerging economies.
Despite the complexity of these issues, and the countervailing pressures of a powerful publishers’ lobby, policymakers
need to resist the temptation to leave copyright and database
protection laws where they stand or to strengthen them further
in keeping with present trends. Few decisions could generate so
many unintended harmful consequences. If these laws continue
to impede e-science in the ways portrayed above, the much
vaunted comparative advantages that industry and government spokespersons associate with maximalist levels of intellectual property protection could give way to private-sector
strangleholds on the most promising avenues of public digital
553. See, e.g., HUGENHOLTZ & OKEDIJI, supra note 159, at 16–27; see also
Abraham Drassinower, Authorship as Public Access: On the Specificity of Copyright vis-à-vis Patent and Trademark, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 199, 199–204
(2008) (arguing that users’ rights, instead of simply serving as an exception to
copyright, are so integral to the modern copyright system that they entail a
redefinition of the wrongs copyright laws were meant to address).
554. In patent law, such thickets had threatened to undermine information
science and such frontier sciences as synthetic biology at least until the U.S.
Supreme Court intervened to readjust the most fundamental design principles
of preexisting patent law itself. See, e.g., Arti K. Rai & James Boyle, Synthetic
Biology: Caught Between Property Rights, the Public Domain, and the Commons, 5 PLOS BIOL. e58, 390 (2007); Arti K. Rai & Sapna Kumar, Synthetic
Biology: The Intellectual Property Puzzle, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1745, 1756–58
(2007).
555. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 477; Peter Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements
and China’s Global Intellectual Property Strategy, in IP ASPECTS OF FREE
TRADE AGREEMENTS IN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION 2–4 (Christoph Antons &
Reto M. Hilty eds., 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1333431.
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research, with the predictable result of killing the goose that
556
lays the golden eggs.
B. RECONCILING THE GOALS OF INNOVATION POLICY WITH THE
NEEDS OF SCIENCE POLICY
In retrospect, it seems ironic that just as new technologies
were producing significant breakthroughs in scientific research,
and as digitally networked sites and other information technologies began empowering new models of collaborative investigation, innovation policies that should embrace these developments were instead using intellectual property rights to control
or, in many cases, impede them. The successive use of public
and private law to preclude access to basic knowledge resources, as well as knowledge-based goods, has increased the
political and social burden of an intellectual property regime
that, in theory, remains dedicated to the public interest of society at large.
Meanwhile, within the public-science community, efforts
are underway to promote the formation of contractually constructed research commons (or semi-commons, as the case may
be), that can flourish in an otherwise highly protectionist intellectual property environment. If successful, the resulting infrastructure could help to maintain a steady flow of downstream
research products and socially beneficial commercial applications that do respond positively to the incentives of intellectual
557
property rights. Given this transnational movement, what
both the European Union and United States require is a longterm policy perspective that discriminates between the needs of
the scientific community, operating within an emerging research commons that is increasingly capable of managing and
integrating its own supplies of data and information, and the
needs of the downstream technology sectors, which depend on
the traditional incentives of intellectual property law to trans558
late scientific discoveries into commercial applications.
556. For farsighted comments in this regard, see Tilman Lüder, Remarks
at the Workshop on Creation and Innovation, Seventeenth Annual Fordham
Intellectual Property Law Institute Conference, Cambridge, United Kingdom
(Apr. 15–16, 2009) (advocating urgent reforms of copyright law’s limitations
and exceptions to meet needs of digital and computational science).
557. See, e.g., BENKLER, supra note 9, at 122–27; BRETT M. FRISCHMAN,
INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED RESOURCES (2012).
558. Cf. Arti K. Rai et al., Pathways Across the Valley of Death: Novel Intellectual Property Strategies for Accelerated Drug Discovery, 8 YALE J. HEALTH
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1 (2008) (articulating a multi-firm, public and private col-
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The object is to avoid pushing the exclusive rights that
primarily govern those downstream incentives deep into the
realm of basic science, where they will fracture and balkanize
559
the research commons. Needed instead are measures that
broaden the research commons and enable it to operate its
computational tools in digitally integrated, field-specific communities that span the world, smoothly and without disruption
from domestic toll collectors waiving IP stop signs.
These projects will require more than tinkering at the edges of copyright law. They will depend on some overall vision, a
willingness to remove obstacles to modern research methods,
and a determination to fund the necessary operations. Reforms
on this scale will entail more than recognition of “users’
560
rights,” which denote important cultural interests and the
public enrichment that ensues from access to literary and artistic works in general. Where science is concerned, information
and data function as inputs to the process of discovery and
thereby constitute an essential ingredient of future scientific
progress.
Exclusive intellectual property rights do not provide the
561
appropriate set of incentives in this upstream research space.
Policymakers should accordingly take pains to ensure that domestic and international intellectual property laws no longer
undermine or impede the most promising opportunities that
automated knowledge discover tools now make possible. These
laboration model for research in the field of medicinal drug discovery).
559. See, e.g., Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, A Framework for Analyzing
the Knowledge Commons, in KNOWLEDGE AS A COMMONS, supra note 10, at 41,
41–82; Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Introduction: An Overview of the
Knowledge Commons, in KNOWLEDGE AS A COMMONS, supra, at 3, 3–26; see
also Jerome H. Reichman, How Trade Secrecy Law Generates a Natural
Semicommons of Applied Industrial Know-How, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF
TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 185, 185–201
(Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2011).
560. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS—Round II: Should Users
Strike Back?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 21 (2004) (considering the question of how a
system with a background rule of proprietary rights should be structured to
recognize positive users’ rights).
561. However, liability rules may resolve many conflicts between incentives and user research needs that otherwise seem intractable. See, e.g., Rai et
al., supra note 558, at 25–27; Jerome H. Reichman, A Compensatory Liability
Regime to Promote the Exchange of Microbial Genetic Resources for Research
and Benefit Sharing, in DESIGNING THE MICROBIAL RESEARCH COMMONS:
PROCEEDINGS OF AN INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP, supra note 479, at 43, 43–53;
Reichman, supra note284, at 185–200; see also ROSA CASTRO BERNIERS, EX
POST LIABILITY RULES IN MODERN PATENT LAW 47–56 (2010) (summarizing
arguments for and against liability rules in patent law).
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tools are critical for addressing the most pressing social and
environmental challenges of our time.
Making the internet safe for publishers of print media
should no longer justify hindering the aggregation of scientific
information and data, or the uses of digitally integrated research methods capable of analyzing them on a global scale.
Rather, the task is to reconcile the historical values of intellectual property law with the modalities of a digital age, in order
to reinforce the needs of scientific investigators operating under
twenty-first century conditions, and to stimulate maximum
public welfare payoffs from their new technological tools.

